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Alle rechten voorbehouden. Behoudens de door de Auteurswet 1912 gestelde uitzonde-
ringen, mag niets uit deze uitgave worden verveelvoudigd (waaronder begrepen het 
opslaan in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand) of openbaar gemaakt, op welke 
wijze dan ook, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. De bij 
toepassing van artikel 16B en 17 Auteurswet 1912 wettelijk verschuldigde vergoedingen 
wegens fotokopiëren, dienen te worden voldaan aan de Stichting Reprorecht. Voor het 
overnemen van een gedeelte van deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere 
compilatiewerken op grond van artikel 16 Auteurswet 1912 dient men zich tevoren tot 
de uitgever te wenden. Hoewel aan de totstandkoming van deze uitgave de uiterste 
zorg is besteed, aanvaarden de auteur(s), redacteur(en) en uitgever geen aansprakelijk-
heid voor eventuele fouten of onvolkomenheden. 
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Preface 
 
 
On Thursday 17 November 2016 Amélie Poméon won the Hanneke Steenbergen 
Scriptie Prijs 2016 for her thesis entitled: Frontex and EBCGA, a Question of 
Accountability. This prize is awarded each year by the Hanneke Steenbergen 
Foundation (see for more information www.steenbergenscriptieprijs.nl) for the 
best master thesis in the field of migration law. During her life, Hanneke 
Steenbergen taught migration law at the University of Leiden and was highly 
dedicated to the promotion of migration law education. After she passed away 
in June 2001, her family, friends and colleagues decided to establish a founda-
tion, the primary purpose of which is to award a yearly prize stimulating research 
and interest in migration law issues. 
Amélie Poméon, under the supervision of Tineke Strik, sets out the central 
question of her master thesis in her introduction as follows: 
 
‘In the international law literature, a lot has been said about state responsibility. 
Practically every textbook on public international law consecrates a chapter to the topic 
and the International Law Commission has adopted articles on it. Less is written on the 
issue whether and how an EU agency can be held responsible or even accountable for its 
actions. The EU tries to shield FRONTEX from all responsibility and accountability, but 
this is not in conformity with recent movements in the legal literature and even amongst 
certain EU institutions, calling for a higher degree of EU agency accountability to be 
balanced with their inherent independence. The fact that FRONTEX has often -more or 
less hesitantly- been accused of performing or at least condoning illegal push-backs, 
clashing, among others, with the EU law principle of non-refoulement (article 19 ECFR), 
and often not leaving the affected migrants with an effective remedy. 
The main research question on which this thesis is based is: To what extent can FRONTEX 
be held accountable for breaches of EU law acting both inside and outside EU territory?’ 
 
The jury (John Bouwman, senior judge, David Kuiper, attorney at law at the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (IND) and Carina van Eck, Commissioner at 
the Netherlands Human Rights Institute) wrote:  
 
‘Amélie provides, with her thesis an almost encyclopedic document about Frontex, the 
European Agency for management of operational cooperation at the external borders of 
the European Union. Frontex plays an important role in protecting external borders and 
therefore has a direct impact on many people’s lives. (…) Worth mentioning is that she 
took an interesting approach by incorporating interviews with various experts on the 
ground. (…) So, a very thorough piece of work on a problem that maintains to be in the 
forefront of every one’s attention.’ 
 
It is a nice tradition of the Law Faculty of the Radboud University Nijmegen to 
publish the winning master thesis in the form of a book. This book of Amélie is 
the fourth publication in this ‘Steenbergen Series’. Previous books published 
were: Hjørdis Snoeys, Klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard. Duidelijk om-
PREFACE 
 
x 
lijnde asiel- en reguliere verleningsgronden of restcategorie? WLP 2004; Sandra 
Adriana Mantu, The Boundaries of European Social Citizenship, WLP 2008; Ellen 
Nissen, The Rights of Minor EU Member State Nationals Wishing to Enjoy Family 
Life with a non-EU Parent in their Country of Nationality. A study in the light of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, WLP 2013.  
Amélie is now a PhD student at the research Centre STER, Radboud Univer-
sity Nijmegen, working on a dissertation on the impact of the cooperation be-
tween the EU and Morocco/Turkey on the legal position of migrants. 
 
We proudly present this book and we hope it may be of use in practice and for 
further research. 
 
Elspeth Guild (chair) 
Karin Zwaan (co-ordinator) 
Tineke Strik (supervisor) 
 
Centre for Migration Law 
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence 
visit us at: http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr 
Nijmegen, January 2017 
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1 
Abstract 
 
 
In light of current socio-political developments such as the recent spike in mi-
grant movement and consequent asylum requests,1 international attention has 
been drawn to the actions of the European Agency for the Management of Op-
erational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (FRONTEX, the Agency), which might be the case particularly due to 
the active role it plays in ‘managing European borders’.2 FRONTEX, as one of the 
European agencies, has a direct impact on many people’s lives.3 
It has frequently been submitted that the Agency’s framework has a certain 
accountability gap.4 In fact, it is often proposed by Union representatives that 
the European Member States involved in the operations in the context of which 
breaches of EU law are suspected to have occurred should answer for these ac-
tions.5 This leaves FRONTEX with a considerable amount of independence and 
autonomously exercisable power, which can have a negative effect with respect 
to the democratic governance of the EU.6 This might be one of the reasons why 
FRONTEX has created the position of a Fundamental Rights Officer as well as a 
Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights after a 2011 amendment to its 
founding regulation.7 However, this does not make up for its lack of an individual 
complaint mechanism,8 which the Agency justifies by claiming its subsidiary role 
as a ‘coordinator’ of the missions carried out by the European Member States’ 
border agencies.9 As such, it does not refer to an individual complaint mecha-
nism10 and makes no mention of the issue of accountability for actions taken 
while exercising its mandate.11 
                                                                      
1  For further information, see eg UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commis-
sioner’s Programme, ‘Note on International Protection’, EC/66/SC/CRP.10, 2015, eg 9ff. 
2  FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
3  JM Beneyto, CoE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Accountability of inter-
national organisations for human rights violations (Doc 12842, Reference 3837, 2012) 1. 
4  See eg European Ombudsman, ‘Letter from the European Ombudsman to the Frontex 
concerning his draft recommendation – OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ’, 09/04/2013, under M. 
5  Recital 4 of Regulation 2007/2004; PACE Resolution 1932 (2013), ‘Frontex: human rights 
responsibilities’, § 6.  
6  M Busuioc, European Agencies – Law and Practices of Accountability (OUP, Oxford 2013), 
eg 53ff. 
7  See Art 26a of Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 as well as FRONTEX, ‘Frontex Consulta-
tive Forum and Fundamental Rights Officer’, Article, 27/04/2012.  
8  See eg EP Press Release of 24/11/2015. 
9  See FRONTEX, ‘Roles and Responsibilities’, 2016. 
10  See eg FRONTEX, ‘Own-Initiative Inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ’, Letter, 17/05/2012. 
11  See search function on FRONTEX homepage: http://frontex.europa.eu/search-results/ 
?q=accountable; http://frontex.europa.eu/search-results/?q=accountability, accessed on 
10/02/2016. 
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Additionally, it is not trivial that the Agency also carries out missions outside 
European Union (EU) territory, liaising frequently with third countries.12 Natural-
ly, questions concerning the legality of any action the Agency undertakes out-
side EU territory arise, especially concerning its legal basis and the applicability 
of EU law outside EU territory. 
The importance and topicality of the issue of FRONTEX’ accountability sky-
rocketed when the proposal for a new European Border and Coastal Guards 
Agency (EBCGA) was introduced mid-December 2015, as it is often hard to de-
termine who should account for and who should be held responsible for possible 
breaches of EU law in the context of FRONTEX-coordinated operations, which is 
due to the fact that there are no clear legal bases nor continuous plans for tasks 
and operational structures for the individual operations but only Operational 
Plans which vary greatly from operation to operation.13 
 
                                                                      
12  See last point under FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
13  M Fink, ‘Salami Slicing Human Rights Accountability: How the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency may inherit Frontex’ genetic defect’, EJILTALK, Blog of the European 
Journal of International Law, 10/03/2016, § 9. 
 
3 
Introduction 
 
 
We had had only three days left to travel when a police boat stopped us. They did not 
want to give us any water. They threatened to destroy our boat if we did not return to 
where we came from immediately. We had nearly died of thirst and had dead bodies on 
board. Still, we had to return to Senegal.1 
 
This account by Dou, a young Senegalese man, has been supported by a testimo-
ny of a representative of the German Institute for Human Rights, who stated that 
in 2008, FRONTEX has sent 5969 persons it intercepted at sea back to Africa.2 
This coincides with Member of the European Parliament (MEP) M Weber’s testi-
mony that reports of collective expulsions and push-backs without examination 
of each individual case in contravention of EU law exist.3  
Amnesty International, PRO ASYL and other Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions (NGOs) have published numerous reports containing witness statements 
which often resemble this one quite closely.4 Another account of this is offered 
by the testimony of Rahim, an 18-year-old who had already been trying to enter 
Europe in different ways for two years. When Amnesty International interviewed 
him in 2014, he told them that:  
 
We were just 10m off the island when the Greek coastguard found us…We were so close, 
we thought we can make it to the island. But the Greek coastguard boat caught up with 
us. We punctured our boat and jumped into the sea so that the coastguard could not tow 
us back to Turkey. The coastguards picked us out of the sea on to their boat... Then we 
sailed towards Turkey for half an hour or so… They put an inflatable boat in the sea and 
pushed us onto it. They also threw two oars at us and pointed to the shore. And then they 
left. They just left us there.5 
 
In and around Greece, the situation for irregular migrants is dire. The role of 
Operation Poseidon Sea, a Joint Operation between, among others, the Greek 
coast guard and the FRONTEX-Agency,6 does not seem to improve the situation 
                                                                      
1  Translated from A Reinhardt, T Reutter, T Schneider, ‘Festung Europa – Wie die EU 
Flüchtlinge mit allen Mitteln fernhält‘, Das Erste, Report Mainz (News Report, 05/10/ 
2009). 
2  Ibid.  
3  Ibid.; similar accounts have been published in Amnesty International, The Human Cost of 
Fortress Europe (Report) (2014) EUR 05/001/2014, 2014-1, Amnesty International, Greece: 
Frontier of Hope and Fear – Migrants and Refugees Pushed Back at Europe’s Border (Report) 
(2014) EUR 25/004/2014, 2014-2 and Pro Asyl, Pushed Back – Systematic Human Rights 
Violations Against Refugees In The Aegean Sea And At The Greek-Turkish Land Border (gut-
leut Verlag, Frankfurt a M 2014). 
4  See eg Amnesty International (2014-1,-2) and PRO ASYL (2014).  
5  Amnesty International (2014-1) 8.  
6 See eg FRONTEX, ‘Poseidon’, Archive Entry, 2016-1. 
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significantly. On the contrary, according to many accounts, people picked up in 
the context of this Joint Operation (JO) are treated degradingly, are humiliated, 
their possessions stolen and their lives and safety disregarded.7 Mass-expulsions 
seem to have become something quite ordinary, with people being wilfully left 
to their fates outside European territorial waters, the risk of their deaths accept-
ed.8 There is, up to date, little proof of FRONTEX' hands-on involvement, but 
from the Agency’s statements, Amnesty has believably concluded that 
FRONTEX boats and personnel were employed in the context of Operation Po-
seidon Sea but wore no discerning marks, so that migrants had no way of identi-
fying them.9 
These push-backs and other human rights violations are alleged to have tak-
en place and to take place, amongst others, in the context of JO Poseidon Sea, 
during which the European agency FRONTEX plays a pivotal role.10 Yet, the vic-
tims of said alleged violations have practically no-one to turn to. This heavily 
criticised state of affairs will be the focus of this thesis. 
FRONTEX’ name is derived from the French translation for the focal point of 
the Agency’s tasks: the frontières extérieures.11 It was established on 26 October 
2004 by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004,12 replacing several predecessors 
such as the Common Unit for External Border Practitioners (SCIFA) and 
SCIFA+,13 and according to paragraph 3 of its preamble, it is a ‘specialised expert 
body tasked with improving the coordination of operational cooperation be-
tween Member States in the field of external border management’.  
The fact that the European Parliament, Commission and Council declare the 
protection of the EU’s external borders against crossings by irregular migrants to 
be one of their top priorities14 gives an account of the Agency’s crucial role in the 
EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.15 However, the EU suffers from a 
certain conflict of interests, and this Janus-head applies by extension also to 
FRONTEX: On the one hand, the Union feels the need to control migration 
                                                                      
7  See eg PRO ASYL (2014), throughout the whole document, especially pp 17ff. 
8  See eg Amnesty International (2014-1,-2) and PRO ASYL (2014).  
9  Amnesty International (2014-1) 17. 
10  PRO ASYL (2014) pp Xff. 
11  The French frontières exterieures translates to external borders. 
12  Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union. 
13  J Pollak and P Slominski, ‘Experimentalist but Not Accountable Governance? The Role of 
Frontex in Managing the EU’s External Borders’ (2009) 5/32 West European Politics 904, 
908. 
14  Ibid., 904. 
15  J Rijpma, ‘Hybrid agencification in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice and its in-
herent tensions: the case of Frontex’, in M Busuioc, M Groenleer and J Trondal (eds), The 
agency phenomenon in the European Union (Manchester University Press, Manchester 
2012) 88ff. 
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flows,16 but on the other, it has a duty to give effet utile to its right to asylum, 
enshrined, inter alia, in article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(ECFR). Hot on the heels of this dilemma the Agency must handle follows the 
question of how to deal with the ramifications arising whenever FRONTEX 
chooses the protection of the EU’s external borders over upholding its other 
obligations such as the ones under article 47 ECFR.  
In the international law literature, a lot has been said about state responsibil-
ity. Practically every textbook on public international law consecrates a chapter 
to the topic17 and the International Law Commission has adopted articles on it.18 
Less is written on the issue whether and how an EU agency can be held respon-
sible or even accountable for its actions. The EU tries to shield FRONTEX from all 
responsibility and accountability,19 but this is not in conformity with recent 
movements in the legal literature and even amongst certain EU institutions, 
calling for a higher degree of EU agency accountability to be balanced with their 
inherent independence.20 
The fact that FRONTEX has often – more or less hesitantly – been accused of 
performing or at least condoning illegal push-backs,21 clashing, among others, 
with the EU law principle of non-refoulement (article 19 ECFR),22 and often not 
leaving the affected migrants with an effective remedy. 
 
The main research question on which this thesis is based is: To what extent can 
FRONTEX be held accountable for breaches of EU law acting both inside and out-
side EU territory? 
In order to answer this question, a series of sub-questions has been devel-
oped, the answers to which will, step by step, lead to the answer to the main 
question. 
First, a theoretical chapter will give the background information on 
FRONTEX, the EU and on accountability needed to gain a general understanding 
of the topic. The questions asked in this chapter are: How can FRONTEX be clas-
sified under international law and what is its role in the European Union? Is it 
possible and necessary to hold EU agencies such as FRONTEX accountable? 
                                                                      
16  See eg European Commission, Directorate General of Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Po-
lices’, 15/12/ 2015. 
17  See eg M Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP, Cambridge 2014) Ch 14; J Crawford, 
Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP, Oxford 2012) Part IX; M 
Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP, Oxford 2014) Part V. 
18  Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 
2001, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, United 
Nations Publication, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) 26. 
19  See eg recital 4: ‘The responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies 
with the Member States. (…)’. 
20  See Chapter 1.2. 
21  Pro Asyl, Pushed Back – Systematic Human Rights Violations Against Refugees In The 
Aegean Sea And At The Greek-Turkish Land Border (gutleut Verlag, Berlin 2014). 
22  P Boeles, M den Heijer, G Lodder and K Wouters, European Migration Law (2nd edn, In-
tersentia, Cambridge 2014) 285. 
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What is accountability and how can it be defined in the present context? To what 
extent can EU agencies be held accountable under different levels of law sys-
tems? Which criteria need to be fulfilled to hold FRONTEX accountable? 
In the second chapter, which presents the Agency’s current framework, the 
following questions will be answered: Which is the legal framework the Agency 
has to adhere to and which could thus influence its accountability? Which is the 
Agency’s Operational framework, in which EU law violations are the most likely 
to happen? What is the Agency’s relationship with the EU institutions, the most 
likely forums for its accountability? How does FRONTEX’ commitment to pro-
tecting fundamental rights effectively look like?  
In the third chapter, in which FRONTEX’ actions inside and outside EU terri-
tory will be shed light on, the leading questions are: How do the Agency’s actions 
inside EU territory look like in practice? Is EU law applicable to FRONTEX’ activi-
ties outside EU territory and which additional rules do these activities outside EU 
territory have to adhere to? How do these activities outside EU territory look like 
in practice? 
In the fourth chapter, in which the facts collected over the last two chapters 
will be applied to the facts established in the first, the following questions will be 
answered: To what extent are the criteria established in chapter 1 fulfilled? Is 
there a necessity for an individual complaint mechanism?  
In the fifth chapter, the main research question will be answered. The main 
conclusion will be placed here to avoid too much unnecessary repetition in the 
preliminary conclusions and because the sixth chapter is mainly intended to give 
an estimation of what is to come. 
In the sixth and last chapter, in which the EBCGA will be taken a look at, the 
following question will be answered: Are the issues concerning accountability 
identified under FRONTEX’ current framework solved in the Commission’s Pro-
posal on an EBCGA? It will end with a short conclusion which will not repeat all 
the main conclusions found in chapter 5. 
Methodology 
At first, I have compiled a list of relevant books and articles found both in physi-
cal form as well as online, which I have skimmed and sorted according to useful-
ness and chapters in which I might refer to them. They have helped me in acquir-
ing a general overview of the research topic, which has further permitted me to 
create a general outline of the research and the individual chapters. 
The snowball method was used on the books and articles first found to be 
relevant to the research and further publications by authors working on similar 
issues were perused. Several internet platforms such as Heinonline, Research-
gate, SSRN, Westlaw, etc were searched for relevant publications. EU, CoE and 
UN legislation, governance documents and press releases etc were perused. Of-
ficial Agency documents were requested via the AskTheEU platform using the 
Union’s transparency and access to information legislation as laid down in regu-
lation 1049/2001. For referencing and the bibliography, the OSCOLA Referenc-
ing Style was used. 
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Interviews were conducted both telephonically with the head of the Consul-
tative Forum Marta Ballestero of UNHCR and via email with her second-in-com-
mand Stefan Keßler of the Jesuit Refugee Service. More members of the Forum 
were asked to participate in such an interview but did not find the time to do so. 
Both FRONTEX and the Fundamental Rights Officer were asked to answer a few 
questions. The Fundamental Rights Officer did not find the time to answer them 
and FRONTEX never got back to the author after having promised to answer my 
questions. 

 
9 
1. Theoretical Background 
 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, the theoretical background which is necessary 
in order to appreciate to what extent FRONTEX can be held accountable will be 
established. For that purpose, it will first be analysed which factors about 
FRONTEX and the European Union need to be taken into account in order to 
determine whether FRONTEX can be held accountable in the first place (Sub-
Chapter 1.1). Secondly, the rather controversial notion of accountability will be 
introduced (Sub-Chapter 1.2). In the third sub-chapter, it will be examined if and 
in what way an agency such as FRONTEX can be held accountable (Sub-Chapter 
1.3). In the fourth sub-chapter, the necessary criteria for holding FRONTEX ac-
countable will be identified. The findings of this Chapter will be resumed in a 
preliminary conclusion (Sub-Chapter 1.5). 
1.1 Classification of the Main Player – FRONTEX 
Recital 3 of amended Regulation 2007/2004/EC1 (the FRONTEX-Regulation) 
states that ‘a specialised expert body tasked with improving the coordination of 
operational cooperation between Member States in the field of external border 
management should (…) be established in the shape of a European Agency’. This 
shows that FRONTEX has been deliberately established as an agency of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). As a first step, it will be determined in the following Sections 
which role the EU holds as an international player and which influence this has 
on holding FRONTEX accountable. The second step will consist in looking at 
FRONTEX’ classification as an EU agency and the consequences this classifica-
tion has on holding FRONTEX accountable. 
 
The EU as an International Player 
In this paragraph, the European Union as a player on the international level will 
be discussed.2 
Difficulties arise while trying to classify the EU.3 It is sometimes viewed as a 
federal union,4 but also often characterised through its unique mixture of inter-
                                                                      
1  Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, amended by Regulation (EC) 863/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007, and by Regulation (EU) 1168/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011. 
2  NB: It serves well to remember that the rules of international law, no matter the topic, are 
not always uniform but may vary depending on the character of the subject of interna-
tional law they are applied to. 
3  See eg A Sari and RA Wessel, ‘International Responsibility for EU Military Operations: 
Finding the EU’s Place in the Global Accountability Regime’, in B Van Vooren, S Block-
→ 
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governmental and supranational features and called a ‘supranational organisa-
tion’ as opposed to an ‘international organisation’.5,6 Supranational organisa-
tions such as the EU,7 and international organisations, which might include or-
ganisations such as the WTO or international NGOs such as Amnesty Interna-
tional,8 can be distinguished by the difference in the degree of autonomous reg-
ulatory powers they possess.9 A supranational organisation is known for its rela-
tively high degree of autonomy and independence from national or even inter-
national control with which certain autonomous powers can be exercised.10 
While, due to their multitude and diversity, it is difficult to find a single defi-
nition for the notion of ‘international institution’,11 an attempt has been made in 
the context of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2011 Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations. Article 2(a) of said document 
states that ‘’international organization’ means an organization established by 
treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own 
international legal personality. International organizations may include as mem-
bers, in addition to States, other entities.’12 Crawford criticises quite astutely 
that this definition can solely be applied in the context of international responsi-
bility, as it presupposes that only international organisations ‘possessing [their] 
own legal personality’ and therefore being fit to be held responsible for their 
actions may be included in this definition; while it has been established that in-
ternational organisations can, but not always do have international legal person-
ality.13 
In contrast, supranational organisations may be defined as ‘hybrid organiza-
tions composed of States. They are structured in a way similar to federal States. 
They make decisions binding directly on member States and their nationals, and 
their laws have supremacy over, and override conflicting, national laws of mem-
ber States.’14 
                                                                      
mans and J Wouters (eds), The EU's Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (OUP, 
Oxford 2013) 129. 
4  Crawford (2012) 170, who also criticises that this characterisation is not unanimously 
accepted, as the EU only has ‘compétences d’attribution’. 
5  Still, other authors define the EU as an international organisation. See eg Beneyto (2012), 
18 at § 61: ‘(…) the European Union is the only international organisation to (…)’.  
6  See eg P Lindseth, ‘Supranational Organizations’, in I Hurd, I Johnstone and J Katz Cogan 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (OUP, Oxford 2016) 1. 
7  Lindseth (2014) 1. 
8  Union of International Organizations, ‘Open Yearbook – International Organizations 
Search’, Index, 2015.  
9  Lindseth (2014) 1. 
10  Ibid., 1ff. 
11  Crawford (2012) 167. 
12  ILC, ‘Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentar-
ies’ (2011), UN Doc A/66/10, Chapter V.  
13  Crawford (2012) 167. See also ICJ, Reparations for Injuries (1949, p 178). 
14  NC Udeariry, ‘To What Extent Do International Organizations Possess International Legal 
Personality?’ (unpublished 2011) 2. 
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The EU has, indeed, been established by Treaty.15 However, it is a Union of 
States and excludes other entities from becoming members.16 The EU’s laws 
have supremacy17 and bind the Member States.18 The EU is thus a supranational 
organisation.  
 
FRONTEX as an EU Agency 
Another classification which needs to be clarified concerns FRONTEX: above, it 
has already been shown that FRONTEX is a European Union agency. The term 
might need clarification. EU agencies are institutions of the European Union, and 
are considered to be pioneering the institutional landscape of the EU19 by im-
plementing EU policies as independent legal players.20 Another reason for their 
high esteem is that they contribute to the implementation of important Union 
policies, allowing the Commission, in particular, to concentrate on ‘core policy-
making tasks’. They also enhance the cooperation between Member States and 
Union by pooling technical and specialist expertise, hence supporting the deci-
sion-making process.21 The distribution of agency seats in practically all Member 
States22 serves to augment the Union’s presence and the domestic awareness of 
the Union in the Member States.23 
The EU distinguishes between four different types of European agencies: de-
centralised agencies, agencies under the Common Security and Defence Policy, 
executive agencies and EURATOM agencies.24 FRONTEX falls under the catego-
ry of decentralised agencies,25 which are also called regulatory agencies.26 This 
means in practice that it belongs to those ‘permanent autonomous bodies set up 
outside the EU institutions to provide technical, scientific and managerial sup-
                                                                      
15  Although its Treaty bases have undergone frequent changes in the past, it is presently 
founded on the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and on the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), see eg article 1(2) TFEU. 
16  Article 49 TEU states that any ‘European State’ fulfilling certain conditions may apply for 
membership in the EU. 
17  Article 2(2) TFEU. 
18  Article 2(1), (2) TFEU. 
19  Commission Communication COM(2008) 135 final, 2ff, see also Busuioc (2013) 13. 
20  European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 1. 
21  Ibid. 
22  See Annex 2, p 133. 
23  European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 1. 
24  See European Union, ‘Institutions, bodies & agencies – contact & visit details’, Part 3. 
‘Type of Agencies’, 2016. 
25  See European Union, ‘Decentralised agencies’, Index, 15/02/2016, no 5 on the list. 
26  See N Atanassov, Accountability of EU regulatory agencies, in European Parliamentary 
Research Service Blog, 03/03/2015.  
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port for EU policy-making and implementation’.27 Based on this, they, and 
FRONTEX specifically, can be said to be part of the EU public administration.28 
European agencification, although today a significant phenomenon, started 
out quite unremarkably in 1975 with the creation of the European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training and the European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working Conditions, only really kicking off in the 1990’s 
and 2000’s, leading to the creation of, at present, 46 agencies.29,30 These agen-
cies are known to have a particularly high level of independence.31 However, 
while agencies are mentioned numerous times in both TEU and TFEU,32 the 
treaties do not explicitly allocate the capacity to create agencies to any EU insti-
tution, which means that European agencification has taken place largely in 
absence of any proper explicit legal basis in the EU Treaties.33 This discrepancy 
between the de iure and the de facto situation consequently bears the potential 
for severe accountability gaps.34 This is especially momentous considering the 
threats to individual liberties implied for action in the field of internal security.35 
Considering the high stakes, the implementation of an accountability mecha-
nism is inevitable and necessary.36  
 
Conclusions 
It has now been established that FRONTEX is an agency of the European Union 
and it has further been explained what an agency actually is. If agencies can be 
held accountable will be explored in Sub-Chapter 1.3 after an explanation of 
what constitutes accountability in Sub-Chapter 1.2. The conditions under which 
FRONTEX can be held accountable for breaches of EU law will be discussed in 
Sub-Chapter 1.4. 
                                                                      
27  European Union, ‘Decentralised agencies’, Index, 15/02/2016. For more information, see S 
Andoura and P Timmermann, Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European 
Agencies Reignited, (2008) Working Paper No 19, European Policy Institutes Network, 8ff. 
28  According to RS Daniels, public administration is legally defined as being ‘inherently the 
execution of a public law. Every application of a general law is necessarily an act of ad-
ministration.’ It will be shown in Chapter 2 that FRONTEX executes public laws of the Un-
ion. It is thus part of the EU public administration. 
29  See European Union, ‘Institutions, bodies & agencies – contact & visit details’, Part 2 
‘Map’, 2016. 
30  Busuioc (2013) 13. 
31  Ibid., 4. 
32  See eg articles 15(1), (3), 16(2), 71, 123(1), 124, 127(4), 130, 228(1), 263, 265, 267(b), 282(3), 
287(1), (3), 298(1), 325(1), (4) TFEU and article 9 TEU as well as several Protocols. 
33  Ibid., 5.  
34  Ibid., 6. 
35  Ibid., 7. 
36  Ibid. 
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1.2 Introducing Accountability 
Accountability is a notion which has very positive connotations despite the fact 
that hardly anyone is able to define it precisely.37 It is an elusive yet attractive 
term. The present Chapter will bring more clarity into this obscure notion by first 
distinguishing between accountability and the term it is most frequently con-
fused with – responsibility – before finding a definition of the notion appropriate 
for the present purposes and showing the different classifications of accountabil-
ity and excluding some from the scope of this thesis. 
 
Delimiting Accountability – Semantics? Accountability v Responsibility38 
Thinking about the consequences of an act or omission having negative effects 
on certain parties, misperceptions might occur as to the terminology employed 
in this context. Therefore, it is prudent to start out by defining the pertinent 
notions in order to be able to clearly differentiate them.39 Of those, the distinc-
tion between ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ seems to be the hardest to 
make.40 In their everyday use and even their usage by legal experts, the words 
‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ are often employed synonymously.41 This 
may, at least in part, be due to the fact that the concept of accountability does 
not seem to have been completely accepted as a concept of European law yet.42 
In fact, many national European law systems, such as the Italian, French and 
Spanish ones, do not know said concept at all.43 A very slow transformation 
seems to take place, according a greater importance to the concept of account-
                                                                      
37  AM Goetz and R Jenkins, Voice, Accountability and Human Development: The Emergence of 
a New Agenda (Background paper for Human Development Report Office 2002) (2002) 
United Nations Development Programme 2002/4, pp 3, 5; M Bovens, ‘Public Accountabil-
ity’, in E Ferlie, LE Jr Lynn and C Pollitt, The Oxford Handbook of Public Management 
(OUP, Oxford 2007), (2007-1) § 8.1. 
38  Read the two (first) comments under M Fink, ‘Salami Slicing Human Rights Accountabil-
ity: How the European Border and Coast Guard Agency may inherit Frontex’ genetic de-
fect’, EJILTALK, Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 10/03/2016, (2016) for a 
further discussion on this distinction. 
39  Busuioc (2013) has proposed on p 45 that accountability is often equated with terms such 
as ‘transparency’, ’efficiency’, ’responsiveness’, ’responsibility’, ’democracy’ and ’partici-
pation’. 
40  It is also the only one which will be looked into in this context, as the distinctions between 
all the words associated with this cluster might take up enough words for a whole new 
paper. 
41  Indeed, renowned English-language dictionaries do not always distinguish between these 
notions, see eg the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, which uses the words synony-
mously. Even English law dictionaries are surprisingly often not precise enough when de-
fining the word ‘accountable’, see eg Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Jowitt’s Dictionary of 
English Law, Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary or Black’s Law Dictionary. 
42  R Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding Concept?’, (2000) 78 Public Administra-
tion 555, 1; C Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 14. 
43  Harlow (2002) 14, see also M Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Concep-
tual Framework’, (2007) 4/13 European Law Journal 447, (2007-2), 449. 
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ability, but, on the European Union level, there are still considerable difficulties 
with holding public bodies accountable.44 
These difficulties can only be alleviated by distinguishing clearly between the 
notions of accountability and responsibility. As stated by the jurisprudence of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), responsibility is ‘a principle 
of international law, and even a general conception of law’, according to which 
‘any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation’.45 Ac-
countability is broader – in addition, it calls for someone to give reasons for and 
explanations of what happened.46 Hence, in contrast to responsibility, accounta-
bility can only occur ex post facto.47 Accountability may be required apart from 
any cases of deviation from the norm, for any number of other circumstances, 
such as for publicity reasons or in order to effectively implement a monitoring 
system.48 Its aim is to ‘provid[e] meaningful redress to the victim and [to] pre-
vent(…) future wrongdoing’.49 Thus, in order to be efficient, accountability has to 
be mandatory.50  
In the legal context, the notion of responsibility is an existential part of the 
accountability process. In order to incur responsibility under international law, a 
subject of international law has to have committed an internationally wrongful 
act.51 Accountability, however, goes further, can be much less formal and have 
more open mechanisms than responsibility.52,53 How these properties are ex-
pressed when holding FRONTEX accountable will be discussed in Sub-Chapter 
1.4 and Chapter 4. It serves well to discuss accountability and not to be content-
ed with discussing the more easily accessed notion of responsibility, because 
accountability, as was shown throughout the last few pages, is a concept which 
is far more encompassing and therefore lends itself better to ensure that EU law 
is respected as well as to achieve a higher degree democratic governance on the 
Union level.54  
 
                                                                      
44  M Busuioc, M Groenleer and J Trondal (eds), The agency phenomenon in the European 
Union (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2012) 3ff. 
45  Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) [1928] (Merits) PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 17, p 4, 29; see also Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Po-
land) [1927] (Jurisdiction) PCIJ Rep Series A No 9, p 4, 21. 
46  M Cornock, ‘Legal definitions of responsibility, accountability and liability’, 3/23 Nursing 
Children and Young People (2011) 25. 
47  Busuioc (2013) 47. 
48  Cornock (2011) 25. 
49  Fink (2016) § 10. 
50  Cornock (2011) 25. 
51  Beneyto (2012) 6. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Those mechanisms will be discussed in 1.3. 
54  Bovens (2007-2) observes on p 465 that ‘Accountability controls and legitimises govern-
ment actions by linking them effectively to the ‘democratic chain of delegation’. See also 
Bovens (2007-1) § 8. 
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Defining Accountability 
As the notion is so versatile and complex, there are many definitions of account-
ability which may be used, and not all of them contain the same elements. How-
ever, looking at several definitions of ‘accountability’ proposed in the legal litera-
ture, there seems to be a general consensus amongst legal scholars that certain 
elements need to be present. For example, Cornock describes accountability as 
the ‘[requirement] to justify [one’s] actions, to explain the rationale that 
prompted the actions and the consequences of [one’s] actions’.55 
Here, the definition of ‘accountability’ proposed by Bovens will be employed, 
as it seems to be very clear-cut and to the point, encompassing all essential ele-
ments and doing away with unnecessary embellishments: Accountability is ‘a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has the obligation 
to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences.’56 
The elements common to most definitions of accountability thus seem to be 
an actor (the accountable), a specific forum (the accountee)57 and three main 
tasks, illustrated in Figure 1:  
 
 
 
1. Informing (accountable), 
2. Debating (accountable and accountee), 
3. Determining possible consequences (accountee).58 
 
Of these stages, which, as such, seem rather self-explanatory, the debating 
phase deserves special attention. It gives the accountee a possibility to question 
                                                                      
55  Cornock (2011) 25. All authors mentioned in the text by name but not by occupation are 
legal scholars or scholars of fields which are of interest to the issues addressed in this the-
sis. 
56  Bovens (2007-2) 450; also in Busuioc (2013) 46. 
57  M Bovens, ‘New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance’ (2007) 5 Comparative Euro-
pean Politics 104 (2007-3) 107; RM Lastra and H Shams, ‘Public Accountability in the Fi-
nancial Sector’, in E Ferran, and CA Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and 
Markets in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 167; see also Busuioc (2013) 46. 
58  Busuioc (2013) 47. 
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and critically analyse the – by default – subjective information submitted by the 
accountable in order to build a more complete and objective picture of the situa-
tion on which the account is given.59 It is stressed that a central requirement is 
the accountee’s (forum’s) independence in order to ensure objective, independ-
ent and impartial treatment of the issue which the accountable is being ques-
tioned for (vertical or at least diagonal accountability), as well as its investigative 
power.60 
Mulgan adds to this that accountability has nothing to do with compliance 
with the law (in general), the latter not being an accountability mechanism but a 
means to control the administration.61 He stresses instead that the ‘legal ac-
countability mechanism is confined to that part of the law which lays down en-
forcement procedures.’62 He refers to the opinion which parts of the literature 
subscribe to that accountability is composed of two features: answerability and 
enforceability.63 This means that for a legal accountability mechanism, it is not 
sufficient that an accountable is legally obliged to answer to a forum but that 
legal accountability provisions also need to provide for the forum’s decision to be 
enforceable, to be obligatory and binding. This opinion is in line with Bovens’ 
idea of a three-step accountability mechanism.    
Accountability can be a measure of democratic governance,64 ensuring that 
accountable actors cannot exercise their powers without screening.65 This is 
meant to prevent abuse of powers by actors who might have a considerable 
influence on central issues.66 
 
Classifying Accountability in the Case of FRONTEX 
It has been affirmed by Bovens that EU agencies can be accountable actors.67 
Recent movements in the legal literature and even amongst certain EU institu-
tions have been lobbying for a higher degree of EU agency accountability to be 
balanced with their inherent independence.68 
                                                                      
59  Ibid. 
60  Bovens (2007-2) 460; M Bovens, T Schillemans and P ’t Hart, ‘Does Public Accountability 
Work? An Assessment Tool’ (2008) 86 Public Administration 225, 233. 
61  Mulgan (2000) 564; see also Harlow (2002) 146. 
62  Mulgan (2000) 564. 
63  Goetz & Jenkins (2002) 5. 
64  JE Gyong, ‘Good Governance and Accountability in a Democracy’ (2011) 26/7 European 
Scientific Journal 72: ‘without good governance being institutionalized through account-
ability, democratic consolidation could not be attained.’ 
65  DW Brinkerhoff, ‘Taking Account of Accountability: A Conceptual Overview and Strategic 
Options’ (2001) (Report) Implementing Policy Change Project, Phase 2, (2001) U.S. 
Agency for International Development Center for Democracy and Governance)) 20. 
66  Ibid., 3; see also Bovens, Schillemans & ’t Hart (2008) 231, where the authors claim that 
accountability serves to enhance an equilibrium of power. 
67  Bovens (2007-2) 450. 
68  See eg S Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy – FRONTEX and the Challenges of 
Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands (2007) CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in 
→ 
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There are many different types of accountability. They can be distinguished 
according to their forum, their actors, the conduct in question or even the obliga-
tion which the actor is called to account for (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Bovens’ distinctions can, when applied in practice, change from situation to 
situation even if it is always the same actor which is called to account. In FRON-
TEX’ case, the one feature which will stay the same is that the accountability will 
stay a corporate one, with the whole Agency facing the consequences which 
might be handed out.69 
It has to be noted that the list in Figure 2 is incomplete. Bovens also talks 
about public accountability,70 meaning that a party can be held accountable by 
an individual of the public, but also that the party to be held accountable belongs 
to the public administration.71 As an EU agency, FRONTEX belongs to the public 
                                                                      
Europe No 261, ie p 28; Pollack & Slominski (2009), theme of the paper; all works by M 
Fink in the bibliography, etc.  
69  Although there are provisions for individual responsibility and liability of Agency staff, see 
articles 10b, 10c, 19 FRONTEX-Regulation, but as discussed in 1.2, those are not the same 
as accountability. 
70  Bovens (2007-1) § 8.1.1. 
71  Others have called this type of accountability ‘government accountability’. See eg Goertz 
& Jenkins (2002), citing RS Barker, Government Accountability and its Limits, Issues of De-
mocracy, Vol 5, No 2 (August 2000). 
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administration,72 and because the discussion about FRONTEX’ accountability 
leans so heavily on the impact the Agency can have on individuals’ lives and the 
necessity of an individual complaint mechanism,73 it is appropriate to discuss an 
accountability mechanism which can also be set off by an individual member of 
the public.74 Busuioc defines legal accountability as a mechanism being based on 
legal provisions, which can be both judicial and extra-judicial.75 This is a very 
appropriate form of accountability for the present purposes, as the acts which 
are at the heart of the issue are breaches of EU law. While Fink expresses that it 
is FRONTEX’ legal accountability which needs to be scrutinised,76 this thesis 
supports the view that ‘legal’ accountability alone might not be a precise enough 
term, as this would not distinguish FRONTEX’ kind of legal accountability from, 
for instance, the one a CEO could face if he or she embezzled his or her com-
pany’s resources. Both of the definitions of legal and of public accountability 
apply here, which is why, for the purpose of this thesis, they are combined to 
form the term of ‘public legal accountability’.77  
 
Conclusions 
The definitions presented in this Chapter lead to the conclusion that, even 
though accountability does not equal judicial review,78 one can be called to ac-
count in order to determine whether a party’s responsibility should be engaged 
or not. Responsibility, or the obligation to make reparation,79 is determined as a 
consequence of the accountability process. This means in turn that articles and 
laws concerning responsibility, whether in national or in international law, are 
mechanisms assisting during the process of accountability.80 Accountability is a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has the obligation 
to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences. While there are many differ-
ent types of accountability, those of interest for determining to what extent 
FRONTEX can be held accountable for breaches of EU law are public accounta-
                                                                      
72  See 1.1.  
73  See 4.3. 
74  It is, however, important to keep in mind that EU agencies cannot directly be held ac-
countable by the general public; see on this Andoura & Timmermann (2008) 18. This is 
why, here, the term ‘public’ is only meant to refer to the possible starting point of an ac-
countability with a complaint made by an individual.  
75  Busuioc (2013) 221. 
76  M Fink, Nobody’s Fault? Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations During Frontex- 
Coordinated Joint Operations, Research Poster Presentation, 2012, (2012-2), sole page. 
77  This distinction is important because in this thesis, only the public legal accountability of 
FRONTEX will be looked into to any significant extent, as the research question concerns 
accountability for breaches of EU law. 
78  Harlow (2002) 146. 
79  See dictum of the Factory at Chorzów-case, n 45. 
80  See also Sari & Wessel (2013) 127: ‘(…) accountability cannot be discharged effectively if it 
is unclear where responsibility lies’. 
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bility and legal accountability, which will, for the present purposes, be combined 
to the notion of ‘public legal’ accountability.  
1.3 Agency Accountability under International, Regional and Domestic 
Law 
Accountability is applied most frequently in the national context or, if the actions 
took place on an international level, with regards to the classic and most promi-
nent subjects of international law: states.81 However, as the subject of this study, 
FRONTEX, is not a state actor,82 the reasoning whether the Agency can be held 
accountable must also be different. Thus, the legal possibility of holding non-
state entities such as FRONTEX accountable needs to be researched. This needs 
to be done for several levels: international law in general and Council of Europe 
(CoE) law as a relevant regional system (1.3.1), EU law (1.3.2), as well as on a 
national level (1.3.3).  
1.3.1 International Law Rules on Agency Accountability 
Under international law, there seem to be no rules specifically targeting the ac-
countability of supranational organisations’ organs. Thus, similar rules, such as 
the Articles on State Responsibility and on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations will be analysed in order to determine whether they can be ap-
plied to the EU’s FRONTEX-Agency.83  
Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) confirms that on the in-
ternational level, the Union should act in conformity with international law and, 
more specifically, with the principles of the UN Charter and several principles of 
international law. Similarly, article 3(5) TEU states that the ‘Union shall contrib-
ute to (…) the strict observance and the development of international law, in-
cluding respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’. 
The first attempt to codify the rules on the responsibility of international or-
ganisations has taken place between 1996 and 2004 when the International Law 
Association (ILA) created recommendations on the topic,84 but due to the gen-
eral lack of attention paid to these articles in the legal literature, they do not 
seem to have been particularly successful. In contrast, the international legal 
framework for state responsibility for extraterritorial action is quite well-known, 
the ILC articles on the topic having been published in 2001. They are not applica-
                                                                      
81  See eg Shaw (2014), Crawford (2012), whose chapters concerning responsibility exclu-
sively deal with state responsibility. 
82  It is, instead, a ‘specialised expert body’ and an agency within the structure of the EU, see 
Introduction above.  
83  As it was already established that responsibility is a significant part of accountability, the 
application of rules on responsibility seems reasonable. 
84  See ILA, ‘Accountability of International Organisations (1996-2004)’, Overview over 
Committee, 2008. 
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ble ratione materiae to non-state actors, especially not to international organisa-
tions, as article 57 ILC 2001 explicitly mentions.85  
Subjects of any kind of legal framework have both rights and obligations.86 
Traditionally, international organisations are often viewed not to be responsible 
nor accountable for their actions.87 However, there is precedence for contrary 
occurrences,88 even if there is still little practical application of the somewhat 
recent rules on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO).89 They 
were published ten years after the 2001 articles, despite the challenges present-
ed by the ‘general lack of extensive and consistent practice.’90  
The commentary to the ARIO shows clearly that the ILC intended for the ar-
ticles to be applicable to the EU, even though a supranational organisation.91 
The European Commission has even submitted observations during the elabora-
tion of the ARIO in order to make sure that the special characteristics of the EU 
be taken into account92 and a CoE report states explicitly that the ARIO are ap-
plicable to the European Union.93  
According to the commentary of the ARIO provided by the ILC, the terms an 
international organisation uses to address their actors are arbitrary and there-
fore irrelevant.94 Instead, the commentary distinguishes between organ and 
agent by implying that an organ is officially affiliated with the international or-
ganisation while an agent is charged by an organ to (help) accomplish a task.95 
FRONTEX would therefore be considered an organ, as it is officially created by 
and affiliated with the EU.96 A clear advantage of the ARIO compared to what-
ever system an international or supranational organisation might have in place is 
that, according to article 32, an international organisation cannot rely on its own 
rules in order to avoid responsibility and thus, possibly, accountability. However, 
as the non-binding ILC articles are a creation affiliated with the UN, it is ques-
                                                                      
85  Because these articles do not differentiate between inter-, multi- and supranational or-
ganisations and use the word international organisation as an umbrella-notion, this article 
also excludes supranational organisations and their bodies. 
86  J Crawford and S Olleson, ‘The Character and Forms of International Responsibility’, in M 
Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP, Oxford 2014) 444. 
87  Ibid., 474. 
88  See eg Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion) ICJ Rep 1949, 174, where the Court held that the UN could, because of its own 
legal personality, bring international claims. Thus, if it can claim damages for injuries suf-
fered in its service, the argumentum a contrario must be that it can also itself be held ac-
countable for harm inflicted, see eg Shaw (2014) 940. 
89  See recital 5 of the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations; NB: it has 
been shown in 1.2 that responsibility is an essential part of accountability. For an elabora-
tion on that, see 1.4. 
90  Beneyto (2012) 8. 
91  See eg Comment No 20-3, 44ff. 
92  See eg UN Doc. A/CN.4/637, 7. 
93  Beneyto (2012) 8. 
94  ILC (2011), Commentary No 6-1, 17. 
95  ILC (2011), Commentary No 6-2, 17. 
96  See eg Regulation 2007/2004 on the creation of the Agency. 
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tionable whether they might be helpful for individuals in case of violations of 
their rights by FRONTEX. Articles 43 and 49 ARIO even specifically refer to states 
or international organisations as the ones meant to invoke the responsibility of 
an international organisation. Also, article 64 ARIO stresses that the ARIO are lex 
generalis compared to the lex specialis of the international organisation’s rules. It 
has to be remembered, however, that the ARIO are but a non-binding legal 
framework.97 There is no fixed forum, no single specific court which is competent 
to deal with these responsibility and accountability issues.98 It is traditionally – 
but not exclusively –the ICJ which is concerned with the ILC articles due to their 
connection with the United Nations (UN).99  
From the general principle of law ‘pacta sunt servanda’100 follows that inter-
national organisations can be held responsible for breaches of their obliga-
tions.101 However, the issue at present is the accountability of FRONTEX, which 
is not an international organisation in its own rights but an agency of a suprana-
tional organisation. Still, Rijpma argues that the doctrine of positive obligations 
is also applicable to EU agencies and FRONTEX specifically,102 and Bovens con-
curs that EU agencies are susceptible to be held accountable.103  
It is further recognized that international legal personality is indispensable 
for any party to be held accountable,104 the criteria for said international legal 
personality need to be discussed. A subject of international law other than a 
state has international legal personality if  
 
(1)… it is ‘a permanent association of states, or other organisations, with lawful objects, 
equipped with organs’,105 … 
(2)… which includes the possibility to distinguish, ‘in terms of legal powers and purposes, 
between the organization and its member states; and’106 … 
(3) ‘the existence of legal powers [is] exercisable on the international plane and not solely 
within the national system of one or more states’.107 
 
                                                                      
97  ILC (2011), General Comment (3), 2.  
98  See ARIO Commentary, which constantly refers to the ICJ throughout the whole docu-
ment. 
99  Ibid. 
100  See eg Art 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Inter-
national Organizations or between International Organizations (1986). 
101  Crawford & Olleson (2014) 444. 
102  J Rijpma, The proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard: evolution or revolution in 
external border management? (2016) Study for the European Parliament Directorate Gen-
eral for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE 556.934 EN, 29. 
103  Bovens (2007-2) 450. 
104  See eg Article 2 ARIO, also comments No 2.7ff, p 8ff.  
105  Crawford (2012) 169. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid. 
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The European Union fulfils these criteria and additionally, the existence of the 
EU’s international legal personality is derived analogically from article 47 TEU 
and the subsequent case law of the CJEU, especially it’s 1972 ERTA case108 and 
its in foro interno, in foro externo doctrine.109 However, the question examined 
concerns not the accountability of the Union but of its agency, FRONTEX. It is 
therefore necessary to determine the Agency’s international legal personality. 
Article 15 FRONTEX-Regulation110 pronounces that the Agency has legal per-
sonality. The difficulty here corresponds to the one concerning the legal person-
ality of the EU: the international character of the legal personality is not estab-
lished by the founding document. Several arguments can be made in favour and 
against111 the international character of the Agency’s legal personality. It is true 
that the FRONTEX-Regulation only provides for legal personality and not for 
international legal personality.112 However, Fink argues, it is possible to systemi-
cally interpret articles 281 and 282 TFEU which have a similar setup to article 15 
of the FRONTEX-Regulation and which have been interpreted to include interna-
tional legal personality. According to Schusterschitz, this means that they have 
domestic legal personality under the Member States’ national jurisdictions.113 In 
addition, Schusterschlitz points out that relevant State practice needs to be tak-
en into account and that Member States treat EU agencies like subjects of inter-
national law, for instance when signing headquarters agreements with them.114 
Had they not wanted to recognise the agencies’ international legal personalities, 
they could have invoked article 218 TFEU and contracted with the EU instead.115 
All in all, the arguments supporting the international legal personality’s exist-
ence seem more compelling.116, 117  
This means that under international law, it is theoretically possible for 
FRONTEX to be held accountable, as it has international legal personality. It is 
problematic, though, that the sets of rules which might be applied would be 
neither binding nor specifically created in order to hold agencies or other bodies 
of inter-, multi- or supranational organisations accountable. 
                                                                      
108  Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
109  H Waele, Layered Global Player – Legal Dimensions of EU External Relations (Springer, 
Frankfurt a M 2011) 3ff. 
110  The Regulation is, in turn, based on articles 74 and 77 TFEU, see 2.1. 
111  See eg W Hummer, ‘Von der “Agentur” zum “Interinstitutionellen Amt’”’, in Hammer, 
Stefan, Somek, Stelzer, Weichelbaum (eds), Demokratie und sozialer Rechtsstaat in Euro-
pa. Festschrift für Theo Öhlinger (WUV-Universitätsverlag, Wien 2004), 92-130. 
112  Recital 14, article 15 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
113  Schusterschlitz (2004) 170. 
114  Ibid., 172ff. 
115  Ibid., 175ff, 188. 
116  See M Fink, ‘Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns 
Regarding “Technical Relationships”’ (2012) 28/75 Merkourios – International and European 
Migration Law 20, (2012-1) 25. 
117  For a more complete list of arguments which cannot be included here as that would ex-
ceed the parameters of this thesis, see the more recent and more compact discussion in 
Fink (2012-1) 25ff and the very detailed analysis of Schusterschlitz (2004). 
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Added Value of the CoE law 
In Europe, two different regional systems exist. The relevance of the European 
Union in this context is self-explanatory. The Council of Europe’s rules can also 
prove to be of significance, as not only all EU Member States also participate in 
the CoE,118 but as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been 
incorporated in the European Union law acquis,119 too, FRONTEX, as a EU agen-
cy, is bound by it as well, even though the Convention is not referred to directly 
in the FRONTEX-Regulation. As has already been said, all Member States of the 
European Union are members of the Council of Europe (CoE), as well.120 There-
fore, the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are 
binding all EU Member States. As the ECHR has been incorporated in the Euro-
pean Union law acquis,121 too, FRONTEX, as an EU agency, is bound by it as well, 
even though the Convention is not referred to directly in the FRONTEX-
Regulation. Therefore, the CoE system does not serve up its own accountability 
mechanism but offers a set of rules which can supplement the EU law provisions 
on accountability. Article 13 ECHR, the right to an effective remedy, in combina-
tion with article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture and of refoulement, forms the 
requirement of judicial review and of the suspensive effect of appeals.122 This 
seems to refer to a system of accountability under CoE law, as well. Additionally, 
article 47 ECFR, which is part of the EU law acquis and binding since the Lisbon 
Treaty came into force,123 serves as a gateway for the principles of article 6 ECHR 
on the right to a fair trial to be applied to asylum procedures, as well.124 These 
articles allude to an accountability mechanism, which can, logically, either be 
implemented by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which can re-
ceive complaints from anyone claiming to be the victim of a violation of the 
ECHR (article 34 ECHR), or the EU judicial mechanism, where the CoE provisions 
could help create a more complete accountability mechanism and would thus 
server as added value. They all only apply to acts committed by a party to the 
ECHR, which the EU is not as of yet125 but are recognised as general principles of 
EU law under article 6 TEU. They are, however, relatively general and as such not 
sufficiently precise to offer a sufficient framework for accountability on their 
own. Hence, they can only play a supplementary role in the Union’s framework. 
                                                                      
118  Compare lists of members: European Union, ‘Member countries of the EU (year of entry)’, 
Overview, 25/01/2016 & CoE, ‘Our member States’, Map and List, 2015. 
119  Art 6 TEU. 
120  See n 118.  
121  Art 6 TEU. 
122  Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder, Wouters (2014), 277. 
123  S Greer, ‘Europe’, in D Moeckli, S Shah and S Sivakumaran (eds), International Human 
Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2014) 437. 
124  S Douglas-Scott, ‘The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ 
(2011) 4/11 Human Rights Law Review 645. 
125  See P Waagstein, ‘Human Rights Protection in Europe: Between Strasbourg and Luxem-
bourg’ (2010) Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, SPICE Digest, 1; on the 
status of the EU accession to the ECHR, see eg ECtHR: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/ 
home.aspx?p=basictexts/accession EU&c=, accessed on 21/04/2016.  
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1.3.2 European Union Law Rules on Agency Accountability 
The European Union has recognised the importance of accountability and has 
discussed the ways it may apply in the EU legal order, as well.126 The findings of 
the European legal order with regards to the concept are going to be explored in 
the following Section. However, here, the analysis will be limited to general 
mechanisms of European law, while those directly and exclusively pertaining to 
FRONTEX will be explored in Chapters 2-4. Furthermore, staying within the 
scope of this thesis, only the two most important mechanisms are going to be 
discussed at this point.  
The standard measure to challenge administrative action is judicial review; 
no matter whether the action is a form of governmental power exerted at the 
domestic level or a form of power accorded, in whatever way it might be, by a 
certain group of states to an international actor.127 On the European Union level, 
the competence to exert said scrutiny over acts of EU institutions is conferred to 
the CJEU by article 263 TFEU. Especially interesting for the present purposes is 
the last sentence of the first paragraph of said article: ‘It (the CJEU) shall also 
review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.’128 
Oliver stresses that there is a difference between legal accountability and ju-
dicial review, as legal accountability implies only that procedural restraints be 
imposed upon the administration as well as that a right of legal action be award-
ed to the alleged victims of the administration’s actions and further, the judicial 
body to which’s attention the matter is brought has the power to impose the 
obligation to correct the damage caused to the victims.129 Accountability can be 
both judicial and extrajudicial.130 This is logically not the case for judicial review, 
the name of which alone excludes it from extrajudicial actions.  
It can be concluded from this and the wording of article 263 (1) TFEU that the 
power to demand public legal accountability of the FRONTEX-Agency is includ-
ed in the competences of the CJEU as conferred by article 263 TFEU. It has been 
pointed out that the most important aspect of (public) legal accountability is 
judicial accountability, which is enforced by courts.131 However, speaking of the 
wording of said article, the only acts the CJEU has the competence to review are 
                                                                      
126  See European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 1. 
127  Harlow (2002) 145. 
128  According to Beneyto (2012) 18, the European Union is the only international organisa-
tion to have created courts with competence over issues of non-contractual liability. He 
does not distinguish between international and supranational organisations. 
129  D Oliver, Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for Accountability, Effectiveness 
and Citizenship (Open University Press, Milton Keynes 1991), 26, cited in Harlow (2002) 
146. 
129  See also Harlow (2002) 6f. 
130  Busuioc (2013) 12. 
131  Busuioc (2013) 196. 
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those ‘intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’.132 This means 
that the judicial accountability of FRONTEX is very limited. Furthermore, engag-
ing the Court’s accountability mechanism involves significant costs, as well as 
narrow rules on time limits and locus standi (see eg articles 263(4) and 265(3) 
TFEU), which renders the Court nearly inaccessible for many individuals.133 Espe-
cially in the present case, individuals will not have a locus standi as they can only 
ask the CJEU to review acts which address or concern them individually. 
FRONTEX, as a regulatory agency, does not produce such acts. In addition, in 
2014, the average duration of direct action cases pending before the Court was 
20 months.134 It can be questioned whether such a long duration is compatible 
with the principle of effective remedy. 
FRONTEX, like all EU agencies, is extra-judicially accountable vis-à-vis the 
European Ombudsman.135 The European Ombudsman is an extra-judicial forum 
created in order to make up for the judiciary’s shortcomings as well as in order to 
create a form of control over the executive.136 Its role is designed to be comple-
mentary to the judicial accountability mechanism of the CJEU.137 According to 
article 228(1) TFEU,138 it can receive complaints from any natural or legal person, 
whether they are an EU citizen or whether they are residing or having their regis-
                                                                      
132  See also EP (2016), Factsheet ‘Competences of the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion’, under A.2; this provision stating that only regulatory acts can be subject to such an 
action follows from the Plaumann doctrine, Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission of 
the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 199.  
133  Busuioc (2013) 219f. 
134  See CJEU press release No 27/15 (2015) 1. Preliminary rulings took an average of 15 
months and appeals took 14.5 months.  
135  Busuioc (2013) 221. 
136  A Tsadiras, ‘The Ombudsman’ in P Craig (ed), EU Administrative Law (OUP, Oxford 2012) 
739; see also Busuioc (2013) 221. 
137  Busuioc (2013) 222. 
138  Article 228 (1) TFEU: A European Ombudsman, elected by the European Parliament, shall be 
empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal per-
son residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning instances of 
maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with 
the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role. He or 
she shall examine such complaints and report on them.  
In accordance with his duties, the Ombudsman shall conduct inquiries for which he finds 
grounds, either on his own initiative or on the basis of complaints submitted to him direct or 
through a Member of the European Parliament, except where the alleged facts are or have 
been the subject of legal proceedings. Where the Ombudsman establishes an instance of 
maladministration, he shall refer the matter to the institution, body, office or agency con-
cerned, which shall have a period of three months in which to inform him of its views. The 
Ombudsman shall then forward a report to the European Parliament and the institution, 
body, office or agency concerned. The person lodging the complaint shall be informed of the 
outcome of such inquiries. 
The Ombudsman shall submit an annual report to the European Parliament on the outcome 
of his inquiries. (All direct quotations of legal provisions will be marked in italics in the 
footnotes of this thesis). 
CHAPTER 1 
 
26 
tered office in a Member State.139 The complaints may concern any ‘instances of 
maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union act-
ing in its judicial role’.140 This includes FRONTEX, which is a European agency.141 
The scope of controllable actions by the Ombudsman is rather limited: It can 
follow up on behaviour, on factual acts but not on acts with legal consequenc-
es.142 It is the Ombudsman’s task to follow up on the allegations and to report on 
them. If the Ombudsman finds the allegations justified, he or she addresses the 
body or agency in question, gives them a period of time in order to issue a 
statement in response and can then decide to forward the report to the Europe-
an Parliament.143 Unfortunately, the reports of the European Ombudsman often 
stay without significant consequence.144 
The Ombudsman is completely independent from all other entities.145 This is 
both advantageous and essential to the effectivity of its role as an impartial and 
objective instance of accountability. Also, its criteria for accepting to examine 
allegations are much broader than the ones of the CJEU. There are no costs in-
volved for the complainant and the Ombudsman can even act on its own initia-
tive.146 However, the fact that its reports are not binding presents a serious dis-
advantage with regards to judicial accountability mechanisms. The Ombudsman 
cannot question existing legislation but only the practice of European bodies and 
institutions nor can it question expert opinions.147 Also, the fact that individual 
complaints may only be lodged by EU citizens or persons living in the EU is a 
major drawback, as many persons alleging to have been victims of violations of 
EU law or of human rights do not reside within the EU.148 Even in terms of the 
time it takes to issue reports, the Ombudsman does not have a better record 
than the CJEU, in certain cases taking up to three years to respond to allega-
tions.149 It can be questioned whether this is in fact a real accountability mecha-
nism, because while steps 1 and 2, informing and debating, might be fulfilled, 
                                                                      
139  See also article 2(2) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman. 
140  See also article 2(1) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman. 
141  See 1.1.  
142  See the clarification in European Ombudsman, ‘Could he help you?’.  
143  Article 228(1)(2) TFEU, articles 3(1), (6), (7) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman. 
144   HJ Blanke, S Mangiameli (eds), The Treaty on European Union (TEU): A Commentary 
(Springer Verlag, Heidelberg/New York 2013), 598. 
145  Article 228(3) TFEU: The Ombudsman shall be completely independent in the performance 
of his duties. In the performance of those duties he shall neither seek nor take instructions 
from any Government, institution, body, office or entity. The Ombudsman may not, during 
his term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. 
146  Busuioc (2013) 224. 
147  Ibid., 239. 
148  F Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: Towards Harmonised Data Protection Principles for Information Exchange at EU-
level (Springer Science & Business Media, Dordrecht 2011) 248. 
149  Busuioc (2013) 240. 
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the last step of determining possible consequences, of sanctioning, is over-
looked.150  
The discussions which have persisted for quite some time now about the in-
troduction of an individual complaint mechanism need to be mentioned at this 
point, but will not be analysed here. This issue, as well as the concrete mecha-
nisms which are mentioned in the FRONTEX-Regulation will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Accountability mechanisms exist under EU law. Especially well-known is the 
EU Ombudsman, and the CJEU may also be called an accountability mechanism. 
Both have their advantages and disadvantages, even though it seems as though 
the disadvantages predominate. Although they are both open to individuals, the 
conditions for access are restrictive and the effectiveness of the Ombudsman’s 
non-binding recommendations are questionable. 
1.3.3 Agency Accountability under the National Laws of the EU Member 
States 
As the EU Member States are often directly involved in FRONTEX Operations 
and even host them,151 the idea that Member States might want for FRONTEX 
to be held accountable before their domestic courts does not seem to be too far-
fetched. While, according to article 47 TEU, the EU possesses domestic legal 
personality, article 343 TFEU and Protocol 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the European Union of 1965 protect the Union from many national accountabil-
ity mechanisms. However, in a conflict between EU Member States and the 
United States of America, a representative claimed on behalf of the Member 
States that the US’ claim was inadmissible because of the lack of exhaustion of 
local remedies in relation to an EC Regulation. The EU Member States' domestic 
courts also asserted their jurisdiction to review international (including suprana-
tional) organisations’ actions if necessary to ensure the right to an effective legal 
remedy.152 The ECtHR, for its part, has introduced a test concerning ‘reasonable 
                                                                      
150  See also Busuioc (2013) 224. 
151  See Chapters 2 and 3. 
152  In addition, the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) has stressed numerous times that 
it has the competence to control whether legal acts of European Union organs and insti-
tutions were intra or ultra vires, compatible with their sovereign powers or not (Maastricht 
Judgment, BVerfGE 75, 223 and BVerfG 12/10/1993, § 5). This refers to a legal act of the 
Union, though, and not to violations of EU law factually committed by a EU agency. It 
has, however, been submitted as a conclusion to different pieces of case law that the 
right to an effective legal remedy implies that legal action can be initiated against inter-
national and even supranational organisations in domestic forums (AM Thévenot-Werner, 
‘The right of Staff Members to a Tribunal as a Limit to the Jurisdictional Immunity of In-
ternational Organisations in Europe’, in M Devers, A Peters, AM Thévenot-Werner and P 
Zbinden (eds), Les Acteurs A l’Ere du Constitutionnalisme Global (Société de Legislation 
Comparée, Paris 2014) 166)). The reasoning behind this differs. The BVerfG has argued in 
its Eurocontrol case that it sees no reservations concerning a domestic court’s interna-
tional competence to offer judicial protection against legal acts of said intergovernmental 
→ 
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alternative means’ to access effective judicial remedy in Waite and Kennedy v 
Germany and Beer and Regan v Germany,153 meaning that an international or-
ganisation’s immunity is waived and its accountability before national courts 
ensured if said organisation does not in itself possess a sufficient complaint 
mechanism.154  
Therefore, if FRONTEX can be held accountable before national courts 
depends on whether it is considered to be offering an effective legal remedy. If 
this were the case, FRONTEX would be exempted from national accountability 
mechanisms as such and judicial review on a national level would only be possi-
ble if national FRONTEX-members acted on the basis of national law.155 Lacking 
an individual complaint mechanism,156 FRONTEX cannot be considered to offer 
an effective legal remedy. However, article 274 TFEU serves as a basis to reason 
e contrario that whenever jurisdiction is conferred to the CJEU, the disputes to 
which the EU is a party are excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member States. In article 19, especially 19(4) FRONTEX-Regulation, jurisdiction 
is indeed conferred to the CJEU. Hence, the courts of the Member States are not 
competent to hold FRONTEX accountable.  
1.3.4 Preliminary Conclusions 
In conclusion, FRONTEX can be held accountable in a range of judicial systems, 
including the international one, most likely represented by the ICJ, in the CJEU 
and the ECtHR.  
For FRONTEX to be held accountable under international law, it is indispen-
sable for the Agency to have international legal personality. While there is a 
                                                                      
organisation. This refers, again, only to legal acts. In Eurocontrol II (BVerfGE, 2. Senat, 
Hetzel v Eurocontrol (Eurocontrol II), 10 Nov. 1981, §§ 59, 63, §§ 79-100), the Court reiter-
ated that it had the capacity to check whether the limits to the authorisation to transfer 
sovereign powers to an international organisation had been exceeded eg by not ensuring 
access to an effective legal remedy to acts of this organisation (Thévenot-Werner (2014) 
114). The French Cour de Cassation approached the subject with a different argument, try-
ing to decide whether granting international organisations immunity meant denial of jus-
tice for those harmed by said organisations if those organisations had no sufficient dis-
pute settlement mechanism and if this could be avoided by recognising the ECHR’s pri-
macy (Cour de Cassation, Hintermann c Union de l’Europe occidentale, 04/11/1995, Rapport 
annuel, 1995, 418). Finally, the Paris Court of Appeal decided to reject an international or-
ganisation’s immunity in order to ensure an effective legal remedy (Cour d’appel de Paris, 
decision of 19/06/1998, cited in Thévenot-Werner (2014) 114. See also Smolinska et al., 
Droit international des relations diplomatiques et consulaires (Primento, Groupe Larcier, 
Editions Bruylant, Brussels 2015) § 395. 
153  Waite and Kennedy v Germany [GC] (App no 26083/94) §67, ECHR 1999-I; Beer and Regan 
v Germany [GC] (App no 28934/95), §57, 18 February 1999. 
154  Thévenot-Werner (2014) 115. 
155  Boehm (2011) 249. 
156  See eg European Parliament, Committees of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, and 
of Petitions, ‘Make it easier for migrants to complain about Frontex border guards, MEP 
say’, Press Release, 24/11/2015. 
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strong opposition to the recognition of FRONTEX’ international legal personali-
ty, it seems more convincing to presume its existence with arguments analogous 
to those employed by the ECJ in the ERTA judgement, in which the European 
Union’s international legal personality was established. While international law 
can evolve and is not entirely static,157 it is more accurate to refer to the EU legal 
system as a living instrument as it evolves quickly and adapts its legislative acts 
with a very high frequency, especially compared to the evolution of international 
law.158 Thus, EU law is generally better suited to concern itself with breaches of 
EU law by an EU agency, especially also because it is the regional law system the 
agencies are created under and which is therefore better suited to address any-
thing concerning EU agencies than the much more general and superficial EU 
law. The ECHR’s relevant provisions cannot be relied on in this context, because, 
while the EU accords them a principle of EU law status,159 they are too general 
and do not offer a sufficiently complete framework to hold an EU agency ac-
countable. They may, however, serve to supplement EU law rules on the matter. 
The CJEU and the European Ombudsman are both technically competent to 
hold EU agencies accountable, but important issues arise: The CJEU can only 
review acts intended to produce legal effects and individuals cannot easily lodge 
a complaint with it. Furthermore, its competence for judicial review is limited to 
acts intended to produce legal effects. As FRONTEX does not have the compe-
tence for producing such acts,160 this mechanism is not fitting for the purpose of 
this thesis. The EU Ombudsman’s mechanism is problematic as it contains issues 
with regards to locus standi and drawn-out procedures, as well as being inacces-
sible to non-EU citizens residing outside the Union. Because jurisdiction is con-
ferred to the CJEU in compliance with article 274 TFEU, FRONTEX cannot be 
brought before a national court of an EU Member State, which can then apply 
EU law to the Agency’s actions.  
It is potentially possible for FRONTEX to be held accountable on different 
levels of law. However, not all of these levels are equally appropriate and well-
adapted to effectively deal with the question to what extent FRONTEX can be 
held accountable for breaches of EU law. International law is much more general 
than EU law, around which EU agencies are designed and which those agencies 
are obligated to comply with. It is furthermore unclear which specific forum un-
der international law would best be concerned with European agency accounta-
bility. EU law is and EU forums are much closer to the issue and thus have a bet-
ter appreciation if the situation. Also, accountees established under EU law are 
logically better suited to appreciate whether accountability for breaches of EU 
                                                                      
157  See eg C Djeffal, Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction 
(CUP, Cambridge 2015) 3. 
158  H Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation: Art and Technology of Rules for Regulation (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2014), around fn 26ff (no page numbers nor numbered paragraphs available); 
N Moussis, Access to the European Union: Law, Economics, Policies (21st edn, Intersentia, 
Antwerp 2015) 45.  
159  Article 6(3) TEU. 
160  Because it is a regulatory agency, see the references under nn 23-25. 
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law needs to be engaged and what consequences are appropriate. A forum es-
tablished under the national law of a Member State and applying domestic ac-
countability provisions might theoretically be well-enough suited to evaluate 
FRONTEX accountability for breaches of EU law, especially as EU law is either 
directly applicable in the Member States or needs to be implemented into the 
States’ national law systems. However, under domestic law, it would hardly be 
possible to make do with one single forum, as it is improbable that every individ-
ual who might possibly have suffered from the consequences of a violation of EU 
law FRONTEX is accountable for would have a locus standi under whichever 
domestic law. 
1.4 Criteria for FRONTEX’ Public Legal Accountability for Breaches of EU 
Law 
In a critical internet-blog, FRONTEX has been called the ‘Kerberos of the EU 
external border regime’.161 It is just one of many metaphors, others equalling 
FRONTEX with the creation of a Fortress Europe.162 Whether the former com-
parison is accurate or not can certainly be discussed, given that Hades’ three-
headed guard dog is, by all accounts, meant to prevent the dead from leaving 
the underworld and the living from entering,163 but the impression the metaphor 
is intended to convey can be understood nevertheless. 
This expression illustrates well the Agency’s position of power from which it 
impacts a great number of individuals’ lives significantly164 and can easily com-
mit, deliberately or not, serious fundamental rights violations, especially in con-
nection with its Joint Operations (JOs).165 This possibility of large-scale funda-
mental rights violations calls for a way to demand reparation, especially for indi-
                                                                      
161  By the authors of the blog FRONTEXWATCH, http://frontex.antira.info/frontexwatch/, 
accessed on 18/04/2016.  
162  E Papastavridis, ‘“Fortress Europe” and FRONTEX: Within or Without International Law?’ 
(2010) 1/79 Nordic Journal of International Law 75, title. 
163  See eg M Bloomfield, Cerberus, The Dog of Hades – The History of an Idea (The Open Court 
Publishing Company, Chicago 1905) 1ff.  
164  See eg FRONTEX’ role in intercepting (articles 3a(1)(j) & 8e(1)(j) FRONTEX-Regulation) 
and returning (see eg art 9 FRONTEX-Regulation) irregular migrants. 
165  Such as push-backs, violations of the principle of non-refoulement, of the right to effective 
remedy etc. See publications by civil society such as Amnesty International (2014-1,-2), 
Pro Asyl (2014), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Pushed Back, Pushed Around – Italy’s Forced 
Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers (Human Rights Watch, New York 2009); Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty 
Hands – Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece (Report) (21 
September 2011) (Human Rights Watch, New York 2011), and M Kreickenbaum, ‘EU bor-
der agency Frontex guilty of massive breach of human rights’, Article for the World So-
cialist Web Site of the International Committee of the Fourth International, 28/10/2013. 
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viduals, who are naturally in a very vulnerable position.166 Thus, it is vital to bal-
ance FRONTEX’ inherent independence, stemming from its agency-status, with 
accountability instances serving as a sort of checks and balances-mechanism. 
Still, FRONTEX submits that it is not responsible nor accountable for its actions, 
which it claims are only of a facilitating nature.167 This, however, would only be 
true if FRONTEX did not fulfil a number of public legal accountability criteria. 
This view seems to be shared by the CoE’s Rapporteur on Migration, Refugees 
and Displaced Persons who, according to the European Ombudsman, considered 
FRONTEX’ position that Member States were the only ones to be held account-
able for eventual human rights violations ‘a shortcut and would not stand up 
under a Court's assessment’.168 
Yarwood has pointed out that ‘subjective factors influence the pursuit of ac-
countability in a given context’ and that, therefore, no universally applicable 
criteria for accountability could be established.169 Bovens concurs, observing 
that ‘there is no general consensus about the standards for accountable behav-
iour’ and says that those standards differ widely depending on the situation and 
the roles of the actors involved.170 Thus, the fact to keep in mind, first and fore-
most, is that accountability is not a standardised concept that applies equally 
and in the same way to every actor called to account. Therefore, the criteria for 
establishing FRONTEX’ accountability for breaches of EU law need to be tailored 
to the given situation, they need to be determined for the exact context. 
Attribution must necessarily be established, as agencies cannot de facto act 
themselves, but it will not be discussed to any extent as the focus of this thesis 
lies on other, perhaps more controversial issues.171 
                                                                      
166  Because of their respective hierarchical positions and the inherently unequal amount of 
power, competences and influence of the Agency and any ordinary person who might 
come in contact with it. 
167  See eg 1(2) FRONTEX-Regulation and FRONTEX, ‘Response to the Ombudsman’s Spe-
cific Questions’, Annex 1 to FRONTEX’ Response to the Ombudsman’s Own-Initiative In-
quiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ, 17/05/2012, 3. 
168  See European Ombudsman, Special Report in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ, 
07/11/2013.  
169  L Yarwood, State Accountability under International Law: Holding States Accountable for a 
Breach of Jus Cogens Norms (Routledge, New York 2011), first page of chapter 2 (page 
numbers missing). 
170  Bovens (2007-2) 450. 
171  For a subject of international law which is not a natural person to be held accountable, it is 
necessary that the act or omission it is accused of can also be attributed to them (M den 
Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012) 60). Attribution 
is necessary because by their very nature, agencies, just like organisations or states, can-
not act for themselves, as they have no physical body nor limbs to execute their plans. 
The ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations stress the impor-
tance of attribution in article 4. Article 6(1) ARIO confirms that the ‘conduct of an organ or 
agent of an international organization in the performance of functions of that organ or 
agent shall be considered an act of that organization under international law, whatever 
position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization’.  
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The EU institutions’ Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies claims 
for all these agencies to have the same accountability standards, namely: obliga-
tion to report, internal and external audit, discharge, warning system, evalua-
tion, transparency and coherence and prevention, detection and investigation of 
fraud, corruption, irregularities and other illegal activities.172 Much of these crite-
ria are not appropriate to establish accountability for breaches of EU law. To 
inspect the Agency’s accounts may be conductive to another kind of accounta-
bility, but does not contribute to establishing whether the Agency can be held 
accountable for a breach of EU law. Discharge and prevention, detection and 
investigation of fraud, corruption etc equally concern an agency’s financial situa-
tion, which is not the focus of this thesis. The obligation to report is part of the 
transparency process, as will be established in the next Sub-Chapter. 
As there are no clear uniform criteria for accountability, especially not for 
public legal accountability, it will be the aim of this and the following Sub-
Chapters to identify the most important ones. It has been established in Sub-
Chapter 1.2 that responsibility is a necessary part of accountability. This is cor-
roborated by Koppell, who has also identified another four criteria for accounta-
bility: apart from responsibility, he adds transparency, liability, controllability, 
and responsiveness.173 Those criteria are rather broad and not all of them are 
appropriate in the present case. It is immediately clear that transparency174 is, 
indeed, a necessary factor of accountability, as transparency implies giving ac-
cess to information about something, which is essential to the first two phases of 
accountability Bovens identified: informing and debating.175 
Responsibility is already recognised as a necessary part of accountability.176 
It is important to distinguish it from Koppel’s criterion of ‘responsiveness’. Re-
sponsiveness is a criterion of political accountability and means that those in 
power should be responsive, ie sensitive to the needs and concerns of the citi-
zens.177  
The common definitions of liability do not serve to convince that liability 
should be a separate criterion for FRONTEX’ public legal accountability, as it 
may, in these forms, neatly be sorted under the umbrella of the responsibility-
criteria.178 It is thus not possible to clearly delimit the concept of liability from 
                                                                      
172  European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 11ff. 
173  J Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Account-
abilities Disorder”’ (2005) 65(1) Public Administration Review 94, 94. 
174  The Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary & Thesaurus defines transparency as ‘the 
quality of being done in an open way without secrets: We want more transparency in 
government.’ (See http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/transparency, 
accessed on 27/06/2016).  
175  See 1.2. 
176  Ibid. 
177  Goetz & Jenkins (2002) 8. 
178  Cornock defines liability as a legal concept implying that there is a disadvantage for the 
person who is liable, the disadvantage often being having to account for one’s actions in a 
legal framework (Cornock (2011) 1). He sees liability as a form of legal accountability 
where the accountee not only has to give an account but may also suffer a legal sanction 
→ 
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transparency and responsibility. In the interest of legal certainty, it is, however, 
rather important to be as precise as possible when establishing criteria so that it 
will be actually possible to establish whether the criterion has been fulfilled. So, 
in order to have clear criteria and concepts, liability will not be introduced as a 
separate criterion but will be considered to be a part of responsibility.  
Transparency and (shared) responsibility as the most necessary criteria for 
establishing FRONTEX’ accountability for breaches of EU law will now be dis-
cussed. It is vital to understand that this thesis does not strive to prove that 
FRONTEX needs to be held accountable as the main and sole party. The aim is to 
show that FRONTEX can, at least, be a party, one of several accountables in a 
mechanism of shared accountability. It will be analysed which criteria FRONTEX 
needs to fulfil to be held accountable for actions. The transparency criteria will 
be discussed in Section 1.4.1 and the responsibility criteria in Section 1.4.2. 
1.4.1 FRONTEX’ Obligations of Transparency 
The obligation of transparency is central to establishing FRONTEX’ accountabil-
ity.179 Not only the general public should benefit from FRONTEX’ partial trans-
parency.180 There needs to be absolute transparency to one forum, so that too 
many cooks do not spoil the broth.181 Transparency shows a kind of dependence 
on a certain forum in form of the obligation to inform and to debate, the first two 
steps needed in an accountability mechanism as defined in Sub-Chapter 1.2. The 
following requirements of transparency should not be understood to be consti-
tutive of accountability; ie, if there is insufficient transparency, this should not 
mean that accountability is excluded. The requirements are, however, meant to 
illustrate whether an existing mechanism is adequate. Transparency should be 
adjusted to be sufficient for the purposes of accountability.  
Bovens has at several instances stressed that transparency alone is not suffi-
cient to constitute accountability.182 He further explains that this insufficiency 
stems from the fact that ‘transparency does not necessarily involve scrutiny by a 
specific forum’.183 It is vital that the obligation to report and to submit to the 
scrutiny of a forum concern one specific forum, as control is always less effective 
                                                                      
(Cornock (2011) 1.). This definition cannot be adopted in this context, as it is close to iden-
tical to the concept of legal accountability as defined for the purposes of this paper. 
Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law defines liability as ‘the condition of being actually or po-
tentially subject to an obligation, either generally, as including every kind of obligation, or 
in a more special sense, to denote inchoate, future, unascertained or imperfect obliga-
tions, as opposed to debts, the essence of which is that they are ascertained and certain. 
Thus when a person becomes surety for another, he makes himself liable, though it is un-
ascertained in what obligation or debt the liability may ultimately result’ (Burke (1977) 
1091). 
179  Fink (2012-2) sole page.  
180  See 4.1 about Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents. 
181  See n 188.  
182  Bovens (2007-2) 453, (2007-3) 107. 
183  Ibid.  
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when divided between several parties.184 It is furthermore important that the 
specific forum FRONTEX is obligated to report to has the competence to mete 
out consequences, in the best case even sanctions, as spelled out in the last step 
of the aforementioned accountability mechanism.185 Lastly, the forum should 
ideally be an instance outside the framework of and autonomous from the ac-
countable in order to ensure objective and impartial investigation, as it is the 
forum which also determines the consequences and possible sanctions.186 
Bovens points out that accountability should be more diagonal,187 with inde-
pendent instances instead of involved parties with potential ulterior motives 
having the competence to decide on the consequences for the Agency. The 
model in which the Agency’s accountability is ensured by a hierarchically higher 
placed forum is not universally accepted, but it seems to be the most commonly 
defended one.188 It should be added in this special case that the possibility for 
                                                                      
184  See in this sense also Fink (2016) § 1.  
185  See 1.2 for the necessary elements of accountability: informing, debating, imposition of 
consequences.  
186  Bovens (2007-2) 451; Bovens, Schillemann, ’t Hart (2008) 231. 
187  See eg Bovens (2007-2) 460. 
188  Another commonly defended method is the principal-agent approach. To discuss it in-
depth would not fit within the framework of this thesis, but a short overview will be given 
for completeness’ sake: The discussion about the principal-agent approach has an impact 
on the determination of the correct forum for FRONTEX’ public legal accountability for 
breaches of EU law: The approach can be taken to mean that the principal is responsible 
for holding the agent accountable (Schillemann and Busuioc (2014) 2ff). Principal and 
agent are generally used synonymously to forum and agent respectively. A concern has 
been expressed that the principal-agent approach is unsuitable for the case of FRONTEX 
as it is not certain by whom the Agency’s powers were conferred (Pollack & Slominski 
(2009) 905; Fink (2012) 24ff, D Curtin, ‘Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative 
Actors to Public Account’ (2007) 4/13 European Law Journal 523, 528). The discussion 
mostly focuses on the Commission and the Council as principals, and Curtin submits that 
even though generally, powers are delegated to agencies by the Commission (Fink (2012) 
24), the Council is the most likely principal, judging from the Agency’s setup (Curtin 
(2007) 528: ‘In the case of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-
operation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), it can be argued that the Council did not 
delegate its own existing executive powers but rather that the tasks in question had been 
largely exercised by the Member States and not the Council (or the Commission). At the 
same time, the agency replaces in a sense much of the fragmentary and opaque struc-
tures that were attached to the Council in one form or another, for example the Common 
Unit for External Border Practitioners (SCIFA) that was a Council Working Party. Perhaps 
it is the latter fact that explains why, despite being proposed by the Commission, the in-
stitutional design of the agency is very much leaning towards the Council as principal.’) 
Nevertheless, Guild et al. argue that the whole model is structurally incompatible with 
certain EU agencies such as FRONTEX because the agencies are governed experimentally 
(An ‘experimentalist’ form of governance (…) establishes deliberately provisional frame-
works for action and elaborates and revises these in light of recursive review of efforts to 
implement them in various contexts’ (C Sabel and J Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, 
unpublished version 2011, 2) and can therefore not be applied (E Guild, S Carrera, L Her-
tog and J Parkin, Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Impact 
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the accountability mechanism also to be initiated by an individual should exist. It 
would thus be initiated by someone who has been directly concerned by an al-
leged breach of EU law. This is because a mechanism which only allows subjects 
of international law, such as states or international organisations or, in this case, 
bodies of the EU access will be less all-encompassing and less universal. The 
reason for this is that it is not always an easy feat for individuals to go the indi-
rect way, meaning to reach the competent authorities and have them acknowl-
edge their complaints. FRONTEX public legal accountability for breaches of EU 
law should entail legally binding consequences. This has several reasons: A con-
sequence which is legally binding will be more effective insofar as that it is en-
sured that the entity upon which the consequence was imposed actually realises 
it.189 Furthermore, sanctions have a better preventive effect than non-compul-
sive consequences and thus deter the Agency from letting breaches of EU law 
happen too easily.190 It has been shown that these elements of transparency 
fulfil the criteria of answerability and enforceability mentioned in Sub-Chapter 
1.2, as FRONTEX has to provide information about its actions and justifications 
for their correctness, and has to suffer sanctions if the forum is dissatisfied either 
with the actions themselves or with the reasoning behind them.191 
1.4.2 FRONTEX’ Responsibility for Breaches of EU Law 
FRONTEX has to be responsible for the breach of EU law in order to suffer delib-
erately imposed consequences for that breach.192 It is not necessary to establish 
that FRONTEX is the sole responsible for said actions, as responsibility can po-
tentially be shared in international law.193 This serves to stop the practice of 
blame-shifting between several international actors involved in a situation.194 
While this is not yet a principle of international law, joint responsibility is a con-
                                                                      
on EU Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office, 
Study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) (CEPS, Brussels 2011) 90. 
189  At least for fear of recrimination. The reasoning is similar as in n225.  
190  See eg Magnussen (2001), 49; see also Bovens, Schillemann, ’t Hart (2008) 232, Bovens 
(2007-2) 463f.; NB: Bovens criticizes that the term ‘sanctions’ has very negative connota-
tions and therefore prefers the term ‘consequences’. Here, however, the term ‘sanction’ is 
emphasized, because the negative, deterrent effect is seen to be of very high value in the 
field of fundamental rights protection, where positive reinforcement may not offer suffi-
cient protection. 
191  As also explained by Goetz and Jenkins (2002) 5. 
192  See eg Crawford (2012) 540. 
193  S Trevisanut, Shared Responsibility Aspects in Search and Rescue Operations at Sea, 
SHARES Research Paper 102, 2016, forthcoming in A Nollkaemper and I Plakokefalos 
(eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2016), 2; 
see also A Nollkaemper and D Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Con-
ceptual Framework’ (2013) 34:359 Michigan Journal of International Law 359, 363. 
194  Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013) 392f; Nollkaemper (2014). 
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cept much discussed in the present day195 and it is even officially claimed that 
FRONTEX and the Member States often share the responsibility for coordinating 
JOs and other activities.196 
An actor can be responsible for actions and omissions. FRONTEX’ responsi-
bility is, however, not established via the same criteria in these two cases.  
 
FRONTEX’ Control Over Its Own Actions 
It is time and time again stressed that FRONTEX’ role is a secondary one, as it is 
portrayed not to act for itself but to facilitate and coordinate for the Member 
States.197 This paragraph will establish that, if FRONTEX has a certain degree of 
independence, of control over the actions, most commonly198 the JOs it partici-
pates in, its facilitating role is not, as such, a reason to deny the possibility that 
the Agency can be held accountable for breaches of EU law. According to 
Majone, independence can be beneficial to the recognition of the capability to 
be held accountable.199 It is additionally important to distinguish control, as used 
in this thesis, from the definition of accountability several authors use, equating 
accountability with a forum’s control over an actor, although control, in contrast 
to accountability, can occur both ex post and ex ante facto. Here, control needs 
to be understood as the Agency’s control over its actions.200 FRONTEX does not 
have many activities which it undertakes on its own. Therefore, this criterion is 
meant to establish that FRONTEX has a sufficiently high degree of independ-
ence from the other actors involved in its actions, ie the EU Member States, to 
establish that it would be appropriate to hold it jointly responsible and account-
able and subject it to any possible consequences. Therefore, it needs to be 
                                                                      
195  See eg the University of Amsterdam’s SHARES project led by A. Nollkaemper under 
www.sharesproject.nl, with contributions of well-known legal experts such as J Crawford 
(see his lecture of 28/04/ 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHL48W3zFzw). 
196  Ramboll Management Consulting, External Evaluation of the Agency under Art 33 of the 
Frontex Regulation, Final Report, Ramboll Management Consulting and EurAsylum Ltd, 
July 2015, 31. 
197  See 2.2.3. 
198  Most commonly, because they bear the biggest potential for FR violations, which are the 
foremost reason for complaints as to the Agency’s accountability; see 3.1. 
199  G Majone, Independence vs. Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic 
Government in Europe (1994) 94/3 EUI Working Papers in Political and Social Sciences 26; 
see M Scholten, ‘Legal Debate – Independence vs. Accountability: Proving The Negative 
Correlation’ (2014) 1/21 Maastricht Journal 197, 197f. 
200  NB: FRONTEX, as an agency, cannot act for itself but needs its agents to do so in its 
name. Therefore, the first step which needs to be taken when determining whether 
FRONTEX can be held accountable for a concrete action is to examine whether the action 
can be attributed to the Agency. M Fink, ‘A “Blind Spot” in the Framework of Interna-
tional Responsibility? Third Party Responsibility for Human Rights Violations: The Case of 
Frontex’, in T Gammeltoft-Hansen and J Vedsted-Hansen (eds), Human Rights and the 
Dark Side of Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement (Routledge, New York 2015) 
(2015-1) 9, confirms that attribution is determined on the basis of a party’s control over a 
wrongful conduct. 
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shown that FRONTEX’ actions are independent, to a degree, from those of the 
Member States, in order to prove that, at least, shared accountability is possible.  
The same criteria do not apply to FRONTEX’ omissions. 
 
Foreseeability for FRONTEX of the Breach of EU Law 
The international law doctrine of positive obligations applies to the Agency and 
that thus, it can be held accountable if it omits to fulfil its positive obligation to 
protect,201 ‘which entails a duty to protect individuals from fundamental rights 
violations committed by others’202 such as national border guards.203 Rijpma 
adds that accountability ‘on this basis arises when a fundamental rights violation 
is foreseeable but the addressee of the obligation does not take reasonable steps 
to prevent the violation’.204  
It is firstly necessary to establish that FRONTEX is bound by such positive ob-
ligations. The ECHR contains positive obligations,205 which are part of the ECFR 
based on article 52(3) ECFR, which states that rights enshrined both in the ECFR 
and the ECHR shall be accorded the same meaning and impact under the ECFR 
as under the ECHR. Such positive obligations are, for instance, inherent in the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of article 3 
ECHR,206 which is the European basis for the principle of non-refoulement. 
Hence, FRONTEX is accountable for omissions to prevent fundamental rights 
violations committed by national border guards in the course of JOs, but only if 
those violations were foreseeable and if, ultimately, it had the means to prevent 
them.207 Traditionally, an action is foreseeable to a party if this party knew or 
ought to have known about it.208 Thus, a party can be held responsible for omit-
ting to prevent another’s wrongful act if it knew or ought to have known about 
the imminent perpetration of such an act and could therefore have prevented it, 
complying with its obligation to protect. 
Goodwin-Gill presented the idea of the applicability of the special duty of 
care in especially hazardous and perilous extraterritorial State operations as 
introduced in Hirsi and Al-Saadoon,209 translated as an obligation to protect.210 
While he did this in order to discuss the possibility of absolute liability, this 
                                                                      
201  Fink (2016) 7ff. 
202  Ibid. 
203  Rijpma (2016) 29. 
204  Ibid.  
205  JF Akandji-Kombe, Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights – 
A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human rights 
handbooks No 7, (CoE, Strasbourg 2007), eg 5. 
206  Ibid., 20. 
207  Fink (2015-1) 16, Rijpma (2016) 29. 
208  See eg Fink (2015-1) 8, J Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge: CUP 2002) 108. 
209  Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, ECHR 2010. 
210  GS Goodwin-Gil, Regulating ‘Irregular’ Migration: International Obligations and Interna-
tional Responsibilities, Keynote Address at the International Workshop of the National and 
Kapodistrian University of Athens Faculty of Law, 20 March 2015, 5. 
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seems to also open the doors for the applicability of EU law and accountability 
obligations in extraterritorial situations. This could be seen as a reason for saying 
that the obligation to protect-criterion mentioned by Rijpma is also extraterrito-
rially valid. The same reasoning for FRONTEX’ accountability for omissions will 
hence be applied to extraterritorial action as to situations inside EU territory.  
Fink argues with international law rules when submitting that it is possible 
for an actor to be held derivatively responsible for aiding or assisting in an act 
constituting such a breach.211 This reasoning relies on international law rules, 
which FRONTEX is bound by through its Regulation.212 These relevant interna-
tional law provisions are found in the ARIO.213 Fink applies a distinction made by 
Special Rapporteur Ago concerning the derivative responsibility of States, who 
distinguishes between participation and coercion. This principle has been incor-
porated into the ARIO, deciding that an international organisation can be held 
responsible if participating freely,214 but not if coerced into participating in an 
internationally wrongful act. This coercion can either take the form of direction 
and control215 or of coercing the IO to commit this wrongful act itself.216 Assum-
ing that the ARIO can be applied to FRONTEX,217 it is possible to hold FRONTEX 
accountable even for actions it only assisted in without being coerced.218 
1.4.3 Preliminary Conclusions 
It has been found in this Chapter that the ideal criteria to determine FRONTEX 
accountability for breaches of EU law are transparency and responsibility.219 
                                                                      
211  Fink (2015-1) 11. 
212  Articles 1(2)§ 2, 2(1a) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
213  Especially article 14 ARIO: Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrong-
ful act 
An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international organi-
zation in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organi-
zation is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) the organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization. 
214  Article 14 ARIO. 
215  Article 15 ARIO (and 17 ILC 2001). 
216  Article 16 ARIO. 
217  This is quite probable, because the commentary (1) to article 14, for example, speaks of 
an ‘entity’ assisting a state or an international organization (ARIO (2011) 36). It does thus 
not seem to be limited to international organisations. See also the discussion in Section 
1.3.1 and n123. 
218  NB: Those articles are still not binding and generally only applied by UN mechanisms and 
chiefly the ICJ, see 1.3.1. 
219  NB: the criteria’s names have been chosen with care, settling on those which seemed to 
be most appropriate. However, there might be disagreement on their appropriateness 
and it is not claimed that they are the only or even the best choice under the circum-
stances but the author’s. It is hence the content, and not the nomination of the criteria, 
that is important. 
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Transparency is an important factor of FRONTEX’ public legal accountability for 
breaches of EU law. Of the two proposed criteria, transparency is needed to 
show FRONTEX’ exact involvement in a situation, to demand of it to respond to 
inquiries about it and to be able to sanction it for possible breaches. It represents 
the general framework necessary for each and every situation where the Agen-
cy’s public legal accountability for breaches of EU law is sought, while responsi-
bility needs to be determined not generally but on a case-by-case basis. It is here 
where it is determined whether the Agency has actually breached EU law. 
Transparency and responsibility include sub-criteria or nuances which need to be 
observed. For transparency, it is necessary that the accountable needs to report 
to a specific independent forum, which can debate over the situation and mete 
out consequences, which may even be sanctions. Responsibility requires that an 
individual’s actions or omissions can be attributed to FRONTEX, that FRONTEX 
is in control of its actions – and at least of part of the activities in case of shared 
responsibility – which it commits for its own purposes or assisting another party, 
and has committed them either alone or assisting another party, most likely a 
Member State. In the case of a violation of FRONTEX’ obligation to protect, it is 
necessary that FRONTEX knew or ought to have known about the situation and 
could have prevented EU law from being breached. It is not necessary, from the 
standpoint of FRONTEX’ obligation to protect, to distinguish between its pres-
ence inside and outside EU territory. 
The criteria for assessing FRONTEX’ accountability for breaches of EU law 
have now been established. In order to be able to assess to what extent 
FRONTEX can be held accountable for breaches of EU law, it is necessary to 
analyse the Agency’s framework and to apply the pertinent facts to the criteria. 
First, the framework needs to be understood.  
1.5 Conclusion 1 
In this Chapter, it has been shown that the EU is a supranational organisation 
and as such, its decisions are binding for its Member States and EU law has su-
premacy. FRONTEX is a decentralised EU agency and hence an independent 
body of the European Union. 
Accountability in this context is ‘a relationship between an actor and a fo-
rum, in which the actor has the obligation to explain and justify his or her con-
duct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences’.220 It is a mechanism which is not synonymous to responsibility, 
although responsibility forms an integral part of the accountability process. The 
forum, also called ‘accountee’, needs to be independent from the accountable in 
order to ensure an objective and impartial assessment of the situation. Breaches 
of EU law, both inside and outside EU territory, require FRONTEX’ public legal 
accountability. This is a combination of two categories. The category of public 
accountability, chosen because the accountable is part of the public administra-
                                                                      
220  Bovens (2007-2) 450, also in Busuioc (2013) 46. 
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tion as well as because breaches of EU law are often complained about by mem-
bers of the public and an initiation of the accountability process by a member of 
the public is in discussion. Legal accountability is appropriate because the ac-
countability mechanisms examined in this context and for breaches of EU law 
are judicial and extra-judicial ones based on procedures fixed by law.  
Neither of the two categories fit perfectly, although they are a better match 
than others. Thus, it is useful to combine them and create a new type of ac-
countability out of their best-fitting aspects. 
EU agencies are independent actors. This independence, however, does not 
go so far as to exclude EU agency accountability: While it is theoretically possible 
to hold an EU agency accountable for breaches of EU law under all three sys-
tems, they all also have more or less fundamental drawbacks. It has been shown 
that the European Union system is the one which is most appropriate and best-
equipped to be the framework for holding an EU agency accountable. 
In order to determine to what extent FRONTEX can be held accountable, it is 
necessary to see whether the criteria for FRONTEX public legal accountability for 
breaches of EU law are fulfilled. It has been established that accountability crite-
ria are best established on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, there is no consen-
sus and not even an explicit discussion on the most appropriate criteria for 
FRONTEX’ accountability. It has already been established that FRONTEX, as an 
EU agency, can and needs to be held accountable. The criteria discussed in the 
last Sub-Chapter serve to discuss whether the existing elements of accountabil-
ity are sufficient and if, in a particular situation, FRONTEX’ accountability can be 
engaged. The criteria which were determined to be the most appropriate to 
determine FRONTEX’ public legal accountability can be divided into two catego-
ries: transparency and responsibility. Under transparency, it can be established 
whether existing elements of accountability are sufficient by looking at the ex-
istence of an independent forum or accountee, ideally in a position which is hier-
archically superior to the one of FRONTEX, to whom FRONTEX as an accounta-
ble is obligated to account, to give report to, and who can demand that 
FRONTEX explain its actions and can subsequently determine the consequences 
and possibly impose sanctions for the Agency’s actions. The criterion of respon-
sibility serves to determine whether the Agency’s accountability can be engaged 
in a specific situation. Here, it has firstly been found that both accountability and 
responsibility can be shared and that FRONTEX can be held accountable both for 
its actions and omissions. The actions which can be attributed to FRONTEX need 
to be committed with at least the Agency’s partial control over them. It cannot 
only have committed them because it was forced to do so. It is sufficient if it had 
control over n action but was only aiding or assisting another party. In the case of 
accountability for an omission, it would be held accountable for a violation of its 
obligation to protect if it knew or ought to have known about a wrongful act and 
could have prevented it. 
The knowledge acquired over these first pages is the foundation for the fol-
lowing discussion, which will continue with an evaluation of the elements of 
FRONTEX’ framework (Chapter 2) and activities (Chapter 3) which are relevant 
for accountability. Then, those elements will be applied to the criteria which 
were just identified in order to assess to what extent FRONTEX can be held ac-
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countable for breaches of EU law under its current framework (Chapter 4). The 
fifth Chapter will contain the main conclusions before the last Chapter will give 
an outlook over the future of the Agency’s accountability. 
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2. Current Framework 
 
 
In this Chapter, part of the elements determining whether the criteria for holding 
FRONTEX accountable for breaches of EU law are fulfilled will be discussed, 
starting with FRONTEX’ general legal framework in Sub-Chapter 2.1 and its op-
erational framework in Sub-Chapter 2.2. Then, its relationship with the EU insti-
tutions will be discussed in Sub-Chapter 2.3 and its commitment to upholding 
and protecting fundamental rights will be analysed in Sub-Chapter 2.4. 
2.1 FRONTEX’ General Legal Framework 
In this Sub-Chapter, FRONTEX’ general legal framework will be discussed in 
order to determine which elements need to be applied to the accountability 
criteria established in Sub-Chapter 1.4.  
FRONTEX’ legal framework consists of different primary and secondary law 
sources which will be discussed in this Sub-Chapter. The first sources to be dis-
cussed as containing legal bases for the Agency are the EU Treaties, which will 
be followed by the legislation directly pertaining to FRONTEX such as the 
FRONTEX-Regulation and concluded by a paragraph on other relevant legisla-
tive acts. 
 
FRONTEX’ Treaty Bases 
To start with, it is interesting and useful to first ascertain where the competence 
to establish FRONTEX lies. In order to find this out, it is necessary to closely read 
the Treaties (TEU, TFEU).1 As was already observed, there are no special provi-
sions in the Treaties conferring the competence to establish bodies and agencies 
of the Union. However, the possibility remains that competence has been con-
ferred for the concerned field of law the Agency is active in. 
The Treaty on European Union contains two articles which pertain to the 
Agency: Article 3(2) as well as article 21(2)(c) TEU are of interest for the topic at 
hand. Article 3(2) requires the Union to offer ‘appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, asylum, immigration’, while article 21(2)(c) proclaims 
that the EU will adhere by the aims of the Charter of Paris which relate to the 
external borders. Article 2(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union firstly enables the Union to take action in the field of its ‘common foreign 
and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy’ under the conditions laid out in the relevant provisions of the TEU. The 
fact that FRONTEX and its tasks can be summarized under the umbrella of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can be verified through the lecture 
of articles 67ff. TFEU, especially article 67(2) TFEU which confirms that the EU 
                                                                      
1  The Union claims that the legal basis for its actions in managing the external borders lies 
within articles 67 and 77 TFEU (EP Factsheet ‘Management of the External Borders’, 2016, 
1), but it is prudent to ascertain whether they constitute in fact the best-suited legal basis. 
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‘shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border con-
trol’. Article 74 TFEU confers the competence to the Council to ‘adopt measures 
(…) ensur(ing) administrative cooperation between the relevant departments of 
the Member States in the areas covered by this Title, as well as between those 
departments and the Commission’, acting, after consultation of the European 
Parliament, on a Commission proposal. Articles 77, 78 and 79 TFEU confer com-
petences in the area of freedom, security and justice. They confer competences 
particularly to the European Parliament and the Council, which shall act in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.2 Finally, article 80 TFEU con-
cludes this chapter of articles pertaining in some form or other to FRONTEX by 
remarking that these policies are governed by several principles, such as the fair 
sharing of responsibility between the Member States. 
 
Legislation Directly Pertaining to FRONTEX 
The Agency was created by the Council on a proposal by the European Commis-
sion and after consulting with the European Parliament and taking into account 
an opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee.3 The legal basis for 
its creation were articles 62(2)(a) and 66 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Communities (TEC), which correspond today to articles 74 and 77 TFEU. Article 
62 TEC has been amended heavily and there is no provision corresponding ex-
actly to article 62(2)(a) TEC in the TFEU, but a combination of articles 77(1)(c) 
and 77(2)(b) TFEU concerning the establishment of an integrated management 
system for the external borders and the introduction of checks carried out on 
persons crossing said borders comes closest. The creation took place through 
                                                                      
2  Article 77 TFEU gives further legal bases for the creation of the Agency, stating that the 
EU shall create policies concerning, eg the effective monitoring of the crossing of and car-
rying out checks on persons at the external borders (§ b), a progressive implementation of 
an ‘integrated management system for external borders’ (§ c). Article 77(2) TFEU confers 
the competence to adopt certain legislative measures to the European Parliament (EP) 
and the Council. Of interest to FRONTEX are those measures concerning the common 
visa policy (§ a) TFEU), the policy on checks of persons crossing the external borders (§ b) 
and the competence to take measures to design and implement an ‘integrated manage-
ment system for external borders’ (§ d). Article 78(2) TFEU awards the competence to 
‘adopt measures for a common European asylum system’ (CEAS) to the European Par-
liament and the Council. In particular, they have the competence to create ‘partnership 
and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people ap-
plying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection’ (§ g). The Council can further 
adopt provisional measures in emergency situations (ie ‘sudden inflow’ of third-country 
nationals) on a Commission proposal and after consultation of the European Parliament 
(78(3) TFEU). Article 79(1) TFEU enables the European Parliament and the Council to cre-
ate a common immigration policy with the purpose of efficiently managing migration 
flows. This includes particularly the issues of entry conditions (§ a), illegal immigration 
and expatriation of irregularly residing third country nationals (§ c) as well as combatting 
human trafficking (§ d). For the purpose of the removal of irregularly present third-
country nationals, the EU can, according to article 79(3) TFEU, enter into agreements with 
third countries for the readmission of the persons being removed from EU territory. 
3  See Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, p2. 
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Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing FRONTEX (FRONTEX – Regula-
tion), which was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ)4 in 
2004 and was later amended by Regulation (EU) 1168/2011,5 which introduced, 
in particular, elements of fundamental rights protection into the Agency’s reper-
toire. The contents of said regulation with regards to FRONTEX’ tasks and in-
struments will be closely examined in the next Sub-Chapter, but the regulation 
also explores the Agency’s organisational structure and other features. It seems 
particularly noteworthy that, while the regulation mentions an incident report-
ing scheme in articles 3a(1)(h) as well as 8e(1)(h), this scheme is not described in 
any further detail and there is still no individual complaint mechanism to be 
found.  
A Council Decision6 fixes FRONTEX’ seat is in Warsaw, Poland, a Member 
State which itself sports external borders with three non-Schengen countries: 
Russia (through its exclave Oblast Kaliningrad7), Belarus and Ukraine. Regulation 
(EC) 863/20078 is referred to in the FRONTEX-Regulation. More precisely, arti-
cles 1a(1a), 2(1)(g), 8(a), (c) of the FRONTEX-Regulation refer to articles 4 and 
4(2) of the former Regulation. This act gives further details to FRONTEX’ task 
created in articles 2(1)(ea) and 2(1)(g) and elaborated in articles 7 and 8 
FRONTEX-Regulation, which the RABIT-Regulation makes reference to in recital 
2. Its legal basis are articles 62(2)(a) and 66 TEC, today 74 and 77 TFEU. The pur-
pose of the regulation is to  
 
establish(...) a mechanism for the purposes of providing rapid operational assistance for a 
limited period to a requesting Member State facing a situation of urgent and exceptional 
pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-
country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member State illegally, in the form of 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams.9 
 
Regulation (EU) 656/201410 directly refers to FRONTEX and to its founding Regu-
lation 2007/2004 regularly and is designed to apply especially to FRONTEX op-
erations at the EU external sea borders. It describes the actions which can be 
                                                                      
4  OJ L349, 25/11/2004. 
5  OJ L304, 22/11/2011, entered into force on 12/12/2011. 
6  Council Decision 2005/358/EC of 26 April 2005. 
7  Which has a special status and is in its entirety considered to be a border area: see Regu-
lation (EU) 1342/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011. 
8  Regulation (EC) 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams. 
9  Article 1 Regulation 863/2007; this Agency task will be further discussed in the next Chap-
ter. 
10  Regulation (EU) 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of opera-
tional cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Opera-
tional Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
[2014] OJ L189/93. 
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taken upon detection of a vessel and even amends the FRONTEX-Regulation in 
several instances (see article 11). Lastly, the new proposal introduced in Decem-
ber 2015 concerning the establishment of a new European Border- and Coast 
Guard Agency (EBCGA), which is supposed to completely reform the FRONTEX-
Agency is of importance here. It will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
The most famous relevant legislative sources which have not yet been pre-
sented here are doubtlessly the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC),11 the ECHR 
and the ECFR. Due to their importance for the protection of fundamental rights, 
they are going to be discussed in the next paragraphs. Other important legisla-
tion which will be discussed here are the Schengen Codes, Return and readmis-
sion legislation, information sharing legislation and relevant CEAS legislation. 
 
The Schengen Codes 
The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) relates to the Agency insofar as that it sets 
standards for the crossing of the Schengen Area’s external borders. It is estab-
lished by Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders12 and has consequently been amended by 
six subsequent acts.13 Concerning the crossing of EU external borders, the Regu-
lation contains rules governing the control of persons crossing said borders. The-
se are some of the rules the FRONTEX-agents as well as national border- and 
coast-guards have to adhere by, as is also confirmed by article 10, especially 
paragraphs 1 and 10 of the FRONTEX-Regulation. Due to its numerous amend-
ments, the Schengen Borders Code has recently been codified in a new regula-
tion,14 which directly mentions the Agency in several instances, which even con-
tain direct obligations addressed to FRONTEX.15  
Currently, a 2014 proposal for amendment of the Schengen Visa Code16 is in 
discussion. It is of interest to FRONTEX as the Code offers a framework for al-
lowing third-country nationals admission at the Unions external borders, a status 
which can, however, still be withdrawn by the border guards (see article 30). 
Furthermore, third-country nationals can apply for a visa at the external borders 
in exceptional circumstances (articles 35 and 36). 
 
                                                                      
11  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137. 
12  [2006] OJ L105/1. 
13  Regulations 296/2008 [2008] OJ L97/60; 81/2009 [2009] OJ L35/56; 810/2009 [2009] OJ 
L243/1; 265/2010 [2010] OJ L85/1; 610/2013 [2013] OJ L182/1; 1051/2013 [2013] OJ L295/1 
(emphases added). 
14  Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schen-
gen Borders Code) [2016] OJ L77/1. 
15  Recitals 19, 31, articles 16, 17, 21, 30 Regulation 2016/399. 
16  Regulation (EC) 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) [2009] OJ L243/1. 
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Return and Readmission Legislation 
Since 2010, the Return Directive17 applies to the Agency concerning one of its 
main tasks: return operations. Article 9 FRONTEX-Regulation makes reference 
to the aforementioned regulation. In this context, readmission agreements with 
third, non-EU countries are also of interest as these countries are often the des-
tination of return operations. Particularly the EU-Turkey Readmission Agree-
ment18 has been the focus of media attention in recent months as a new version 
is destined to enter into force on 1st June 2016.19 Today, 17 readmission agree-
ments between the EU and third states are in force (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
                                                                      
17  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally stay-
ing third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98. 
18  Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission 
of persons residing without authorization [2014] OJ L134/3. 
19  See Commission Press Release/Fact Sheet ‘EU-Turkey Agreement: Questions and An-
swers’ (2016). 
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Recent publications by the NGO Statewatch20 show that the European Commis-
sion seems to be seriously considering further readmission agreements with So-
malia,21 Ethiopia22 and Sudan,23 countries in which, according to Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), the human rights situation is still ‘abysmal’.24, 25 The European 
Commission is at the moment discussing taking up negotiations for a readmis-
sion agreement with Nigeria.26, 27 
 
Information Sharing Legislation 
In 2013, Regulation (EU) 1052/2013 establishing EUROSUR28 came into force. It is 
a regulation co-authored by the European Parliament and the Council on the 
basis of article 77(2)(d) TFEU after a proposal from the European Commission. It 
is intended to strengthen the sharing of intelligence and the operational coop-
eration between national authorities as well as with FRONTEX by creating a 
European Border Surveillance System (‘EUROSUR’) by providing them with  
 
(…) the infrastructure and tools needed to improve their situational awareness and 
reaction capability at the external borders of the Member States of the Union (‘external 
borders’) for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and 
cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of 
migrants.29 
 
In addition, article 14(3) FRONTEX-Regulation makes reference to Council Regu-
lation (EC) 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liai-
son officers network.  
Council Decision 2005/267/EC30 is concerned with a Commission proposal 
and after consideration of the EP opinion. Its legal basis was article 66 TEC, to-
day article 74 TFEU. The objective behind establishing said secure web-based 
intranet site is to ensure ‘secure and rapid information exchange between Mem-
                                                                      
20  Statewatch (2016), ‘Leaked: “non-papers” on migration, mobility and readmission with 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan’.  
21  See Commission and EEAS non-paper No 7206/16. 
22  See Commission and EEAS non-paper No 7205/16. 
23  See Commission and EEAS non-paper No 7203/16. 
24  See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015, (Human Rights Watch, New York 2015) 
508. 
25  See HRW, ‘Sudan – Events of 2015’, 2016, HRW, ‘Ethiopia – Events of 2015’, 2016 and 
HRW, ‘Somalia – Events of 2015’, 2016. 
26  See European Commission, ‘Nous proposons l'ouverture des négociations avec le Nigéria 
sur un accord de réadmission #migrationEU@Mina_Andreeva’, Twitter Post, 11/05/2016.  
27  Return Operations will be further, but briefly, discussed in (Sub-)Chapters 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 3 
and 6. 
28  [2013] OJ L295/11. 
29  Recital 1 Regulation 1052/2013. 
30  Council Decision 2005/267/EC of 16 March 2005 establishing a secure web- based Infor-
mation and Coordination Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services 
[2005] OJ L83/48.  
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ber States on irregular or illegal migratory flows and phenomena’.31 This coin-
cides with the Agency’s task outlined in articles 2(1)(h) and (i), the first of which 
also refers to the Decision as well as Regulation (EC) 45/2001. 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) came into being through Regulation 
(EC) 1987/200632 and is a well-functioning comprehensive information system 
which is at the service of, amongst others, those charged with external border 
control as well as police instances. While the Regulation does not specify which 
information is collected, it is mentioned which information may be contained in 
alerts: According to article 20(2) of the Regulation, the information collected 
includes all names and aliases, past and present, connected to a person, perma-
nent distinctive physical characteristics, place and date of birth, sex, photo-
graphs, fingerprints, their nationalities, any violent history, as well as infor-
mation surrounding the issued alert. It has to be remembered that, even though 
only the information on persons for whom alerts have been issued is meant to be 
entered into SIS, all this extensive information is previously collected from per-
sons who have not, as a rule, done anything wrong. This means that information 
to be handed over to border guards and police is collected before a person has 
ever come in conflict with the law.  
The Visa Information System (VIS) was established through Council Decision 
2004/512/EC33 and elaborate by Regulation (EC) 767/2008.34 Its objective is to 
‘enable authorised national authorities to enter and update visa data and to con-
sult these data electronically’,35 with the purpose of ‘improving the implementa-
tion of the common visa policy, consular cooperation and consultation between 
central visa authorities by facilitating the exchange of data between Member 
States on applications and on the decisions relating thereto’.36 The VIS has as a 
consequence that all authorised personnel all across the Union can access infor-
mation about people having applied for Visa no matter where in the Union.  
 
                                                                      
31  Recital 1 of Council Decision 2005/267/EC.  
32  Regulation (EC) 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Decem-
ber 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen In-
formation System (SIS II) [2006] OJ L381/4. 
33  Council Decision 2004/512/EC of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System 
(VIS) [2004] OJ L213/5. 
34  Regulation (EC) 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 
concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Mem-
ber States on short-stay visas [2008] OJ L218/60. 
35  Article 1(1) Council Decision 2004/512/EC. 
36  Article 2 Regulation 767/2008, which adds that the ultimate goals are ‘(a) to facilitate the 
visa application procedure; (b) to prevent the bypassing of the criteria for the determination 
of the Member State responsible for examining the application; (c) to facilitate the fight 
against fraud; (d) to facilitate checks at external border crossing points and within the terri-
tory of the Member States; (e) to assist in the identification of any person who may not, or 
may no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the 
Member States; (f) to facilitate the application of Regulation (EC) 343/2003; (g)to contribute 
to the prevention of threats to the internal security of any of the Member States.’ 
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Relevant CEAS Legislation 
Directive 2013/32/EU37 concerns common procedures for granting and withdraw-
ing international protection and is also known as the Asylum procedures direc-
tive. The 2013 version is a recast of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 
2005 on minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refu-
gee status. As most applications for international protection are made at the 
border (see recital 38) and therefore within FRONTEX’ sphere of operation, the 
Agency has to adhere by these provisions, too. Furthermore, there is a myriad of 
other relevant secondary law sources, which concern, for example, financial mat-
ters38 or data protection and privacy,39 many of which are referred to in the arti-
cles and recitals of the FRONTEX-Regulation.40 
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
FRONTEX’ legal framework is not limited to its founding Regulation and its 
amendments or even to the following regulations which pertain to it exclusively. 
There are numerous pieces of EU legislation forming the Agency’s legal frame-
work. From this follows that, if there are a lot of legal provisions which the Agen-
cy has to respect, that there is also a wide basis of provisions which FRONTEX 
could potentially breach, and for which it could then hypothetically be held ac-
countable. Its tasks and instruments are defined in a number of EU legal docu-
ments, but mainly in the FRONTEX-Regulation. They show the Agency’s impres-
sive range of action.  
                                                                      
37  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] OJ 
L180/60. 
38  Regulation (EC) 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [1999] OJ 
L136/1; Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2343/2002 of 19 November 2002 [2002] OJ 
L357/72; article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regu-
lation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities [2002] OJ L248/1 
(repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 966/2012 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the gen-
eral budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 
[2012] OJ L298/1, see the new regulation’s first recital). 
39  Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
[2001] OJ L145/43; Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of 
such data [2001] OJ L8/1; Commission Decision 2001/ 844/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 29 No-
vember 2001 amending its internal Rules of Procedure [2001] OJ L317/1 is mentioned in 
article 11(d)(1) as applying to the handling of classified information; article 1(1)(a) and (b) 
of Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unau-
thorised entry, transit and residence [2002] OJ L328/17. 
40  See eg Recitals 17, 18, 19, articles 11(a), 20(h) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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2.2 FRONTEX’ Operational Framework 
In this Sub-Chapter, FRONTEX’ operational framework will be presented by 
starting out with the Agency’s tasks (2.2.1), the operational cycle each of the 
Agency’s JOs follows (2.2.2), its cooperation with the Member States (2.2.3) as 
well as its independent competences (2.2.4).  
2.2.1 FRONTEX’ Tasks  
In order to assess and evaluate how FRONTEX can be held accountable, it is es-
sential to understand what it is the Agency does. A first step in that direction is 
to look at what it is theoretically supposed to do, ie the tasks and competences it 
is legally accorded. In this Section, a closer look will be taken at what the Agency 
is doing which could be in violation of EU law and at how the actions are taken or 
omitted to be taken. In other words, the Agency’s tasks and the instruments at 
its disposal will be discussed. This is necessary in order to get a better grasp of 
the Agency’s functioning and in order to evaluate, later on, how FRONTEX’ ac-
countability can be sought. FRONTEX’ competences will be analysed in Section 
2.2.3. 
Article 2(1) of the FRONTEX-Regulation enumerates the main tasks the 
Agency is required to perform. The article contains eleven different categories of 
tasks which broken down to seven distinct groups of tasks on the Agency’s web 
presence: joint operations, training, risk analysis, research, rapid response capa-
bility, information systems and information sharing environment.41 
Figure 3 not only shows that the Agency’s setup with Management Board 
and Executive Director is the standard composition of an EU agency as set out in 
the Common Approach on European Agencies.42 It also illustrates FRONTEX’ 
tasks and how they can be categorised. 
Generally, FRONTEX itself has divided its tasks into three distinct categories: 
The Operations Division, the Capacity Building Division as well as the Adminis-
trative Division.43 
 
                                                                      
41  See FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
42  European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 5. 
43  The third category of tasks is the Administrative Division, which contains the tasks of 
Finance and Procurement, Human Resources and Services, Legal Affairs, Information and 
Communication Technologies. Those tasks are rather internal to the Agency and there-
fore less relevant for this thesis. 
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The three kinds of tasks an instruments FRONTEX has under the Operations 
Division are risk analysis, the FRONTEX situation centre, and joint operations 
and return support. The risk analysis is based on articles 2(1)(c) and 4 of the 
FRONTEX-Regulation and includes the collection and analysis of ‘intelligence on 
the ongoing situation at the external borders. These data are compiled from 
border crossing points and other operational information as well as from the 
Member States and open sources including mass media and academic re-
search’.44, 45 The analysis further includes an assessment of the Member States’ 
capacity to deal with any given situations. FRONTEX has furthermore created a 
FRONTEX Situation Centre (FSC) which is not mentioned in the Regulation and 
which has the main ‘task of providing a constantly updated picture, as near to 
real time as possible, of Europe’s external borders and migration situation’.46 It is 
also a central point of contact and information for all the stakeholders in the 
Agency,47 and fulfils multiple functions to support FRONTEX rapid response 
actions.48 
                                                                      
44  See eg FRONTEX, ‘Migratory Routes Map’, Map, 2016. 
45  See FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
46  See FRONTEX, ‘Information management’, 2016.  
47  Ibid. 
48  These functions are enumerated by FRONTEX as follows: ‘Situation monitoring — This is 
FSC’s core function. All other areas of the centre’s activity contribute in some way to its 
ability to provide as detailed, accurate and up-to-date a picture as possible of the situa-
tion at the EU’s external borders. FSC provides situation and crisis monitoring, delivering 
early alerts and situation reports to internal and external customers. 
→ 
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The task FRONTEX may be best-known for to the general public are its Joint 
Operations (JOs). Their legal basis are articles 2(1)(a), 3 and 3(a) of the FRON-
TEX-Regulation. FRONTEX itself states that this task obligates it to ‘plan, coor-
dinate and evaluate joint operations conducted using Member States’ staff and 
equipment at the external borders (sea, land and air).’49 The Agency assists 
Member States in joint return operations, eg by coordination or organisation of 
the Operation, as determined by articles 2(1)(f) and 9 FRONTEX-Regulation as 
well as Directive 2008/115/EC. Under the heading of the Capacity Building Divi-
sion, FRONTEX categorises the tasks and instruments of training, research and 
development, pooled resources as well as third countries and EU cooperation. It 
also provides ‘common training standards and specialist tools’, eg for border 
guards and senior officers on multiple competence levels.50 This is based on arti-
cles 2(1)(b), 5 and 8(c) of the FRONTEX-Regulation. The Agency furthermore 
forms a research platform for EU border-control personnel as well as representa-
tives of science and industry. This is based on articles 2(1)(d) and 6 of the 
FRONTEX-Regulation. 
According to a number of articles of the FRONTEX-Regulation,51 the Agency 
‘has created a pooled resource in the form of European Border Guard Teams 
(EBGTs) and an extensive database of available equipment which brings togeth-
er specialist human and technical resources from across the EU.’52 This resource 
pool is meant to assist Member States is emergency situations such as humani-
tarian emergencies and rescue at sea53 or in cases of the rather vague notion of 
‘specific and disproportionate pressures’.54 Its task of cooperating with or facili-
                                                                      
Central point of contact — In order to ensure effective communication, FSC provides a 
clear point of official contact (incoming and outgoing) between Member States and Fron-
tex as well as for other external partners. 
Joint operational support — FSC processes incoming data from all fields of operation, col-
lating and processing it into daily situational pictures of what is happening on the ground. 
This processing includes checking the quality of incoming data and ensuring it is available 
in the right format for further analysis. Frontex has developed its own specialised report-
ing systems that allow all participants in joint operations to share information effectively. 
Media monitoring — An indispensable element of staying abreast of the bigger picture is 
constantly monitoring open and media sources. 
Mission awareness and back-up — The aim of mission awareness is to keep the relevant 
Frontex staff informed about critical areas and any other pertinent information about 
countries outside the EU. 
Crisis management support — In the event of a rapid intervention being deployed, it is 
FSC’s role to ensure that all in-house procedures are followed correctly and to monitor 
the progress of the emergency support measures.’ See FRONTEX, ‘Information manage-
ment’, 2016. 
49  See FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
50  Ibid.; it is not clarified what these tools consist of. 
51  Articles 2(1)(da), 2(1)(e), 2(1)(ea), 2(1)(g), 3(b), 3(c), 7, 8, 8(a), 8(d) and 8(e) of the FRON-
TEX-Regulation. 
52  See FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
53  Article 2(1)(da) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
54  Article 2(1)(e) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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tating the cooperation with third countries and their competent authorities will 
be examined in the next Chapter.  
FRONTEX, in addition, establishes information systems and an information 
sharing environment on the legal basis of articles 2(1)(h), 2(1)(i) and 11 FRON-
TEX-Regulation as well as Regulation (EC) 45/2001 and Decision 2005/267/EC. 
These information systems ‘regard (…) emerging risks and the current state of 
affairs at the external borders form the basis of risk analysis and so-called “situa-
tional awareness” for border control authorities in the EU’.55 This service is not 
categorised under one of the two first options but mentioned under the name of 
Information and Communication Technology in the completely separate third 
branch of Corporate Governance, together with Financial and Corporate Ser-
vices, Human Resources and Security and Legal Affairs.  
This rather extensive list of FRONTEX’ tasks and instruments serves to illus-
trate the Agency’s place of importance within the EU institutional setup, and 
their diversity has also been shown. This illustrates well why it is so important to 
be able to hold the Agency accountable, as it can influence the activities at the 
EU’s external borders from so many vantage points.  
2.2.2 FRONTEX’ Operational Cycle 
FRONTEX introduced the term ’operational cycle’ in order to talk about the steps 
to be taken before, during and after the exercise of a JO.56 Usually, the opera-
tional cycle’s kick-off is a proposal from a Member State.57 The first two para-
graphs of article 3 FRONTEX-Regulation58 enable the Agency to initiate and co-
ordinate operations with Member States itself, provided that the host Member 
States agree and then to ‘evaluate, approve and coordinate’ the proposals. The 
evaluation starts with a risk analysis,59 which consists of the gathering of intelli-
gence on the basis of which reports on the current situations in the targeted 
regions are drawn up and in which vulnerabilities are identified and recommen-
dations made (last paragraph of article 3(1) FRONTEX-Regulation). Secondly, 
the planning phase follows. Planning is done in meetings between FRONTEX 
and the Member States. Discussions are held on which supplies and officers 
should be deployed, specialised training is granted to the officers who are in 
need of it and, finally, the Operational Plan is drawn up and agreed upon.60 It 
                                                                      
55  See FRONTEX, ‘Mission and Tasks’, 2016. 
56  An illustration of the ‘operational cycle’ can be seen in FRONTEX, ‘Operational cycle’, 
Video, 07/01/2014. 
57  Art 3(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
58  Article 3(1) FRONTEX-Regulation: The Agency shall evaluate, approve and coordinate 
proposals for joint operations and pilot projects made by Member States, including the re-
quests of Member States related to circumstances requiring increased technical and opera-
tional assistance, especially in cases of specific and disproportionate pressures. 
The Agency may itself initiate and carry out joint operations and pilot projects in cooperation 
with the Member States concerned and in agreement with the host Member States. 
59  Article 4 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
60  Article 3a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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contains information on what shall be done as well as where and when, on the 
person(s) in charge, the code of conduct et cetera.61 
The in the following phase, the operation is implemented. Guest officers are 
deployed to the host Member State where they are under the command of their 
hosts with the Agency issuing views and recommendations when needed.62 All 
officers carry out the same tasks, which depend on the Operational Plan. Tactical 
risk analysis takes place in order to ensure flexibility to adapt the operation if 
necessary. As a last step, an evaluation is done in order to determine where im-
provement is needed.63 The Agency may terminate a JO after informing the host 
Member State that the conditions for executing the mission are no longer given; 
equally, a participating Member State or the Executive Director can request said 
termination.64 
2.2.3 FRONTEX’ Cooperation with the Member States 
In this Section, the relationship between FRONTEX and the Member States in-
volved in its work, especially in its Joint Operations will be explored.  
It is interesting to note that whenever FRONTEX competences are men-
tioned, an emphasis is placed on the Agency’s assistant role – FRONTEX assists, 
advises, facilitates, contributes and coordinates, but it scarcely acts in its own 
name.65 Its competence is therefore closely tied to the competences of the EU 
Member States. Member States negotiate the contribution of their border 
guards to specific JOs as well as of their national experts to the European Border 
Guard Teams (EBGTs) and technical equipment annually with FRONTEX. They 
are then notified a month and a half before the foreseen deployment, and will, in 
accordance with the bilateral agreement, second the guards which they are free 
to select autonomously.66 The deployed EBGTs are under the command of the 
host Member State, which is bound by the Operational Plan drawn up before-
hand by Executive Director and the future host Member State.67 A commanding 
officer is supplied by the Agency, through whom FRONTEX can communicate its 
views.68 This officer is entitled to support by the host Member State and to full 
access to his or her team.69 The Agency has no influence on the sanctioning of 
national border guards who have committed wrongful acts. They stay subject to 
their home Member State’s jurisdiction.70 The use of weapons is subject to au-
thorisation of the host Member State and needs to be in accordance with that 
                                                                      
61  Article 3a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
62  Articles 3c, 10 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
63  Article 3(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
64  Article 3(1a) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
65  See 2.2.3. 
66  Article 3b(2), (3), 7(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
67  Articles 3c(1), 8e FRONTEX-Regulation. 
68  Articles 3b(5), 3c(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
69  Articles 3c(3), 8g FRONTEX-Regulation. 
70  Article 3c(4) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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State’s law.71 In any case, Guest Officers from participating Member States are 
only supposed to take part in operations ‘under instructions from and (…) in the 
presence of’ national border guards from the host Member State.72 Member 
States can request the Agency’s assistance in situations where they face specific 
disproportionate pressures while needing assistance in fulfilling their obligations 
of control and surveillance at the external borders, and FRONTEX is obligated to 
send appropriate assistance.73 Member States also take part in supply the Agen-
cy with the necessary equipment.74 FRONTEX has to ask the host Member State 
for permission in order to invite representatives from other EU bodies or interna-
tional organisations to participate in its activities.75 Member States can conclude 
bilateral agreements with third country and include a role for the Agency within 
such agreements.76 
One of the most important aspects of the Member State influence on 
FRONTEX actions is that the majority of the staff involved in JOs are provided by 
the Member States. FRONTEX itself has, according to its 2016 working pro-
gramme, 417 staff members, of which 121 are support staff, working in adminis-
trative functions or ‘implementing governance level activities’.77, 78 This rather 
low number of staff and the resulting issue of FRONTEX’ dependency on the 
Member States’ personnel will in future be further exacerbated, as a Council 
Decision has put the obligation upon all EU agencies to diminish their staff by 5% 
until the end of 2017. Furthermore, calls by the Agency to be awarded more per-
sonnel have gone unanswered.79 Therefore, FRONTEX will soon have even less 
staff to carry out its tasks.80 
FRONTEX depends heavily on the support and agreement of the Member 
States, which thus have a great influence on the Agency, especially due to the 
facts that the host Member State and its national border guards have the most 
influence on JOs. In addition, FRONTEX has to rely on Member States’ agree-
ment to provide material and personnel over which it has no disciplinary power 
because its own staff numbers are excessively low.  
 
                                                                      
71  Article 10 (5), (6), (7) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
72  Article 10 (3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
73  Article 8(1) FRONTEX-Regulation, NB the use of the word ‘shall’.  
74  Recital 9, article 7(3) FRONTEX-Regulation.  
75  Article 13 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
76  Article 14 (1), (7) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
77  FRONTEX (2015-3) 19. 
78  In 2015, it had 317 staff members: FRONTEX (2014), Annex 1, 117. 
79  H. Foy and D. Robinson, ‘Frontex chief welcomes plan for more powerful EU border force 
– Action to boost control of Schengen frontier should have happened a decade ago, says 
Fabrice Leggeri’, Financial Times (London, 13/12/2015). 
80  Ramboll Management Consulting (2015) 75, who also note that this happens in spite of 
the promise of the allocation of eight new positions until 2020 by the EUROSUR Regula-
tion. 
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FRONTEX’ Relationship with the Management Board 
The Management Board is largely composed of representatives of the EU and 
Schengen Member States as well as two Commission representatives. Hence, it 
needs to be presumed to be a body with interests of its own and not exclusively a 
FRONTEX body. It ‘should be entrusted with the necessary powers to establish 
the budget, verify its execution, adopt the appropriate financial rules, establish 
transparent working procedures for decision making by the Agency and appoint 
the Executive Director and his/her deputy’.81 
The Management Board decides, on a case-by-case basis, on the conditions 
under which the United Kingdom and Ireland may participate in JOs.82 The Man-
agement Board decides on the profile and number of border guards which will be 
seconded to the EBGTs.83 It is also the author of the rules on providing the bor-
der guards with daily allowances.84 Concerning Return operations, the Board 
decides on content and modus operandi of the rolling operation plan after a 
proposal from the Executive Director.85 
It plays a predominant role in the protection of personal data and classified 
information.86 It approves the deployment of liaison officers and defines the list 
of priority for deployment on a proposal of the Executive Director.87 The Man-
agement Board approves the Headquarters Agreement between Agency and 
host Member State.88 It creates specialised branches within FRONTEX if it de-
cides that there is a need for them.89 It can decide to adopt provisions allowing 
for national experts to be seconded to FRONTEX.90 The Management Board 
adopts FRONTEX’ budget.91 It adopts activities, decisions and programmes 
which then need to be implemented by the Executive Director, whom it not only 
appoints but also has the power to dismiss.92 Its further influence is laid out ex-
pansively in article 20(2) FRONTEX-Regulation.93 
                                                                      
81  Recital 15, see also article 20 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
82  Recital 27 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
83  Article 3b(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
84  Article 8h(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
85  Article 9(1c) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
86  Articles 11a, 11d(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. These mechanisms have, however, not been 
properly implemented yet. See Ramboll Management (2015) 135. 
87  Article 14(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. This mechanism also has not been properly imple-
mented yet. See Ramboll Management (2015) 135. 
88  Article 15a FRONTEX-Regulation. 
89  Article 16 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
90  Article 17(5) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
91  Article 29(9) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
92  Articles 25(3)a, 26(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
93  Article 20(2)-(7) FRONTEX-Regulation: 2. The Management Board shall: (a) appoint the 
Executive Director on a proposal from the Commission in accordance with Article 26; (b) be-
fore 31 March each year, adopt the general report of the Agency for the previous year and 
forward it by 15 June at the latest to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Court of Auditors. The general report 
shall be made public; (c) before 30 September each year, and after receiving the opinion of 
→ 
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It has been shown that the Management Board’s influence on FRONTEX is 
extensive. However, this is only natural, as it is one of two standard agency bod-
ies in accordance with the Common Approach on European Agencies.94 It is still 
worth noting how far its influence reaches, as it is composed of representatives 
of Member States and Commission and as there is no independence clause in the 
FRONTEX-Regulation as there is with regards to the Executive Director and the 
FRO.95 
                                                                      
the Commission, adopt, by a three-quarters majority of its members with a right to vote, the 
Agency’s programme of work for the coming year and forward it to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission; this programme of work shall be adopted according 
to the annual Community budgetary procedure and the Community legislative programme in 
relevant areas of the management of external borders; (d) establish procedures for taking 
decisions related to the operational tasks of the Agency by the Executive Director; (e) carry 
out its functions relating to the Agency’s budget pursuant to Articles 28, 29(5), (9) and (11), 
Article 30(5) and Article 32; (f) exercise disciplinary authority over the Executive Director and 
over the Deputy Director, in agreement with the Executive Director; (g) establish its Rules of 
Procedure; (h) establish the organisational structure of the Agency and adopt the Agency's 
staff policy, in particular the multiannual staff policy plan. In accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2343/2002 of 19 November 2002 on 
the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regu-
lation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget 
of the European Communities the multiannual staff policy plan shall be submitted to the 
Commission and the budgetary authority after receiving a favourable opinion of the Com-
mission; (i) adopt the Agency's multiannual plan aiming at outlining the future long term 
strategy regarding the activities of the Agency. 3. Proposals for decisions on specific activi-
ties to be carried out at, or in the immediate vicinity of, the external border of any particular 
Member State shall require a vote in favour of their adoption by the Member of the Man-
agement Board representing that Member State. 4. The Management Board may advise the 
Executive Director on any matter strictly related to the development of operational man-
agement of the external borders, including activities related to research provided for in Arti-
cle 6. 5. Should Ireland and/or the United Kingdom request to participate in the Agency’s ac-
tivities, the Management Board shall decide thereon. The Management Board shall take its 
decision on a case-by-case basis by an absolute majority of its members with a right to vote. 
In its decision, the Management Board shall consider if the participation of Ireland and/or the 
United Kingdom contributes to the achievement of the activity in question. The decision shall 
set out the financial contribution of Ireland and/or the United Kingdom to the activity for 
which a request for participation has been made. 6. The Management Board shall forward 
annually to the budgetary authority any information relevant to the outcome of the evalua-
tion procedures. 7. The Management Board may establish an Executive Bureau to assist it 
and the Executive Director with regard to the preparation of the decisions, programmes and 
activities to be adopted by the Management Board and when necessary, because of urgency, 
to take certain provisional decisions on behalf of the Management Board. (Emphases 
added). 
94  European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 5.  
95  See articles 25(1), 26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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2.2.4 FRONTEX’ Independent Competences 
This Section looks at which competences the FRONTEX-Regulation accords to 
FRONTEX.96  
Looking at FRONTEX’ competences illustrated in amended Regulation 
2007/2004, especially in its article 1(2),97 the impression is won that the Agency’s 
part is a passive one: its role is to assist,98 cooperate,99 coordinate,100 facilitate101 
or support102 the EU Member States and institutions. However, this is not entire-
ly accurate. FRONTEX is indeed laid out to be independent in technical matters 
and has administrative, legal and financial autonomy.103 Its ‘full autonomy and 
independence’ are further secured by its autonomous budget, which it is granted 
by the Community.104 FRONTEX has the competence, after consulting with the 
Member State in question, to assess said Member State’s vulnerability with re-
gards to its ‘capacity to face upcoming challenges’, especially specific dispropor-
tionate pressures at the external borders, and Member States are furthermore 
obligated to report to FRONTEX on operational matters at the external borders 
which are outside of the Agency’s competences.105 This shows that the Agency 
can exert a certain influence on the Member States. FRONTEX, together with 
the Consultative Forum, is the author of the Code of Conduct, which lays down 
procedures intended to safeguard important principles106 and which is applicable 
                                                                      
96  The Executive Director is a representative of the Agency (art 15 FRONTEX-Regulation) 
and completely independent from the Member States or the EU institutions (art 25(1) 
FRONTEX-Regulation). Thus his competence is here considered to be part of FRONTEX’ 
competence: The Management Board appoints the Executive Director (art 20(2)(a) 
FRONTEX-Regulation) ‘to respect the autonomy of the agencies’ (European Parliament, 
Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 6). 
97  Article 1(2) FRONTEX-Regulation: While considering that the responsibility for the control 
and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States, the Agency, as a body of 
the Union as defined in Article 15 and in accordance with Article 19 of this Regulation, shall 
facilitate and render more effective the application of existing and future Union measures re-
lating to the management of external borders, in particular the Schengen Borders Code es-
tablished by Regulation (EC) No 562/2006. It shall do so by ensuring the coordination of the 
actions of the Member States in the implementation of those measures, thereby contributing 
to an efficient, high and uniform level of control on persons and of surveillance of the exter-
nal borders of the Member States. 
98  See eg recitals 5, 10, 11 articles 2(1)(b), (da), (e), (g) 3(1), 9(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
99  See eg articles 2a, 3(1), 5 § 7, 9(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
100  See eg articles 2(1)(a), 3(1), 9(2), 14 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
101  See eg recital 4, 12, 27, articles 1(2), 11, 12, 14 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
102  See eg recital 10, articles 1(3) 9(1), (1c), 12 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
103  Recital 14, article 15 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
104  Recital 16 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
105  Articles 2 and 4 FRONTEX-Regulation. The article 4-mechanism has, however, not yet 
been implemented. See Ramboll Management (2015) 132. 
106  Such as the rule of law, fundamental rights, protection on unaccompanied minors, vul-
nerable persons and persons in need of international protection (see article 2(a) FRON-
TEX-Regulation). 
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to all persons who are involved in FRONTEX’ activities.107 Hence, even national 
border guards, otherwise bound by the instructions of the host Member State 
and the laws of their home Member State,108 have to adhere by it. The Common 
Core Curricula, plans for the training of border guards, are equally developed by 
the Agency and member States are obligated to implement them into the train-
ing of their national border guards.109 FRONTEX also has the competence to 
initiate JOs and pilot projects itself, although the host Member State needs to 
agree and it still needs to carry them out in cooperation with the concerned 
Member States.110 However, while the Member States are envisioned to general-
ly propose JOs,111 FRONTEX still evaluates, approves and coordinates these pro-
posals.112 The fact that the Agency’s approval is mentioned implies that 
FRONTEX can also withhold its approval and thus stop a JO from being realised. 
Moreover, it can ‘decide to put its technical equipment at the disposal of Mem-
ber States participating in the joint operations or pilot projects’.113 It has the 
same margin of appreciation in the context of rapid interventions, where it ‘may’ 
deploy EBGTs in response to a Member State proposal.114 The Executive Director 
can also propose to deploy EBGTs.115 If a rapid intervention is about to be initiat-
ed, the Agency can demand that the Member States supply information on and 
their national border guards themselves within a short timeframe.116 Before 
deploying EBGTs, the Executive Director has the competence to send an Agency 
expert to assess the situation at the requesting Member State’s external bor-
ders.117 It is the Executive Director who decides whether EBGTs will be deployed 
or whether assistance will be lent in other ways.118 
Operational Plans are drawn up by the Executive Director, the host Member 
State agrees to it and the other concerned Member States are only consulted.119 
The Executive Director also needs to approve, together with the host Member 
State, any amendments of the Operational Plan.120 During JOs, Agency person-
nel is present together with the national border guards seconded by the Member 
States.121 The coordinating officer for each JO is chosen by FRONTEX.122 On its 
                                                                      
107  Article 2a FRONTEX-Regulation. Information on the Code of Conduct can be found in 
Sub-Chapters 2.2, 2.4 and Chapter 4.1.  
108  See articles 3c(1), 3c(4), 10 (especially 10(2) and 10(3)) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
109  Article 5 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
110  Article 3(1)(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
111  See article 3(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
112  Article 3(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Article 8a FRONTEX-Regulation. 
115  Article 3b(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
116  Article 8b FRONTEX-Regulation. 
117  Article 8d(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
118  Article 8d(4), (5) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
119  Article 3a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
120  Article 3a(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
121  Article 3a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
122  Articles 3b(5), 8g FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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own initiative, and after informing the participating Member States, the Agency 
can terminate JOs and pilot projects if the ‘conditions to conduct’ them are no 
longer fulfilled.123 Member States can only request the Agency to do so.124 Those 
conditions are especially not fulfilled any longer if fundamental rights violations 
or international protection obligations ‘of a serious nature’ can be presumed to 
persist.125 At this point, it should be considered when persisting violations of 
such grave dimensions can ever be considered not to be ‘of a serious nature’. 
FRONTEX can acquire or lease necessary technical equipment itself or in co-
ownership with the Member States.126 Both the Agency and the Executive Direc-
tor have the competence to make proposals with regards to the rules on and 
provision with technical equipment.127 It also has the competence to conclude 
working arrangements with the competent authorities of third countries and can 
even deploy officers to said country as well as receiving third-country officers in 
return.128 
These provisions prove that while FRONTEX’ powers are not extensive, it still 
has a considerable influence on the actions taken in the name of control and 
surveillance of the external borders and is able to shape JOs to its liking. This 
inherent independence is one of the reasons why, in the interest of checks and 
balances, it is so important that there is a way to hold FRONTEX accountable for 
its actions. Its powers and independent competences are far-reaching enough to 
doubt the recurrent statement that FRONTEX cannot be held accountable be-
cause of its subsidiary, facilitating role. 
2.2.5 Preliminary Conclusions 
FRONTEX has a long list of tasks which can be divided into three categories. The 
Operations Division and the Capacity Building Division are especially interesting 
for the present purposes. The tasks are described in article 2(1) FRONTEX-
Regulation. In the course of the execution of these tasks, breaches of EU law are 
especially possible as they are not exclusively internal to the Agency. The most 
important task mentioned here for the coming discussion are the Joint Opera-
tions, based on articles 2(1)(a), 3 and 3(a) of the FRONTEX-Regulation and in 
which the FRONTEX-Regulation proclaims that the Agency’s role mostly in-
volves facilitating, planning and assisting. These Joint Operations generally fol-
low a certain Operational Cycle, in the different phases of which the Agency has 
more or less important roles and occasionally can even be said to hold rather 
dominant positions (see eg risk analysis and termination). 
                                                                      
123  Article 3(1a) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
124  Ibid. 
125  Ibid. 
126  Article 7(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
127  Article 7(5) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
128  Article 14(2), (3), (6) FRONTEX-Regulation. The working arrangements will be examined 
more closely in Chapter 3.3. 
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It is important for the Agency’s functioning that the Member States agree 
with and support the Agency as well as provide it with both supplies and person-
nel, seeing that its own staff is so short in numbers. It is therefore certain that 
the Member States often hold a dominant position with regards to FRONTEX 
and may even have a certain influence on it. This holds especially true for the 
host Member State and its national border guards. The Management Board also 
plays an extremely important role with regards to the Agency, which is not unu-
sual and in fact foreseen by the Union. Still, its influential role needs to be taken 
into account as the MB is not a neutral Agency body but composed of Commis-
sion and Member State representatives who are by no means obligated to act 
independently. FRONTEX itself has also been shown to be able to also act rather 
independently in some situations, especially with regards to surveillance and 
control the external borders and influencing the way JOs and other activities are 
exercised. 
2.3 Hierarchical Framework 
In this Sub-Chapter, the Commission’s impact on FRONTEX, which is somewhat 
more extensive than the one of the other EU institutions, will be presented 
(2.3.1) before outlining the influence of Council and EP (2.3.2). 
2.3.1 Commission 
Two Commission representatives are members of the Management Board.129 It 
furthermore takes direct influence on the Agency through a number of provi-
sions, such as article 1(3) FRONTEX-Regulation, which obligates FRONTEX to 
support the Commission in different ways in the management of the external 
borders. It gives an opinion on FRONTEX’ planned working arrangements and 
planned deployment of liaison officers.130 The Commission has to agree to the 
implementing measures the Management Board wants to take on the Staff Reg-
ulation.131 It proposes to the Management Board whom to appoint as Execu-
tive Director and gives an opinion on the Agency’s work programme as well as 
the multiannual staff policy plan and the financial rules applicable to the Agency 
before the Management Board adopts it.132 The Commission has to give its con-
sent before a deviation from the financial rules laid out in Regulation 2343/ 
                                                                      
129  Article 21 FRONTEX-Regulation; the influence of the Management Board is analysed later 
in this Chapter. 
130  Article 14(8) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
131  Article 17(4) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
132  Articles 20(2)(a), (c), (h), 26, 32 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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2002133 is possible in specific instances.134 The Commission’s accounting officer 
consolidates the accounts transmitted to by the Agency’s accounting officer.135  
The Commission’s influence is tangible, but not as overwhelming as the one 
of the Member States. It is mostly mentioned in the FRONTEX-Regulation with 
regards to its rights to be informed and to receive reports in various situations.136 
2.3.2 Council and Parliament 
The Council plays the most significant role in the development of the policy and 
legislation on external border control and surveillance, which is why FRONTEX 
has to cooperate closely with it as well as with the other EU institutions.137 The 
Council decides on the location of the Agency’s seat.138 Both the European Par-
liament and the Council have the competence to invite the Executive Director to 
report to them directly on the execution of his or her tasks, especially on the 
implementation as well as the monitoring of the Fundamental Rights Strate-
gy.139 Both Council and Parliament have a strong influence on the Agency’s 
budget and financial matters. For instance, the Council gives a recommendation 
to the Parliament to discharge the Executive Director from the management of 
the budget of the discharge year.140 
Most of the Council’s and the European Parliament’s powers with regards to 
FRONTEX lie within the fact that they have a right to be informed about nearly 
everything that is happening within the Agency.141 Their direct influence on the 
Agency is much more insignificant than those of the Member States and the 
Commission – if the fact that they are those with legislating power in the Agen-
cy’s field of action. 
2.4 FRONTEX & Fundamental Rights 
Fundamental Rights and Human Rights are two terms used seemingly inter-
changeably. It therefore seems interesting to point out the difference between 
human rights and fundamental rights, as both terms are used frequently in the 
context of FRONTEX’ obligations to respect the rights of persons attempting to 
cross the EU’s external borders. While a distinction seems difficult between the 
notions of human rights and fundamental rights, the Fundamental Rights 
                                                                      
133  Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2343/2002 on the framework Financial Regulation 
for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of the general Financial Regulation [2002] OJ 
L357/72. 
134  Article 32 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
135  Article 30(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
136  Which will be discussed in 4.1. 
137  Recital 20 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
138  Article 15 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
139  Article 25 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
140  Article 30(9) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
141  This will be discussed in Sub-Chapter 4.1. 
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Agency (FRA) has said that in European law, the notion of fundamental rights 
describes human rights within a certain context that is internal to the Union.142 
The FRA further notes that while the two terms define similar issues, the term 
‘human rights’ usually refers to an international setting while the notion of ‘fun-
damental rights’ is more often found in constitutional contexts.143 
In this Section, the efforts which are made by the Agency in order to protect 
fundamental rights as well as their effectiveness will be evaluated. This is neces-
sary because FRONTEX installed these institutions in 2012 in response to human 
rights concerns expressed by the international community.144 These concerns, 
however, have not been completely alleviated through this move: In fact, ac-
cording to a report by German public broadcasting radio broadcaster 
Deutschlandfunk, former FRONTEX Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen has, during 
his mandate, admitted that human rights violations were taking place regularly, 
claiming that five to ten instances of push-backs exercised by Agency officers 
had to be investigated yearly.145 
2.4.1 Human Rights and Fundamental Rights Instruments FRONTEX is 
Bound by 
The Geneva Refugee Convention146 is referred to in article 1(2)(2) FRONTEX-
Regulation, which promises the Agency’s fulfilment of its tasks in full considera-
tion of it. This does, however, not provide the Agency with a framework for its 
actions as the Convention offers no procedural provisions and is held in rather 
general terms.  
Both the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights form parameters to FRONTEX’ actions, limiting them 
insofar as that the Agency is oblige to respect certain rights. FRONTEX makes 
reference to the ECFR, which has become binding with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, 
already in article 1(2)(2) of amended Regulation 2007/2004.147 The European 
Convention on Human Rights is not a EU legal document per se, but the Europe-
an Union is bound by article 6(2) TEU to accede to the ECHR and article 6(3) TEU 
determines that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR constitute 
general principles of EU law. Articles 3, 5, 6 and 13 as well as article 4 of Protocol 
                                                                      
142  Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Frequently asked questions – What is the difference be-
tween human rights and fundamental rights?’, FAQ, 2016. 
143  Ibid. 
144  See eg Special Report of the European Ombudsman in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/ 
BEH-MHZ concerning Frontex. 
145  See Deutschlandfunk, ‘Frontex gibt Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu EU-Grenzschutz-
agentur an illegaler Gewalt gegen Flüchtlinge beteiligt’, transcript of radio broadcast, 17/ 
10/2013. 
146  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951. 
147  Especially interesting to FRONTEX’ actions are article 1 containing the right to the respect 
and protection of human dignity, article 2, article 4 setting out the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment, but also articles 6, 8, 11, 17, 18, which contains the 
right to asylum, the prohibition of refoulement of article 19, articles 24 and 47 ECFR.  
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4 and Protocol 7 should be of special interest to the Agency. It has especially 
been shown that these articles impact FRONTEX work greatly through the 
ECtHR’s 2012 Hirsi Jamaa & Others v Italy decision,148 and in which the ECtHR 
has found violations of articles 3 ECHR, 4 Protocol 4 and 13 ECHR through the 
practice of interception-at-sea, destined to prevent irregular migrants from 
reaching European territory. 
2.4.2 Fundamental Rights Issues in the FRONTEX Regulations 
The 2011 amendment of the FRONTEX-Regulation introduced important im-
provements of the Agency’s dedication to the protection and upholding of fun-
damental rights, the first of which is article 1(2)(2), which obliges FRONTEX to 
comply with, amongst others, the ECFR and ‘obligations related to access to 
international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement; and fun-
damental rights’ while respecting article 26a. However, the provisions which 
actually provide for fundamental rights protection look to be quite similar to 
each other insofar as that they are all rather general. Article 9(1) FRONTEX-
Regulation, for example, simply calls for the ‘full respect for the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights’, without specifying what this might entail and without includ-
ing any specific obligations the Agency might be forced to adhere by. The same 
can be said for article 9(1a), which also calls for the full respect for fundamental 
rights, enumerating a few specific rights afterwards, but also being, essentially, 
devoid of any concrete, substantial meaning. In article 10(2), it is said that guest 
officers shall observe fundamental rights. The last paragraph of article 14(1) pro-
vides that cooperation with third countries shall promote European standards, 
also covering fundamental rights and human dignity. It is, however, not ex-
plained what ‘covering fundamental rights and human dignity’ entails. 
Article 26a FRONTEX-Regulation implements certain fundamental rights 
mechanisms.149 Before, the Agency had been subject to serious criticisms as to 
                                                                      
148  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, ECHR 2012, which will be discussed in 
3.2.3. 
149  Article 26a FRONTEX-Regulation: Fundamental Rights Strategy – 1. The Agency shall draw 
up and further develop and implement its Fundamental Rights Strategy. The Agency shall 
put in place an effective mechanism to monitor the respect for fundamental rights in all the 
activities of the Agency. 2. A Consultative Forum shall be established by the Agency to assist 
the Executive Director and the Management Board in fundamental rights matters. The 
Agency shall invite the European Asylum Support Office, the Fundamental Rights Agency, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant organisations to par-
ticipate in the Consultative Forum. On a proposal by the Executive Director, the Manage-
ment Board shall decide on the composition and the working methods of the Consultative 
Forum and the modalities of the transmission of information to the Consultative Forum. -The 
Consultative Forum shall be consulted on the further development and implementation of 
the Fundamental Rights Strategy, Code of Conduct and common core curricula. -The Consul-
tative Forum shall prepare an annual report of its activities. That report shall be made pub-
licly available. 3. A Fundamental Rights Officer shall be designated by the Management 
Board and shall have the necessary qualifications and experience in the field of fundamental 
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its respect for fundamental rights.150 It was consequently obligated to imple-
ment a Fundamental Rights Strategy (art 26a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation) including 
a Fundamental Rights Officer (art 26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation) and a Consulta-
tive Forum (CF) (art 26a(2) FRONTEX-Regulation). Their roles, however, are only 
defined in a very vague manner and only ever mentioned in this one article. In 
order to evaluate their effectiveness, these roles will be further described in the 
following paragraphs with the help of additional sources, starting with the Fun-
damental Rights Strategy, then the FRONTEX Consultative Forum on Funda-
mental Rights and, lastly, the Fundamental Rights Officer.151 
 
The Fundamental Rights Strategy 
According to FRONTEX, the Fundamental Rights Strategy promotes FRONTEX’ 
commitment to respect and protect fundamental rights by emphasising the 
attachment to fundamental rights ‘at every level’ of activity.152 The Agency says 
that the Strategy contains general principles which are meant to safeguard fun-
damental rights and professional ethics, especially during JOs.153 It adds:  
 
For that purpose, it sets out the need for developing knowledge and skills of officers 
participating in the Joint Operations Coordinated by Frontex and implementing proper 
monitoring mechanisms based on reporting to the competent authorities and disciplining 
malpractices adequately.154  
 
Although ‘Frontex considers that respect and promotion of fundamental rights 
are unconditional and integral components of effective integrated border man-
agement’,155 the Agency considers its Fundamental Rights Strategy to be an 
understanding of fundamental rights shared among the European border guard 
community and even in third countries.156 It considers its own role to be one of 
development and promotion of said strategy but neither sees itself explicitly 
bound by said strategy, as it is only an understanding, and neither amongst 
                                                                      
rights. He/she shall be independent in the performance of his/her duties as a Fundamental 
Rights Officer and shall report directly to the Management Board and the Consultative Fo-
rum. He/she shall report on a regular basis and as such contribute to the mechanism for 
monitoring fundamental rights. 4. The Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Fo-
rum shall have access to all information concerning respect for fundamental rights, in rela-
tion to all the activities of the Agency. (Emphases added). 
150  See eg Human Rights Watch (2011). 
151  NB: It should be mentioned again at this point that while more material information was 
requested, it was, more often than not, not available: Representatives of the CF professed 
not to have much information on a lot of the issues discussed in this thesis, the FRO did 
not find the time to respond to any questions and no answer was received from FRONTEX 
itself at all. A lot of the literature available on these issues is also held rather vague. 
152  FRONTEX (2014-2) 3. 
153  Ibid.  
154  Ibid.  
155  Preamble of the FRONTEX Fundamental Rights Strategy of March 2011. 
156  Ibid.  
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those groups among which it seeks to promote the strategy it aims to develop – 
even though it seeks to take on an exemplary role (objective no2).157 The crea-
tion of the Strategy was made obligatory for FRONTEX when inserted into arti-
cle 26a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation with the 2011 amendment. The Regulation does 
not say much about the Strategy. It contains FRONTEX’ obligation to create it 
and, in paragraph 2, it says that the Consultative Forum should be consulted on 
its development implementation. It is further specified that an effective funda-
mental rights monitoring mechanism should be put into place. There is exces-
sively little information in the Regulation on how the Strategy should look like 
and on what it should contain. The Fundamental Rights Strategy was developed 
in 2011 with the help of a drawing committee composed of FRONTEX represent-
atives, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Member 
States representatives, the European Commission, as well as representatives of 
the Fundamental Rights Agency and the International Organization for Migra-
tion.158  
FRONTEX considers its codes of conduct, developed to apply specifically to 
its several types of activity, to be part of the Fundamental Rights Strategy and 
through them the Consultative Forum can exert a considerable influence on the 
Strategy.159 According to the 2015 Evaluation Report, both a Fundamental 
Rights Action Plan and a Fundamental Rights Annual Progress Report are au-
thored by FRONTEX; they line out its progress in protecting fundamental rights. 
160 The Report criticises that there is a lack of uniform implementation of the 
Fundamental Rights Strategy in the Member States and equally varying degrees 
of compliance with it. However, Ramboll Management observes that compliance 
with and implementation of the Strategy is a conditio sine qua non and that even 
the strategy itself says that it is ‘inextricably linked to the commitment of na-
tional border-guard services to share their objectives and support Frontex in 
their implementation’.161 It is further problematic that there is no clear under-
standing between the Agency, the Consultative Forum and the Member States 
where the Member States’ responsibility to protect fundamental rights ends and 
FRONTEX’ responsibility begins and vice versa, which also impacts the imple-
mentation of the Strategy negatively.162  
Consequently, the Fundamental Rights Strategy, while a good start, is in it-
self a rather questionable means to secure protection of fundamental rights. 
 
The FRONTEX Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights 
The Agency itself describes the task of the Consultative Forum in the following 
manner: it ‘serves as a knowledge and expertise resource which advises Frontex 
Management Board (MB) as well as the Executive Director in all Fundamental 
                                                                      
157  Ibid. 
158  FRONTEX (2012) 1.  
159  Ibid 3. 
160  Ramboll Management (2015) 86; see also FRONTEX (2012) 1. 
161  Ramboll Management (2015) 87, FRONTEX (2011) 7. 
162  Ramboll Management (2015) 87. 
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Rights matters, offering strategic advice on how Frontex can structurally im-
prove respect for Fundamental Rights in its various activities’.163 The Agency 
further claims that the Forum, consisting of 15 international organisations and 
EU Agencies,164 is consulted an matters concerning the Fundamental Rights 
Strategy, common core curricula and Codes of Conduct and will be informed on 
any Fundamental Rights related Agency activities. 165 While there does not seem 
to be any binding legal framework the Consultative Forum has to abide by, it has 
itself provided a detailed description of its role and functioning, as developed by 
the CF itself,166 in its first annual report from 2013.167 Furthermore, it has devel-
oped its own Working Methods, which introduce the CF as being a ‘knowledge 
and expertise resource to enable Frontex and its Management Board (MB) to 
gain information and advice relevant to the aim of developing and promoting 
the respect of Fundamental Rights (FR) in all Frontex’ activities’.168 It adds that in 
the context of its tasks, ‘the CF will offer strategic opinions, recommendations 
and a pool of information on how Frontex can structurally improve the respect 
and promotion of FR in its various activities’.169 CF vice president Stefan Keßler 
with the Jesuit Refugee Service has elaborated that the CF has provided: 
 
•  Expert review of key documents, e.g., Frontex Plan of Work, training curricula, VEGA 
Children Handbook; 
•  Input to the drafting process of the Code of Conduct for Joint Return Operations; 
•  Human rights related information for the use of the Risk Analysis Unit; 
•  Recommendations based on observations during field visits to joint operations; 
•  Participation of Consultative Forum members in the joint operation VEGA Children; 
•  Human rights related training to border guards in Frontex-coordinated seminars; 
•  Ongoing communication on fundamental rights matters through formal and in-
formal meetings, communication with the office of the Fundamental Rights Officer, 
with the Executive Director, with the Management Board and with several Frontex 
staff.170  
 
Keßler criticizes that the CF has no direct access out of its own volition to the JOs 
in order to better observe and issue recommendations but has to wait for 
FRONTEX to issue an invitation, as well as for the host Member State to approve 
of this, which in practice happens seldom.171 He adds that the CF is not able to 
                                                                      
163  See FRONTEX, ‘Consultative Forum – General information’, 2016. 
164  Consultative Forum (2014-1), p 5ff; see also Management Board Decision No 29/2015 of 
09 September 2015 on the composition of the Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamen-
tal Rights. 
165  Article 26a(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
166  Consultative Forum (2014-1) 7. 
167  Ibid., 8-15. 
168  Consultative Forum (2014-2) 1. 
169  Ibid. 
170  Keßler (2016) 1. 
171  Ibid.: ‘Frontex may invite the Consultative Forum to visit a joint operation as observer, and 
the Consultative Forum has actively asked to be invited to send members on occasional 
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effectively exercise its right to access all information with regards to fundamen-
tal rights and FRONTEX, which needs to be improved172 and that the CF needs to 
be given more time for its recommendations, for which it often has but a couple 
of days, according to the head of the Consultative Forum Marta Ballestero.173 
This is especially grave because the member of the CF still retain positions within 
their original organisations and need to fulfil the tasks of their occupations as 
well as devote as much time as is possible to the completion of the tasks of the 
CF. 
 
The Fundamental Rights Officer 
The Fundamental Rights Officer is, according to article 26a(3) of the FRONTEX-
Regulation, appointed by the Management Board as an independent agent and 
needs to be sufficiently qualified and experiences in fundamental rights matters. 
She does not benefit from any detailed description on the Agency’s website, but 
the position is described in a vacancy note as:  
 
The Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) holds an independent role within the Agency to 
support its work from a fundamental/human rights perspective, for which the FRO has 
the mandate to identify and propose both preventive and corrective measures and 
making observations on the identified needs and challenges in all the activities of the 
Agency.174 
 
                                                                      
visits to Frontex coordinated operations. The aim is not to monitor, but to be in a position 
to issue recommendations on joint land or sea border operations that are based on obser-
vations of how things work in practice and not only on the examination of rules, instruc-
tions and reports that are on paper. However, the visits do not only have to be arranged 
with Frontex, but the approval of the member states concerned with that activity is re-
quired as well as the agreement of the member state that hosts the operation. This 
means that Consultative Forum members can visit joint operations, but not by unilateral 
decision, randomly or at short notice. Nor is there a right to such visits.  
Additionally, the access of the Consultative Forum to certain sets of Frontex documents 
must be improved if the Forum is expected to produce more meaningful recommenda-
tions.  
More time is needed for the consultation processes (including the preparation of expert 
meetings) as the timelines should allow for the consultation of relevant experts within the 
organisations and institutions that are represented on the Consultative Forum.  
The Consultative Forum members carry out their work (analyses, drafting of reports or 
contributions, consultations with other Forum members, exchange and engagement with 
other stakeholders, etc) within their regular working time and with their organisations’ 
resources; it must therefore be reconciled with their other duties. This limits the time and 
means members can devote to the Consultative Forum.’ 
172  Ibid.; Ballestero (2016), see also Y Pascouau and P Schumacher, Frontex and the respect of 
fundamental rights: from better protection to full responsibility (Policy Brief, 03 June 2014) 
(European Policy Centre, Brussels 2014)2. 
173  Ibid.; Ballestero (2016). 
174  FRONTEX, Vacancy Note for an Associated Fundamental Rights Officer, 23/12/2015, 
(2015-5). 
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These descriptions do not constitute a legally binding framework, and even if 
they were defined as such, they would contain much too little information to be 
considered a comprehensive legal framework for the Officer’s or the Forum’s 
activities. The Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) is independent, but reports 
regularly to the Management Board, the Consultative Forum and to her appoint-
ing authority: The Executive Director, and thus contributes to the fundamental 
rights monitoring mechanism.175 Just like the CF, she has access to all docu-
ments.176 However, the CF observes: 
 
Contrary to the Consultative Forum, the Fundamental Rights Officer has a clear monitor-
ing role that covers all Frontex coordinated operations and activities. She receives all inci-
dent reports and individual complaints and has unfettered access to documents and offi-
cials. She can also observe operations in situ and participate in internal Frontex briefings, 
debriefings and discussions.177  
 
The roles of FRO and Consultative Forum are meant to complement each 
other.178 Her tasks include making observations concerning the state of funda-
mental rights protection in JOs; supporting the fundamental rights monitoring 
mechanism by monitoring comportment and situations during FRONTEX-co-
ordinated and -led activities, even including field visits, and reporting regularly to 
several instances; advise FRONTEX on ex ante and ex post facto measures it 
could take to protect fundamental rights more effectively; keeping record of all 
possible fundamental rights-related incidents within the framework of activities 
the Agency is involved in; controlling the implementation of the Fundamental 
Rights Strategy; and contributing to the improvement of further fundamental 
rights issues within the given framework.179 
Therefore, the FRO has to do an impressive amount of work, which she is 
barely able to handle given that she is significantly understaffed.180 Furthermore, 
the resources allocated to the FRO are negligible (see Figure 4). The Figure de-
picts the allocation in percentage points of human resources in light blue, and 
the one of financial resources in dark blue. It shows that The FRO is allocated one 
percent of the Agency’s human resources, and 0,0% of its financial ones.  
                                                                      
175  Article 26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation; FRONTEX (2012) 4.  
NB: there is a contradiction here between the FRONTEX report and the Regulation: the 
Regulation states that the MB designates the FRO, the Report says that it is the Executive 
Director. 
176  Article 26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
177  Consultative Forum (2014-1) 14. 
178  FRONTEX (2012) 4. 
179  Ibid. 
180  Consultative Forum (2016) 18f.  
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It can thus be concluded that while the FRO has an important mandate and is in 
a position to effectively control the Agency’s adherence to fundamental rights 
standards, she is hindered in the effective execution of these tasks by an inade-
quate allocation of resources. 
2.4.3 Further FRONTEX-related Fundamental Rights Issues 
The facts that only a very vague legal framework exists for both the FRO and the 
CF and that the Fundamental Rights Strategy is neither binding nor sufficiently 
precise or elaborated might be one of the reasons why the Agency’s critics are 
not appeased by the amendments to its regulation.181 
In 2013, the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly has recommended the EU and 
FRONTEX for their recent human rights oriented efforts (§4) but criticised that a 
number of concerns have not or have only been inadequately treated and there-
fore remain (§§ 5ff).182 The fact that FRONTEX is still seen as only a coordinator 
of Member States’ actions and that responsibility is still wholly placed on those 
Member States is bemoaned (§ 6). The Parliamentary Assembly then calls upon 
FRONTEX and the EU as well as the EU Member States to improve their funda-
mental rights protection schemes in four distinct points: § 7 addresses issues at 
FRONTEX’ operational and structural level, § 8 addresses structural issues with 
human rights implications, § 9 asks the Union to ensure that the Agency and the 
member States adhere by their human rights obligations and it asks the same of 
                                                                      
181  See eg European Ombudsman, Recommendation OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ, 09/04/2013, but 
also Human Rights Watch, ‘The EU’s Dirty Hands – Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment 
of Migrant Detainees in Greece’ (2011). 
182  PACE (2013-1). 
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the Member States in § 10. Under all these paragraphs, the Assembly gives con-
crete ideas and approaches with which to reach said aims.183  
It seems to be a general phenomenon that provisions often only contain de-
scriptions of certain rights of refugees or persons seeking international protec-
tion, but do not mention the States’ or other actors’ concrete duties.184 This has 
not only occurred in the FRONTEX-Regulation but in other legislative documents 
as well. Some examples are the EU-Treaties, but also Regulation (EU) 656/2014, 
which has been shown to be highly relevant for FRONTEX and which will be ana-
lysed in detail in Section 3.2.3. Fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed 
by provisions in numerous acts in Europe. Those of these articles pertaining to 
the Agency will be pointed out and analysed before evaluating the effectiveness 
of FRONTEX’ fundamental rights protection scheme. Article 67(1) TFEU, which is 
part of the chapter on the area of freedom, security and justice on which the 
foundation of FRONTEX is based, proclaims that fundamental rights shall be 
respected in the EU. Recital 22 of the FRONTEX-Regulation declares that the 
‘Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recog-
nised by Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’.185 Article 6 TEU says that the 
rights and freedoms set out in the ECFR are recognized by the Union and that 
the fundamental rights of the ECHR shall be recognized as general principles of 
EU law. Recital 5 of Regulation (EU) 656/2014 provides that FRONTEX may co-
operate with third states on matters of the protection of the external sea borders 
‘insofar as full respect for the fundamental rights of migrants is ensured’. Recitals 
9 and 10 both mention compliance with ad respect for fundamental rights.  
All these vague references to fundamental rights which in reality do not 
amount to much seem to have alibi-functions more than being actually meant to 
protect fundamental rights, as clear obligations addressed to States, the Agency 
or even the EU in general are missing, which makes it hard to discern any actual 
protection standard emanating from these articles. 
2.5 Conclusion 2 
There is a myriad of EU legislation forming the Agency’s legal framework. Due to 
this high number of legal provisions binding FRONTEX, there is also a wide basis 
                                                                      
183  They will be further discussed in appropriate places in the following Chapters. 
184  R Weinzierl, The Demands of Human and EU Fundamental Rights for the Protection of the 
European Union’s External Borders (German Institute for Human Rights, Berlin 2007) 9. 
185  NB: The recital limits itself to citing paragraph 2 of article 6 TEU, as the whole article 
refers to different sources of rights, freedoms and principles to be recognized by the EU. 
This is probably due to the fact that the Regulation was written before the Lisbon-
amendment of the TEU, and article 6(2) TEU under the Treaty of Nice-version was the 
only paragraph to make reference to fundamental rights and the ECHR. The reference to 
article 6(2) TEU might therefore be classified as an oversight in the 2011 amendment of 
the FRONTEX-Regulation. 
CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
 
 
73 
of provisions which the Agency could potentially breach, and for which it could 
potentially be held accountable. Its tasks and instruments, defined in the 
FRONTEX-Regulation and its article 2(1) as well as certain other EU legal docu-
ments, show the Agency’s impressive potential range of action. Especially the 
Joint Operations are an important means to safeguard the external borders of 
the Union. They follow operational cycles, during which FRONTEX sometimes 
exerts more and sometimes exerts less independent influence.  
Member States involved in a JO, especially the host Member State, have a 
considerable impact on it. FRONTEX depends heavily their support and agree-
ment of the Member States, whose impact is especially due to the facts that the 
host Member State and its national border guards have the biggest effect and 
influence on JOs. In addition, FRONTEX has to rely on Member State personnel 
over which it has no disciplinary power because its own staff numbers are exces-
sively low. The role of the Member States is especially important within the op-
erational cycle of a JO.  
The Management Board’s impact on FRONTEX’ actions is extensive, which 
does not surprise as such a role is foreseen for it in the Common Approach on 
European Agencies and as it is composed of representatives of Member States 
and Commission. There is no independence clause in the FRONTEX-Regulation 
concerning the Management Board as there is with regards to the Executive 
Director and the FRO, but this follows logically as it is composed of said repre-
sentatives.  
The EU institutions vary in degree and nuance of their impact on the Agency, 
but have mostly only the right to be informed about a lot of decisions and ac-
tions within the Agency’s framework. The Commission’s agreement is needed on 
issues concerning the Staff Regulation, it gives a proposal on the identity/choice 
of the Executive Director, gives an opinion on the multiannual staff policy plan, 
consents on deviations from the standard financial rules and consolidates the 
Agency’s accounts. Most of the Council’s and the European Parliament’s powers 
with regards to FRONTEX lie within the fact that they have a right to be in-
formed about nearly everything that is happening within the Agency. Their di-
rect impact on the Agency is much more insignificant than those of the Member 
States and the Commission – if the fact that they are those with legislating pow-
er in the Agency’s field of action. Hence, it has been shown that Member States 
and EU institutions have a significant influence on the Agency’s actions, which 
go so far that CoE Rapporteur Cederbratt spoke of them as FRONTEX’ ‘two mas-
ters’186. However, it cannot be denied that the Agency has a margin of manoeu-
vre of its own.  
While FRONTEX declares its willingness to uphold and protect fundamental 
rights recurrently, the actual substance of the provisions promising fundamental 
right protection is very questionable. It is clear that FRONTEX has made pro-
gress concerning fundamental rights matters in implementing its obligations 
under article 26a FRONTEX-Regulation, but strong issues remain. It is doubtful 
                                                                      
186  PACE, ‘Frontex: human rights responsibilities’, Explanatory Memorandum by CoE Rap-
porteur Cederbratt, (2013-3), §89.  
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that the Fundamental Rights Strategy, while a good start, is in itself an appropri-
ate means to secure the protection of fundamental rights. The missions, tasks 
and competences of the FRO remain blurry and their extent unclear, which leads 
to the assumption that their influence is rather limited. The Consultative Forum 
has a number of useful competences, although they are neither appropriately 
far-reaching nor entirely binding, as for example their Working Methods. It 
serves as a good example for transparency, but is, itself, not provided with suffi-
cient information. Even though fundamental rights are mentioned numerous 
times in a number of pieces of EU legislation relating to FRONTEX, all those 
instances remain vague and seem to have an alibi-status at most. 
FRONTEX might thus ‘serve two masters’, as implied by Cederbratt, but 
even though its powers are not extensive, it still has a considerable margin of 
manoeuvre concerning the actions taken in the name of control and surveillance 
of the external borders and is able to shape JOs to its liking. 
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3. Inside-Outside 
 
 
In this Chapter, it will be examined how FRONTEX’ JOs look like in practice (Sub-
Chapter 3.1). It will be examined if there needs to be a distinction between ac-
tions outside and inside EU territory when discussing FRONTEX accountability 
and the rules which need to apply to the Agency’s extraterritorial action in addi-
tion to those which were discussed in Chapter 2 will be elaborated (Sub-Chapter 
3.2). Examples will be given for FRONTEX’ extraterritorial activities (Sub-Chapter 
3.3).  
3.1 JO Poseidon Sea as an Example for FRONTEX’ Activities Inside EU 
Territory – What does a JO Look Like in Practice? 
FRONTEX JOs are naturally subject to a dichotomy, insofar as that they have 
two rather contradicting objectives, the first one being the securing of the exter-
nal borders and the second one being the Agency’s general humanitarian objec-
tives.1 In theory, they need to be balanced, but whether this succeeds is a differ-
ent question2.3 
There are four different kinds of JOs which FRONTEX may carry out, initi-
ated by itself or a Member State and differentiated after their area of operation: 
Air, Land, Return, Sea.4 Up to this point, a lot has been written in this thesis 
about the parameters of a FRONTEX Joint Operation in this thesis without ever 
presenting what a JO actually looks like. In this Sub-Chapter, the more practical 
aspects of FRONTEX’ actions will be shed light on. 
While FRONTEX has some information on its website about its operations,5 
it keeps most details to itself and does not offer much information at all about 
                                                                      
1  See for example articles 1(2), 2(1)(c), (d), (e), (h), 4§3, 6, 8, 8a, 11c(1), FRONTEX-Regula-
tion on the objective of securing the Agency’s external borders and recital 22 as well as ar-
ticles 1(2), 2(1)(da), 3b(4), 5, 9(1a), 10(2), 14(1), 26a, 33(2b) FRONTEX-Regulation on the 
humanitarian objectives. On this, see also S Carrera and L Hertog, Whose Mare? Rule of 
Law Challenges in the Field of European Border Surveillance in the Mediterranean (CEPS, 
Brussels 2015) CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe No 79, 5, who refer to the 
former Italian Mare Nostrum operation. 
2  During JOs, potential asylum seekers are impeded from ever reaching Europe and actu-
ally making their claim and as regular migration for the purpose of asking for asylum is 
hardly ever possible. Therefore, it may indeed be questioned whether the JOs’ objectives 
to fight, amongst others, irregular migration, are in fact in coherence with EU law. How-
ever, this is a topic for another thesis. 
3  An elaboration on the successful fulfilment of the Agency’s humanitarian objectives fol-
lows below on p11. 
4  See FRONTEX Operations Archive, http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/archive-of-opera-
tions/, accessed on 08/03/2016. 
5  Especially in the Operations Archive which sloppily offers cursory overview over past 
operations. 
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ongoing operations. Even in response to requests under the Unions public access 
to EU documents Regulation,6 the Agency claims reasons of ‘public interest in 
the field of public security, defence and military security and international rela-
tions’,7 or that the disclosure of current information would ‘jeopardize the effec-
tive control and surveillance of external sea borders of the EU Member States 
and the fight against cross-border crime and ultimately undermine the protec-
tion of the public interest as regards public security’,8 in order not to grant any 
access to this information at all.9 However, it is still possible to gain access10 to 
its outdated Operational Plans (OPs), which then are heavily redacted by having 
had large parts blacked out.11 
One of the most famous Operations which is largely, though not exclusively, 
carried out in the EU is JO Poseidon Sea. As the topic of this Section is FRONTEX’ 
actions inside EU territory, the focus will be on the aspects set inside said terri-
tory. However, as the exact operational areas are blacked out in all Operational 
Plans made available by FRONTEX, the exact locations of the actions carried out 
during a JO are confidential and thus not available to the general public.12 
Joint Operation Poseidon Sea is an Eastern Mediterranean-based operation 
created in 2014 and hosted by Greece, with 22 other EU and EEA-countries par-
                                                                      
6  See Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission docu-
ments.  
7  Brooks (2014) 23. 
8  See eg the answer to K. Hayat via AskTheEU.org, ‘Request for Triton Operational plan 
(2015)’, Request for Information, 21/06/2015: FRONTEX via AskTheEU.org, ‘Request for 
Triton Operational plan (2015)’, Denial of Request, 22/06/2015. 
9  See eg the denied request for information of K. Hayat via AskTheEU.org, ‘Request for 
Triton Operational plan (2015)’, Request for Information, 21/06/2015.  
10  Interesting remark on the side: in order to gain access to the past Operational Plans for 
FRONTEX JOs, one has to make a request under the right of access to documents in the 
EU Treaties, as developed in Regulation 1049/2001. However, FRONTEX seems to be reti-
cent to provide the information needed insofar as that, as of recently, it requires the re-
questing party to provide proof that they in fact are a ‘natural or legal person residing or 
having its registered office in a Member State’ in accordance with article 2(1) of the 
aforementioned Regulation. In practice, that means that one has to either provide the 
Agency with a copy of one’s ID, which may be quite the deterrent, or give up on one’s re-
quest. See also Author via AskTheEU.org, ‘Latest available Operational Plans for Opera-
tions Poseidon Sea and Poseidon Land, Triton, Alexis, Good Will and Serbia & Albania’, 
Request for Information, 17/04/2016. 
11  See the examples in Annex 3. 
12  See eg OPs for JO EPN Poseidon Sea 2015, p 7 & Annex 4, p 27; and JP Triton 2015, p 8 & 
Annex 4, p 22, all available on the AsktheEU platform: Author via AskTheEU.org, ‘Latest 
available Operational Plans for Operations Poseidon Sea and Poseidon Land, Triton, 
Alexis, Good Will and Serbia & Albania’, Request for Information, 17/04/2016; see also 
Carrera (2007) 22; V Moreno-Lax, ‘Searching Responsibilities and Rescuing Rights: Fron-
tex, the Draft Guidelines for Joint Maritime Operations and Asylum Seeking in the Medi-
terranean’ (2010) RefGov-FR-28, 6. 
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ticipating.13 As depicted in Figure 5 below, its general area of operation is situat-
ed along the sea border between Turkey and the Greek isles.14 The four Greek 
islands most frequented by irregular migrants and around which, logically, the 
JO’s activities are most centred, are Lesbos (on which 49% of the irregular mi-
grants arriving on the Greek isles land), Kos (17%), Samos (15%) and Chios 
(11%).15 Its aim is ‘[t]o implement coordinated operational activities at the exter-
nal sea borders of the Eastern Mediterranean region in order to control irregular 
migration flows towards the territory of the Member States of the EU and to 
tackle cross-border crime’.16 According to a FRONTEX press pack from Septem-
ber 2015, Poseidon Sea was expanded17 because 2014 saw a dramatic increase in 
migration movement across the Turkish-Greek sea borders.18  
 
 
 
Poseidon Sea’s objective is to ‘implement coordinated operational activities at 
the external sea borders of the Eastern Mediterranean region in order to control 
irregular migration flows towards the territory of the Member States of the EU 
                                                                      
13  See, FRONTEX, ‘Poseidon Sea’, Archive Entry, 2016. 
14  Ibid. 
15  See FRONTEX Press Pack (2015) 9. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Although Poseidon Land existed since 2006, see Amnesty (2014-2) 26, and Poseidon Sea 
since 2007, see FRONTEX, ‘Poseidon’, Archive Entry, 2016-2. 
18  See FRONTEX Press Pack (2015) 9. 
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and to tackle cross-border crime.’19 It was first set out to only last for nine 
months, but was subsequently extended and expanded into a European Patrol 
Network (EPN)20 lasting until the end of 2015.21 At that point, it was changed 
into the ‘Poseidon Rapid Intervention’ Operation, which has not yet been entered 
into the Operations Archive, possibly due to the fact that it is still ongoing. The 
original purpose of Poseidon Sea to control irregular migration flows, is amended 
by ‘put[ing] a greater emphasis on security checks’.22 Poseidon Sea has been 
replaced by the Poseidon Rapid Intervention at the end of 2015, which now offers 
more officers for identifying and fingerprinting arriving migrants, more inter-
preters and even forged documents experts, as well as technical support in order 
to improve Greece’s capacity for border surveillance as well as registration and 
identification of migrants.23  
One of the activities coordinated by FRONTEX during such operations is the 
so-called ‘nationality screening’, where personnel attached to the JO appreciates 
whether intercepted irregular migrants do in fact have the nationality they claim 
to have. In the Poseidon Sea 2015 OP, FRONTEX gives data as to the outcomes 
of the nationality screening process of the 2014 JO (Figure 6 below): 
It seems important to remark upon the fact that although a significant num-
ber of people continue to lose their lives by attempting to cross the Western 
Mediterranean Sea from Turkey towards the Greek isles,24 still no focus is put on 
rescuing and preserving life, but rather on ‘security checks’ and ‘preventing ir-
regular migration’.25 However, Ballestero stresses that FRONTEX is bound by 
and respects its obligations under the International Law of the Sea, which com-
pel it to abandon any other missions as soon as persons in distress are spotted 
and to ensure their return to safety.26 
 
                                                                      
19  See FRONTEX, ‘Poseidon Sea’, Archive Entry, 2016. 
20  EPN was established by FRONTEX and is a ‘permanent regional border security concept 
that enables the synchronization of national measures of the Member States and their in-
tegration to joint European activities’ (FRONTEX, ‘European Patrols Network’, Article, 
24/05/2007and is meant to effectively ‘unite (…) the members of the agency’s operational 
branch of the “Joint Maritime Operations’” (N Frenzen, ‘European Patrol Network Meet-
ing, 23-24 Sept.’, Blog entry on the MigrantsAtSea Blog, 19/09/2010). For more informa-
tion, see the first link to FRONTEX’ explanation about the EPN.  
21  See FRONTEX, ‘JO EPN Poseidon Sea (as of 28.12.2015 – Poseidon Rapid Intervention)’, 
Archive Entry, 2016. 
22  FRONTEX, 'Frontex and Greece agree on operational plan for Poseidon Rapid Interven-
tion', Article, 17/12/2015. 
23  FRONTEX, ‘Frontex launches rapid operational assistance in Greece’, Article, 29/12/2015.  
24  The IOM has stated on 22/03/2016 that ‘The Aegean Sea continues to be this year’s most 
deadly migrant route.’ (https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-
160547-deaths-488, accessed on 25/06/2016). 366 people have drowned on the Aegean 
Sea between Turkey and Greece between 01/01 and 31/03/2016 (https://www.iom.int/ 
news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-169846-deaths-620).  
25  For more discussion of the SAR issue, see Chapter 6. 
26  Ballestero (2016). 
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Poseidon Sea’s budget started out with € 2,250,000.00 in 200727 and has since 
increased dramatically to € 19,960,291.22 for 2015,28 which translates into an 
increase of around 787%. This impressively large budget coincides with a shift in 
migratory movement from Italy and Spain as countries of arrival to Greece as the 
primary receptor.29  
Thus, it has been shown that FRONTEX ‘protects’ both EU and Schengen 
borders. One JO by the way of which the external borders are guarded is the 
Poseidon Rapid Intervention, which is still better known under its former name JO 
Poseidon Sea, an operation under which it is concerned with the prevention of 
irregular migration, although it is not specified how the prevention is ensured, 
and with the processing of migrants who arrive on the Greek isles. The operation 
in the Aegean Sea includes several FRONTEX-led activities, such as nationality 
screening. It has an impressively high budget which has grown by 787% in the 
last eight years. 
                                                                      
27  See FRONTEX, ‘Poseidon’, Archive Entry, 2016 (2016-2). 
28  See FRONTEX, ‘JO EPN Poseidon Sea (as of 28.12.2015 – Poseidon Rapid Intervention)’, 
Archive Entry, 2016. 
29  See Annex 4. 
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3.2 Legal Framework for Actions Outside EU Territory 
This Sub-Chapter complements the previous one insofar as that, here, 
FRONTEX’ actions outside EU territory30 will be shed light on in order to deter-
mine whether the Agency’s role is, as often claimed, one so passive that its ac-
countability can be excluded completely. This is why not only the Agency’s com-
petences as determined in the relevant regulations need to be looked at but 
their functional applicability as well as FRONTEX’ margin of manoeuvre have to 
be examined. In this Sub-Chapter, the actions it is involved in outside the territo-
ry of the European Union will be looked into. However, this Sub-Chapter will not 
mirror the previous one exactly but only examine the issues which are pertinent 
here. 
The EU is well-known for its policy of externalising immigration and border 
controls.31 This practice makes it easier to minimise the entry of ‘undesirable’ 
migrants by not even letting them reach EU territory.32 Today, this policy is part 
of what is also commonly referred to as the ‘external dimension’ of EU asylum 
and migration law.33 This begs the question which law FRONTEX’ movements 
outside the EU34 are governed by. Generally, an entity’s (most commonly, a 
state’s) sovereign power over a territory is limited by the borders of said territo-
ry.35 The sovereignty is expressed, eg, through the jurisdiction of the entity over 
the territory and through its legislative power binding all persons present on said 
                                                                      
30  Article 2(2) of the Schengen Border Code implies that the notion of Schengen territory is 
consistent with the combined territories of the Schengen Member States. The definition 
may be analogously applied to the EU territory; see also Den Heijer (2012)195. 
31  Eg through carrier sanctions etc; See eg E Guild, Danger: Borders under Construction: 
Assessing the First Five Years of Border Policy in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(Centre for European Studies, Brussels 2005) 1: ‘In both law and practice the border for the 
movement of persons to and within Europe is no longer consistent with the edges of the 
physical territory of the Member States.’ 
32  See M den Heijer, How the Frontex Sea Borders Regulation avoids the hot potatoes (2014) 
conference paper, 7.  
Coincidentally, the CEAS also only applies on EU territory and migrants can only ask for 
asylum when inside the EU, at its external borders or in airport transit zones (Articles 1, 
3(1) Dublin III Regulation (EU) 604/2013, 3 Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU, 1, 3(1) 
Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU). 
33  Den Heijer (2012) 167; C Boswell, ‘The 'External Dimension' of EU Immigration and Asy-
lum Policy’ (2003) 3/79 International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 
619; R Zapata-Barrero, ‘The External Dimension of Migration Policy in the Mediterranean 
Region: Premises for Normative Debate’ (2013) Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios 
Estratégicos 2/2013, 2. 
34  See eg article 14 (1) § 2 FRONTEX-Regulation: The Agency and the Member States shall 
comply with norms and standards at least equivalent to those set by Union legislation also 
when cooperation with third countries takes place on the territory of those countries.  
35  G Calster, ‘International Law and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization’, in A Schwa-
bach and AJ Cockfield (eds), The Role of International Law and Institutions (EOLSS, Oxford 
2009) 106. 
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territory.36 Generally, an action deemed to be extraterritorial will be considered 
to be unlawful unless an alternative ground for jurisdiction can be found.37 
3.2.1 Extraterritorial Applicability of EU Law 
The extraterritorial applicability of EU law is a topic of high relevance for the 
question of FRONTEX’ accountability. This is because the applicability of the 
legal framework the Agency is bound by is in question for a large percentage of 
its actions – those outside EU territory. The question whether or not EU law is 
applicable therefore needs to be addressed.38 
The assessment in what way EU law is indeed applicable to extraterritorial 
action is complicated immensely by the fact that FRONTEX is not an Agency 
which acts completely independently. It cooperates, facilitates and coordinates 
tasks with the EU Member States. The operations headed by Member States in 
which FRONTEX participates need to follow common rules, yet, it is argued that 
Member States do not need to adhere to EU rules when outside EU territory.39 
FRONTEX, as a coordinator and facilitator, would logically have to adhere to the 
same rules as the Member States in a cooperation agreement with third coun-
tries. However, in agreements with the competent authorities – in which the 
Member States are not implicated – FRONTEX cannot be forced to adhere to the 
same rules as the Member States and the extraterritorial applicability of the 
legal framework it is governed by needs to be discussed, too. 
 
EU Legislation 
The discussion about the extraterritorial applicability40 of EU law is of immense 
interest concerning the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is, 
according to different provisions in a plurality of EU legislative measures, limited 
to the EU’s territory and border. 
The Dublin Regulation, the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception 
Conditions Directive all contain measures stipulating that international protec-
tion has to be applied for on the territory of a Member State or at their borders 
including airport transit zones.41 This raises the issue of the effective protection 
of the right to international protection when FRONTEX acts in international wa-
                                                                      
36  Ibid. 
37  J Scott, ‘The new EU ‘extraterritoriality’’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1342, 
1345. 
38  Article 14 (1) § 2 FRONTEX-Regulation: The Agency and the Member States shall comply 
with norms and standards at least equivalent to those set by Union legislation also when co-
operation with third countries takes place on the territory of those countries. 
39  Den Heijer (2012) 188, referring to several works respectively by the British House of 
Lords, Rijpma, Battjes and Weinzierl. 
40  For contrary opinions, please consult Den Heijer (2012) 188, especially fn 117. 
41  Articles 1, 3(1) Dublin III Regulation (EU) 604/2013, 3 Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/ 
32/EU, 1, 3(1) Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU. 
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ters or the territory of a third country. The Qualification Directive,42 however, 
does not mention such a restriction.  
The applicability of EU law to FRONTEX’ extraterritorial actions can be in-
ferred from the FRONTEX-Regulation itself: Article 1(2) states that the Agency’s 
task is to ‘facilitate and render more effective the application of existing and 
future Union measures relating to the management of external borders, in par-
ticular the Schengen Borders Code’. It is hardly conceivable that the facilitation 
of the application of EU legislative measures should be accomplished outside the 
legal order in question. Most compellingly, the second paragraph of article 1(2) 
FRONTEX-Regulation underlines that ‘[t]he Agency shall fulfil its tasks in full 
compliance with the relevant Union law’. This article does not contain a territori-
al limitation. Furthermore, the second paragraph of article 14(1) FRONTEX-
Regulation states that ‘[t]he Agency and the Member States shall comply with 
norms and standards at least equivalent to those set by Union legislation also 
when cooperation with third countries takes place on the territory of those coun-
tries’. From this, it can be inferred that Member States and Agency have to apply 
Union law to their extraterritorial actions taken within the framework of this 
Regulation, an obligation which can only be replaced by even higher standards. 
The Schengen Borders Code, already briefly discussed in Sub-Chapter 2.1, 
also has an extraterritorial dimension to it. It is important to mention it separate-
ly as the EU territory and the Schengen external borders, which FRONTEX is also 
tasked to protect, do not coincide completely. It has been stated that ‘the 
Schengen Borders Code is remarkably responsive to different types of pre-bor-
der control measures and may as such constrain the freedom of European Mem-
ber States in subjecting migrants to controls away from their borders.’43 It is, for 
instance, within the Member States’ competence to fix the border crossing 
points at which the SBC is applied. Furthermore, the Schengen convention, 44 
SBC and the Carrier Sanctions Directive45 foresee pre-border controls by those 
parties which transport persons into EU territory and penalties for those carriers 
who do not exercise this obligation sufficiently.46 These pre-border controls have 
been criticised because, on the one hand, certain parties such as the British 
House of Lords suggest that EU law does not, in fact, provide a legal basis for 
them and moreover, procedural guarantees are denied to those who are turned 
away before reaching the external border as the CEAS framework only applies 
on EU territory and at its borders and international transit zones.47,48 
                                                                      
42  Directive 2011/95/EU. Read Den Heijer (2012), pp 203ff for an extensive elaboration on 
this phenomenon. 
43  M den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland 2012) 
199. 
44  Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. 
45  Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001. 
46  See especially article 36 Schengen Convention. 
47  Den Heijer (2012) 194. 
48  For an extensive elaboration, see Den Heijer (2012) 193ff. 
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EU legislation offers a number of more or less compelling arguments for its 
application to the Agency’s actions outside EU territory, the probably most con-
vincing one being contained in the FRONTEX-Regulation itself. 
Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have issued judgements concerning European 
extraterritoriality, although the ECJ’s approaches have not yet been as permis-
sive as to the extraterritorial application of their respective instruments as the 
ECtHR. First, the ECtHR’s case law will be discussed before the CJEU’s judge-
ments will be analysed. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
While it is established that the EU is not a state but a supranational organisation 
(see Sub-Chapter 1.1), it is nonetheless bound by general rules of Public Interna-
tional Law, as is confirmed by articles 3(5) and 21 TEU. The Public International 
Law rules on extraterritorial action have been summarised by the ECtHR. The 
Banković Judgement49 enumerates a number of Public International Law criteria 
for the extraterritorial extension of a state's jurisdiction abroad: nationality, flag, 
passive personality, effect, protection, diplomatic and consular relations and 
universality. It clarifies in Al-Skeini50 that, outside these reasons, any extraterrito-
rial action presupposes the acquiescence, consent or invitation of the sovereign 
of the territory on which the action is to take place (§ 153).51 In the case of 
FRONTEX, one of these last three criteria could be fulfilled in the Operational 
Plans and cooperation agreements concluded before FRONTEX either cooper-
ates itself with competent authorities or coordinates cooperation between an EU 
Member State and a third country. It further says in Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda52 that 
a state’s human rights obligations are not limited to the state’s territory if the 
state exercises ‘control and authority’ over the nationals of the foreign territory 
they are in.53  
The ECtHR has stated in the Hirsi case54 that the ECHR is not applicable ex-
clusively within its territorial limitations as depicted in article 56 jo 1 ECHR. It has 
reiterated its previous case law establishing the applicability of the ECHR to its 
Member States' actions outside their territories.  
The Hirsi judgment has laid down a set of criteria for the return of irregular 
migrants which Den Heijer summarises as follows:  
                                                                      
49  Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (dec) [GC] (App no 52207/99) § 59, ECHR 2001-
XII. 
50  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom [GC] (App no 55721/07) ECHR 2011. 
51  See also C Costello and V Moreno-Lax, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model’, in S 
Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Bloomsbury Publishing, London 2014) 1663, § 59.12. 
52  Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom [GC] (App no 27021/08) ECHR 2011. 
53  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom [GC] (App no 55721/07) § 137 ECHR 2011; Al-
Jedda v the United Kingdom [GC] (App no 27021/08) § 84 ECHR 2011. 
54  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC] (App no 27765/09) ECHR 2012. 
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i) the returning country must verify, even if no individual asylum claim is made, 
whether the country of return fulfils its international obligations in relation 
to the protection of refugees,  
ii) the migrants must have access to a procedure to identify them and to assess 
their personal circumstances,  
iii) the personnel conducting the interviews must be trained to do so and the 
migrants must be assisted by interpreters or legal advisers,  
iv) the migrants must be informed about their destination and be able to chal-
lenge their transfer before an independent tribunal, before the transfer is en-
forced.55 
 
In Ilaşcu,56 it has held that the ‘exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for 
a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions im-
putable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention’ (§70). It reiterates its findings of the 
Banković57 decision that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of a State, within the meaning of Arti-
cle 1, is essentially territorial’ (§71) but may be extended beyond territorial 
boundaries in certain cases: 
 
Whenever the State through its agents operating outside its territory exercises control 
and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation 
under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the 
Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual.  
 
This reasoning is also known under the ‘effective control’ moniker.58 In conse-
quence, it has accepted in Al-Skeini that the ECHR and its rights may in the same 
sense be ‘extraterritorialised’.59 It concludes in §§ 81 and 82 that the establish-
ment of continuous and exclusive de iure and de facto control is the criterion for 
the establishment of a CoE Member State’s jurisdiction outside its territory and 
in consequence the establishment of the applicability of the ECHR in said situa-
tion. Thus, the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR was established through 
the Hirsi judgement, but it has to be kept in mind that those are CoE instruments 
and as such not – yet – part of the EU law acquis as such as the EU has not yet 
acceded to the ECHR and is not a CoE member yet.  
Therefore, while this is useful precedence and cross-fertilisation is encour-
aged, the extraterritorial applicability of EU law has to be established by other, 
more binding, means.  
                                                                      
55  Den Heijer (2014) 9. 
56  Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia [GC] (App no 48787/99) § 311, ECHR 2004-VII. 
57  Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (dec), [GC] (App no 52207/99), ECHR 2001-XII.  
58  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom [GC] (App no 55721/07) § 137, ECHR 2011. 
59  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom [GC] (App no 55721/07) §§ 136-137, ECHR 2011. 
Hirsi here further refers to Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, 26 June 1992, Series A 
no. 240, Banković and Others, cited above n498, §§ 67, 75 and Ilaşcu and Others, cited 
above n 56, § 314. 
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The Court of Justice of the European Union 
Several ways to establish the extraterritorial applicability of EU law through 
CJEU case law will be presented in the following paragraph. 
The international role of the EU has been confirmed by the CJEU in its Costa 
v ENEL case,60 and it states in Diva Navigation that the EU is bound by interna-
tional law.61 From this, it can be concluded that EU law, just as the law of indi-
vidual states, is limited in its jurisdiction to its territory.62 But the international 
law rules on extraterritorial action allow for this limitation to be overcome in 
certain instances:  
The ECJ first confirmed the extraterritorial applicability in the context of EU 
competition law.63  
In its subsequent case law, the ECJ discussed extent to which the Union is 
able to regulate Member States’ actions on foreign territory, and, in connection 
with employment law, came to the conclusion that a sufficiently close link 
needed to be established between the territory and the issue. In Boukhalfa,64 the 
Court reiterated its prior case law and elaborated that the EC Treaty’s applica-
tion to the territories of the Member States ‘does not preclude Community rules 
from having effects outside the territory of the community’,65 again confirming 
the importance of the existence of a sufficiently close link to the (Union) law in 
question.66 While this set of recurring criteria is only found in cases on very spe-
cific issues and the total number of relevant cases is rather underwhelming,67 
they may still be an adequate means to establish the applicability of EU law to 
third-country cooperative efforts. This case law concerns EU Member States as 
opposed to bodies of the Union. It could be argued that, therefore, the criteria 
cannot be applicable to the Agency in its cooperation agreements with the com-
petent authorities of third countries. However, this counterargument would fall 
short, for the reasoning displayed in the relevant cases can also be applied to the 
Agency and do not seem to be particularly exclusive to the Member States. 
Therefore, it is highly probable that a sufficient link between the Agency’s ac-
tions in protecting the EU’s external Borders can be established. 
                                                                      
60  Case 6-64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, see also Case C-18/90, Office national de 
l'emploi v Bahia Kziber [1991] ECR I-00199, §§ 15, 23, which confirms that many conven-
tional treaties can be invoked before the EU Courts. 
61  C-286/90, Anklagenmyngdiheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva navigation Corp [1992] 
ECR I-6019, § 9, cited in I Nitsche, ‘Extraterritoriality and International Cooperation: The 
State Of Play In EC-USA Relations In Competition Matters’, in V Kronenberger (ed), The 
European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (TMC Asser Press, 
The Hague 2001) 279. 
62  Nitsche (2001) 279. 
63  Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, § 90; Case 48/69, ICI v Commission 
[1972] ECR 619; Den Heijer (2012) 189; Scott (2014-2) 1356ff.  
64  Case C-214/94, Ingrid Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I-02253. 
65  Boukhalfa, § 14. 
66  For an extensive explanation of the relevant case law, see Den Heijer (2012), pp 188ff. 
67  Den Heijer (2012) 193. 
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Additionally, it is conceivable to argue that EU law can be extraterritorially 
applicable by analogously applying the doctrine of implied external compe-
tences of the ECJ’s 1972 ERTA case.68 In this case, the Court argues that if the EU 
has internal competences, it also has corresponding external competences: in 
foro interno, in foro externo. This has been codified in articles 3(2) and 216 TFEU69 
with the Lisbon Treaty. These articles and the case law refer to the Union’s legis-
lative powers, but an analogous application of the case law seems to be in the 
interest of the Court, taking into account its Opinion 1/13 on the Hague Conven-
tion on Child Abduction, where the Court holds that the Treaty provisions are 
imperfect and still need to be interpreted in the light of the CJEU case law.70 
There are several arguments in the European case law, some more and some 
less convincing, which can be used to establish the applicability of EU law to 
FRONTEX’ actions outside EU territory. 
 
Legal Doctrine and Theories 
Costello and Moreno-Lax argue that, even though the Treaties refer once71 and 
the ECJ case law from time to time to an ‘EU territory’, that the EU does not, in 
fact, have a territory and that this term and further notions such as ‘area’ are 
rather used to define the Contracting parties bound by the EU Treaties.72 They 
reason that it is not the purpose of the Treaty provisions to delimit the Union 
territory but to define the High Contracting Parties.73 Furthermore, they claim 
that not even the provisions with an internal focus are tightly constrained to EU 
territory and illustrate this with the examples of the internal market and com-
mon fisheries policy, where public international law principles come into play,74 
and with the examples of commercial sanctions and climate change, where there 
are actual ‘EU extraterritorial legislation and enforcement action developing a 
                                                                      
68  Case 22/70, Commissioner v Council (ERTA) [1972] ECR 263. 
69  Article 3(2) TFEU: The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union 
or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its con-
clusion may affect common rules or alter their scope. Article 216 TFEU: 1. The Union may 
conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where 
the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to 
achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or 
alter their scope. 2. Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of 
the Union and on its Member States. (Emphases added). 
70  OJ C 462, 22/12/2014, p4–4. 
71  See articles 52 TEU and 355 TFEU. 
72  C Costello and V Moreno-Lax, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model’, in S Peers, T 
Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, London 2014) 1664, §§ 59.14-59.15. 
73  Ibid, § 59.15. 
74  Ibid, 1664ff, §§ 59.16(ff) and 59.20(ff). 
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strong effectiveness dimension’.75 In consequence, EU law would not need to be 
bound by any territorial limitations but is applicable once Union competence is 
established with the help of the EU Treaties, whether within the territory of a 
Member State or extraterritorially. 
There are, thus, several methods with which it is possible to establish the 
application of EU law to FRONTEX’ and the Member States’ actions outside EU 
territory. 
3.2.2 Cooperation with Third Countries 
In this Section, the rules which apply to FRONTEX’ extraterritorial actions in 
addition to the general legal framework will be presented. 
 
 
 
FRONTEX’ actions outside EU territory are often carried out in cooperation with 
third countries.76 A map of the third countries cooperating with the Agency in 
                                                                      
75  Ibid, 1666, § 59.22. 
76  This Chapter does not include the UK and Ireland in the definition of third countries al-
though they are not part of the Schengen Area and have opted out of the FRONTEX-
→ 
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2014 (orange) can be found in Figure 7, which also illustrates those countries with 
which negotiations with regards to a cooperation agreement were still ongoing 
at that point in time (orange/grey). As can be seen, cooperation agreements with 
the EU and Schengen Member States’ neighbouring countries are largely in 
place or underway, with only a few exceptions in North Africa and the Middle 
East. 
 
Legal Basis 
The Treaty bases for FRONTEX’ third-country cooperation are article 21(1) TEU 
and article 78(2)(g) TFEU. Article 21 TEU77 determines that the EU shall seek to 
build partnerships and relations with, amongst others, third countries. Article 
78(2)(g) TFEU78 is more specific, allowing for ‘partnership and cooperation with 
third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asy-
lum or subsidiary or temporary protection’. This partnership and cooperation has 
to be based on measures adopted by the European Council and the European 
Parliament. Such a basis can be found in the FRONTEX-Regulation. Article 79(3) 
TFEU, allowing for readmission agreements between the EU and third countries, 
may also be seen as a viable legal basis for this kind of cooperation. 
Recital 12 of the Regulation allows for cooperation between FRONTEX and 
the competent authorities of third countries in order to realise the Agency’s mis-
sion, but only insofar as that it is necessary to fulfil its tasks. It clarifies that Regu-
lation 2007/2004 defines the topics of this cooperation, and asks for the estab-
lishment of Working Arrangements. Also, the Agency’s role again is to be the 
                                                                      
Regulation (see eg article 12 FRONTEX-Regulation). Please observe their special relation-
ship with FRONTEX. 
77  Article 21 (1) TEU: The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indi-
visibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the princi-
ples of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law. -The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles 
referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common prob-
lems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. 
78  Article 78 TFEU: 1. The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protec-
tion and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country 
national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other rele-
vant treaties. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures for a 
common European asylum system comprising: (..) (g) partnership and cooperation with third 
countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or 
temporary protection. (Emphases added). 
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one of a facilitator of operational cooperation between the EU Member States 
and third countries.79  
However, all of the Agency’s actions need to be in full compliance with the 
relevant EU law,80 and, if outside EU territory, the cooperation with third coun-
tries on their territories needs to comply with standards ‘at least equivalent’ to 
those set out in EU law.81 
FRONTEX can carry out different activities on the territories of third coun-
tries. Unfortunately, a lot of policy terms are used, the exact definitions of which 
are unclear: In cooperation with the relevant third country’s competent authori-
ties, it can identify best practices on, eg, return operations.82 Furthermore, con-
cerning management tasks and operational cooperation, ‘to the extent required 
for the fulfilment of its tasks’ and acting within the limits of the EU external rela-
tions policy, it has the competence to cooperate with third countries’ competent 
authorities.83 The same framework is applicable for the Member States present 
on third country territory for activities falling under article 14.84 
Again, the need for respect for fundamental and human rights as well as 
human dignity is expressly stressed.85  
It is laid down in its Regulation that FRONTEX has the competence to con-
clude Working Arrangements with the competent authorities of third countries 
with the purpose of ‘managing operational cooperation’.86 They are intended to 
strengthen and cement said cooperation. These arrangements cannot be con-
cluded without prior consultation of the Commission, which offers an opinion, 
and full information of the European Parliament ‘as soon as possible’.87  
FRONTEX claims that it enters into negotiations for these working agree-
ments only after being conferred a mandate by the Management Board.88 This 
is, however, not confirmed by the FRONTEX-Regulation, which only confirms 
that proposals on activities carried out at or in the vicinity of a Member State’s 
external border need prior consent of the Management Board, given by the way 
of a vote in favour.89 However, these Working Arrangements are not forcibly 
                                                                      
79  The modalities of said cooperation are further defined in articles 3a(1)(k) and 8e(1)(k), 
9(2), 14 FRONTEX-Regulation.  
80  Article 1(2)(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
81  Article 14(1), second paragraph, FRONTEX-Regulation. 
82  Article 9(2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
83  Articles 14(1), (2) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
84  Article 14(1), third paragraph, FRONTEX-Regulation.  
85  Article 14(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
86  Article 14(2) FRONTEX-Regulation: 2. The Agency may cooperate with the authorities of 
third countries competent in matters covered by this Regulation within the framework of 
Working Arrangements concluded with those authorities, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the TFEU. Those Working Arrangements shall be purely related to the man-
agement of operational cooperation. 
87  Article 14(8) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
88  See FRONTEX website: http://frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries/, accessed on 
03/06/ 2016. 
89  Article 20(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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carried out in the vicinity of the Member States’ external borders. It works in 
favour for the conclusion of these arrangements that, for issues covered by the 
FRONTEX-Regulation, the Union can provide additional funding for ‘technical 
assistance projects’ in third countries.90, 91 
In addition, the Agency, after approval of the Management Board, has the 
competence to post liaison officers92 in countries with ‘minimum human rights 
standards’93, particularly in those which, according to FRONTEX intelligence and 
risk analysis, are countries of origin or transit for irregular migrants, in their bor-
der management practices who then form part of the cooperation network. In 
this context, it is important to ask what those ‘minimum human rights standards’ 
are and which instance is competent to define them.94  
The possible reciprocal deployment of liaison officers from said third coun-
tries to operations on EU territory is temporarily limited.95 These operations are 
subject to prior opinion of the Commission and the Parliament has to be in-
formed ‘as soon as possible’.96 Concerning the liaison officers, the Management 
Board composes a list of prioritised countries of deployment on a yearly basis. 
The officers have the mission to establish and maintain contact with the relevant 
authorities in the third countries they are stationed in, their purpose being con-
tributing to the return of illegal migrants as well as preventing and combatting 
illegal immigration.97 Funding may be provided by the Union’s relevant external 
relations instruments.98 Concerning the necessity, for accountability purposes, 
to prove the existence of certain dependence on the Union (transparency) and a 
relative independence with regards to the Member States (responsibility),99 this 
financial contribution is proof of a certain element of dependence of the Agency 
upon the EU.  
With the approval of the concerned Member States, FRONTEX has the com-
petence to invite third country observers to participate in several of its activi-
ties100 with a view to improve cooperation and best practices exchange between 
                                                                      
90  Article 14(5) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
91  The nature of WAs under international law is disputed, but will not be discussed here as 
the focus of this thesis is accountability under EU law, for which the international law na-
ture of WAs is not crucial. More information on this issue can be found in Fink (2012-1), pp 
25ff. 
92  In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation 
of an immigration liaison officers network [2004] OJ L064/1. 
93  Article 14(3) FRONTEX-Regulation.  
94  Both FRONTEX and the FRO have been questioned about this, but the FRO has not found 
the time to answer any questions and while FRONTEX has promised an answer, none has 
been provided.  
95  Article 14(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
96  Article 14(8) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
97  Article 14(4) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
98  Article 14(5) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
99  See 1.4. 
100  See articles 3, 4 and 5 FRONTEX-Regulation; it is not specified which tasks these third 
country observers can fulfil.  
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the parties. The ‘safety of the mission’, however, has priority and therefore 
forms a natural limitation. What exactly this ‘safety of the mission’ entails is not 
further defined. Further rules and modalities of cooperation need to be laid out 
in the Operational Plans.101 Concerning the Operational Plans of sea operations, 
they need to contain information concerning the ‘application of the relevant 
jurisdiction and legislation in the geographical area’, especially international and 
Union rules on interception, SAR and disembarkation.102 
3.2.3 Extraterritorial Maritime Action – the Sea Borders Regulation 
FRONTEX maritime action is always bound by the law of the sea103, 104 It is fur-
thermore bound by the relevant EU law, especially the Sea Borders Regula-
tion105, for example when carrying out operations outside the Member States’ 
territorial waters (see eg in article 7).106 The FRONTEX’ maritime operations, 
especially those operating outside Member States’ territorial waters, are subject 
to persistent reproach: Rijpma criticises that, by ‘making it increasingly difficult 
for people to actually reach EU territory, the Member States try to avoid the 
responsibility for asylum claims or the –in practice often impossible– removal of 
irregularly-present third-country nationals’.107 The Sea Borders Regulation came 
into being after extensive discussions and according to the ordinary legislative 
procedure after the ECJ annulled Council Decision 2010/252/EU in 2012 for lack 
of proper legislative competence. It fills in some of the gaps left in the Council 
Decision but still leaves a lot to be desired with regards, for example, to the rec-
onciliation of the Agency's two somewhat contradictory aims of securing the 
external borders and securing refugee rights. This can be attributed to the legis-
lating institutions' wish to comply with the Hirsi judgement and to the European 
Parliament's co-legislative role, as it strived to enshrine particular fundamental 
rights guarantees in the Regulation.108 Den Heijer said that the ‘Regula-
tion establishes a somewhat uneasy compromise between fundamental rights 
and the liberty of States to treat boat migrants outside ordinarily applicable 
statutory guarantees.’109,110 
                                                                      
101  Articles 3a(1)(k), 14(6) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
102  Article 3a(1)(j) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
103  Codified, eg, in the law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), the Convention on the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Convention on Search and Rescue (SAR). 
104  See eg recital 9 jo 8 Regulation 656/2014. 
105  Regulation (EU) 656/2014. 
106  See also 2.1. 
107  J Rijpma, ‘Frontex: Successful Blame Shifting of the Member States? (ARI)’ (2010) ARI 
69/2010 Real Instituto Elcano, 2. 
108  Den Heijer (2014) 6. 
109  Ibid. 
110  Eg: the issue of Member States having inadequate standards is not addressed at all. Con-
cerning the Dublin Regulation, several judgements by the ECtHR (Tarakhel v Switzerland 
[GC], App no 29217/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts) and MSS v Belgium and Greece [GC], App no 
30696/09, ECHR 2011) have been made declaring the conditions in Italy and Greece inac-
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According to article 1(2)(2) FRONTEX-Regulation, the Agency has to comply 
with its ‘obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the 
principle of non-refoulement’.111 A similar expression can be found in article 4 of 
the Sea Borders Regulation. Even though article 4 solemnly and lengthily prom-
ises the protection of fundamental rights in the context of the surveillance of the 
EU’s external sea borders, other parts of the Regulation do not adhere to said 
standards. Articles 6, 7 and 8 contain provisions allowing the border guard teams 
intercepting vessels to forcibly redirect them away from European soil if they 
think that their suspicion that migrants are smuggled on said vessels are well-
founded. This comes dangerously close to a legalisation of the push-back-
operations which have been so heavily criticised under human rights standpoints 
for years. However, Ballestero has explained that, according to the regulation, 
sufficient assessment of the individual irregular migrant’s situation takes place 
before an eventual redirection.112 
The Regulation fails in several instances to be sufficiently precise.113 It explic-
itly forbids refoulement, yet the border- and coast guards have the competence 
to order boats away from EU territorial waters, even if the boat in question is 
already located in the territorial waters of one of the Member States.114 It has, 
however, been pointed out that it is important to distinguish between disembar-
kation115 and push-backs116, the one being a legal undertaking and the other in 
breach of international and EU law.117 Still, this raises concerns as to the mi-
grants’ ability to even ask for asylum if they are being forced away when inter-
cepted, which is also hard to distinguish from an action falling under the 
refoulement prohibition, found eg in article 19 ECHR but also assumed under 
article 78 TFEU, which prohibit the towing back or escorting of migrant vessels 
to non-EU countries because of the acute possibility for grave human rights vio-
                                                                      
ceptable (Den Heijer (2014) 11). It is not clear if migrants can nonetheless be disembarked 
on the territory of said states sporting inadequate conditions. 
111  See also article 2(1a) FRONTEX-Regulation: In accordance with Union and international 
law, no person shall be disembarked in, or otherwise handed over to the authorities of, a 
country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, or from which there is a risk of 
expulsion or return to another country in contravention of that principle. The special needs of 
children, victims of trafficking, persons in need of medical assistance, persons in need of in-
ternational protection and other vulnerable persons shall be addressed in accordance with 
Union and international law. 
112  Information obtained through a personal interview on 05/05/2016. 
113  Den Heijer (2014) 3. 
114  Articles 6, 7, 8 Regulation 656/2014. 
115  In this context: The practice of compelling a vessel to the shore, either of an EU Member 
State or a third country, and of removing the passengers, suspected irregular migrants, 
on the shore of said country. 
116  In this context: The practice of repelling one or a group of irregular migrants who are 
about to cross or have just crossed an external EU border and compelling them to change 
direction, most frequently towards their starting point, without individually assessing 
their situations. It is contrary to the prohibition of refoulement.  
117  Ballestero (2016). 
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lations.118 The effet utile of article 18 ECHR is endangered through these actions. 
Still, the head of the CF Marta Ballestero119 assesses the regulation in a relatively 
positive way because it puts in place better fundamental rights protection stand-
ards than the rules in place before, praising especially the clear rules on disem-
barkation and individual assessment which, according to her, bring predictability 
and stability.120  
The Regulation thus121 only partly complies with the Hirsi judgement, which 
can be explained by certain Member States’ disinclination to grant migrants 
access to the asylum law procedures and guarantees connected to them.122  
3.3 Practical Application of the Rules on Third-Country Cooperation 
FRONTEX’ JOs have the potential to overspill into the territories of third coun-
tries, as was the case with the 2006 Hera II Joint Operation, during which boats 
affiliated with the JO are said to have patrolled the territorial waters of Senegal, 
Mauretania, Libya and Cape Verde.123 Although it is disputed whether JOs can 
legally exceed the limits of EU territory,124 under article 14 of the FRONTEX-
Regulation, the Agency does have the competence to facilitate operational co-
operation between the Member States and third countries, to conclude Working 
Arrangements with the competent authorities of third countries and even to 
deploy liaison officers and station them within third countries. This Sub-Chapter 
aims at giving an idea of the different forms of third-country cooperation 
FRONTEX is involved in. This will be done first with the example of the Italian 
cooperation with Libya (3.3.1), by looking at the Working Arrangement with 
Cape Verde (3.3.2), and then by briefly discussing the first JO with an extraterri-
torial dimension – JO Hera II (3.3.3).125  
3.3.1 Italy’s Bilateral Cooperation Agreement with Libya 
Purposes for third-country cooperation vary, but when FRONTEX is involved, 
they usually concern the prevention of irregular migration towards, and, more 
                                                                      
118  Weinzierl (2007) 9. 
119  Information obtained through a personal interview on 05/05/2016. 
120  The opinion is shared by FRONTEX, see its 2015 report on the implementation of Regula-
tion 656/2014, p15. 
121  There are, in fact, many more examples for this incompatibility. See on this Den Heijer 
(2014). 
122  Den Heijer (2014) 9ff. 
123  See Fink (2012-1) 22 and Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: “Nobody wants to have 
anything to do with us” – Arrests and collective expulsions of migrants denied entry into 
Europe’ (Report) (1 July 2008) AFR 38/001/2008, 14f. 
124  Fink (2012-1) 22. 
125  The possibility of deployment of liaison officers will not be discussed in detail at this point 
because it seems to be a phenomenon having comparably little impact on the issues at 
hand. 
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importantly, into the EU/Schengen territory and the return of third-country na-
tionals illegally staying in the Member States.126 Guild takes this phenomenon of 
preventing irregular migrants from reaching the border to mean that this phe-
nomenon of externalising border controls shows that in ‘both law and practice 
the border for the movement of persons to and within Europe is no longer con-
sistent with the edges of the physical territory of the member-states’.127 This 
‘“off-shoring” of the borders’ may, for example, be observed in FRONTEX sur-
veillance operations on African soil.128 As was established above,129 third-
country cooperation can take two different forms: it can either be bilateral coop-
eration between an EU Member State and a third country with FRONTEX acting 
as a coordinator or cooperation between FRONTEX and the competent authori-
ties of a third country. A well-known example for bilateral cooperation is the 
Italy-Libya Bilateral Cooperation Agreement of 2008130 with its 2009 Protocol. 
This Agreement was a product of the change in status of Libya as a destina-
tion for irregular migrants and refugees to a country not only of destination but 
also of significant transit on the way to Europe via Italy, especially Sicily.131 In 
Table 2, the substantial increase in migrants arriving in Sicily since the turn of the 
century can be seen. The Italian Refugee Council and UNHCR have noted that 
the number of migrants arrived in 2008 was more than 15 times the number of 
migrants having arrived in 2000.  
 
 
 
Italy has encouraged cooperation with Libya since the end of the 1990’s and 
since then, both countries have concluded several agreements.132 In 2005, it has 
proposed setting up an asylum processing centre in Libya.133 The bilateral coop-
eration agreement signed in 2008134 emphasises the protection of both coun-
                                                                      
126  Eg article 14(4) FRONTEX-Regulation, see also Table 1 in 2.1. 
127  Guild (2005) 1. 
128  N Vaughan-Williams, ‘Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen–Detective 
and the War on Terror’ (2008) 12:1 Space and Polity 63, 67. 
129  See 3.2.2. 
130  The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and 
Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
131  S Klepp, ‘Italy and its Libyan Cooperation Program: Pioneer of the European Union’s 
Refugee Policy?’, in JP Cassarino (ed), Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmis-
sion in the Euro-Mediterranean Area (Middle East Institute, Washington 2010) 78ff. 
132  Klepp (2010) 79.  
133  TJ Hatton, European asylum policy (IZA, Bonn 2005) IZA Discussion Papers No 1721, 11 
fn 19. 
134  Signed on 30/08/2008. 
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tries’ common maritime borders. It was briefly suspended early in 2011 but re-
sumed later in the same year.135 FRONTEX’ tasks and competences within the 
boundaries of this agreement need to be defined in provisions contained in said 
agreement.136 It is implied through publications by civil society137 that FRONTEX 
has the task of returning irregular migrants to Libya under the Friendship Agree-
ment; however, the agreement itself is not freely accessible and FRONTEX’ ex-
act role can therefore not be determined.138 
However, this kind of task is not without precarious human and fundamental 
rights implications as there is a right to leave any country one is in.139 Particularly 
interesting in this context is the quote from former FRONTEX Deputy Director 
Gil Arias-Fernandez, who has said that ‘(…) our agency does not have the ability 
to confirm if the right to request asylum as well as other human rights are being 
respected in Libya’.140 
Especially problematic is the fact that, as of 2010, Libya still had no function-
ing asylum system and is still one of the few states not to have signed the Gene-
va Refugee Convention141, 142 Concerning Libya’s attitude towards asylum seek-
ers even before the civil war broke out in 2013, the following quote by an official 
of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs is particularly telling: ‘if Libya offered 
asylum, asylum seekers would come like a plague of locusts’.143 
In fact, Italy’s practice of forcibly returning migrant vessels to their Libyan 
points of departure which has been condemned by the ECtHR in its Hirsi Judge-
ment was based on this agreement.144 
With regards to the EU-Libya Cooperation, the Commission has been given 
the mandate to negotiate an EU-Libya Framework Agreement,145 but the nego-
                                                                      
135  BBC, ‘Libya and Italy revive “friendship deal”’, News Article, 15/12/2011. 
136  Article 14(7) FRONTEX-Regulation.  
137  See HRW (2009) 7.  
138  In its general reports, FRONTEX only states that many irregular migrants arriving by boat 
set out in Libya, but it does not mention what happens to them after their interception or 
after thy are picked up during a SAR mission, see eg FRONTEX, FRONTEX, ‘General Re-
port 2014’, Report TT-AE-15-001-EN-N, 2015 (2015-6) 17; FRONTEX, ‘General Report 
2013’, Report TT-AE-14-001-EN-N, 2014, (2014-3) 54.  
139  To be found, eg, in Art 13(2) UDHR & 12(2) ICCPR, Article 2.2 of Protocol No. 4 to the 
ECHR. Not to be confounded with a right to enter another country, which does not exist, 
as the competence to determine who may and who may not enter its territory is at the 
very heart of a state’s sovereignty. 
140  HRW (2009) 37, referring to a link which is no longer valid. 
141  See UNHCR, ‘States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the 1967 Protocol’, 04/2015. 
142  Klepp (2010) 79, see also European Commission Report 7753/05 52. 
143  Cited in Klepp (2010) 79. 
144  Fink (2012-1) 34. 
145  Commission Press-Release IP/08/1687, ‘EU-Libya: negotiations on future Framework 
Agreement start’, 12/11/2008. 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
96 
tiations were suspended in 2011 and have not been resumed as of yet.146 How-
ever, an EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) has been initiated in 
Libya in 2013 in which FRONTEX is involved in a planning capacity, later on also 
complementing mission activities.147 FRONTEX has a mandate to negotiate a 
Working Agreement with Libya,148 but nothing has come of it yet. 
3.3.2 Example for a FRONTEX Working Arrangement - Cooperation with the 
National Police of Cape Verde 
At the moment, there are 17 Working Arrangements (WAs) in force between 
FRONTEX and third countries.149 Furthermore, the Agency has the mandate, 
conferred by the Management Board, to negotiate arrangements with eight 
further countries.150 
The Working Arrangement concluded on 17 January 2011151 between 
FRONTEX and the National Police of Cape Verde152 was chosen was chosen as a 
typical example for a Working Arrangement and one of the two first ones con-
cluded with an African partner.153 In general, these working arrangements are 
very brief, most are around 3 to 4 pages long and thus rather superficial.154 It is 
                                                                      
146  See European Commission, ‘Libya’, Fact Sheet on European Neighbourhood Policy, ac-
cessed on 10/05/2016. 
147  See European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in 
Libya’, factsheet, accessed on 10/05/2016. In FRONTEX, General Report 2012, Report TT-
AE-13-001-EN-N, 2013, 14, the Agency describes its involvement as follows: ‘Further-
more, Frontex contributed to the preparatory activities undertaken and co-ordinated by 
the European External Action Service (Crisis Management and Planning Di-rectorate) 
aimed at launching a civilian Com-mon Security and Defence Policy mission to Libya on 
border security. In this context, the Agency participated in an EEAS-led fact finding mis-
sion to Tripoli, with the purpose of identifying possible action to be carried out in Libya to 
support the local authorities in developing an efficient border manage-ment system.’ 
148  FRONTEX, ‘FRONTEX-led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya – 28 May-5 
June 2007’, Report, 2007, § 10. 
149  These countries are the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United 
States, Montenegro, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Armenia, Turkey and Azer-
baijan and the CIS Border Troop Commanders Council and the MARRI Regional Centre in 
the Western Balkans (FRONTEX, ‘Third Countries’, 2016); find the texts of the Working 
Arrangements here: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/, accessed 
on 03/06/2016. 
150  These countries are: Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt, Brazil, Tunisia and 
Kosovo, see FRONTEX, ‘Third Countries’, 2016. 
151  See FRONTEX, ‘Frontex signs Working Arrangement with Cape Verde’, PR/2011/2, press 
release, 17/01/2011.  
152  Find the Working Arrangement between FRONTEX and the National Police of Cape 
Verde here: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/WA_with_Cape_ 
Verde.pdf. 
153  Fink (2012-1) 23, 29, 30.  
154  See FRONTEX, ‘Index of /assets/Partners/Third_countries’, Index, 2014.  
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also stressed that they are no international treaties and therefore do not dis-
charge the parties from their obligations under international law.  
The objectives of the Working Arrangements are generally very similar to 
each other.155 In the Cape Verde WA, the objectives are to ‘enhance cooperation 
and coordination to counter illegal/irregular migration and related cross-border 
crime with a view to strengthen border security’, to ‘develop good relations and 
mutual trust between the authorities competent in the field of border security’, 
and to ‘facilitate measures taken by Frontex and the National Police of Cape 
Verde by means of mutual agreement on border security activities in their joint 
efforts to fulfil their respective objectives and tasks.’156 As can be seen, these 
objectives are so vague that they do, in fact, not serve to explain what is done in 
practice based on this WA. The implementation is secured by constant dialogue 
between the heads of FRONTEX and the Cape Verde National Police, facilitated 
through specific contact points which communicate daily as well as expert work-
ing groups, especially appointed when the need arises.157 The fact that the im-
plementation is supposed to be secured only through direct communication 
without the apparent existence of an implementing agreement renders it even 
more difficult to get an overview about the practical application of the WA from 
the outside. 
The activities included in the WA are information exchanges and mutual par-
ticipation in risk analysis, where Cape Verde Officers participate in FRONTEX 
Risk analysis and the Cape Verde National Police is provided with the risk analy-
sis reports.158 Also, technical cooperation in monitoring and contributing to re-
search relevant for the control and surveillance of the external borders in con-
formity with article 6 FRONTEX-Regulation may take place depending on the 
Executive Director’s decisions on a case-by-case basis, which he also does for the 
participation of Cape Verdean officials in FRONTEX JOs and Pilot Projects.159 
Training cooperation within the meaning of article 5 FRONTEX-Regulation can 
take place, which means that the Agency may provide Cape Verdean personnel 
with training.160 FRONTEX-led JOs at the external borders shared with Cape 
Verde should be led in close cooperation and with participation of Cape Verdean 
authorities, which may only be excluded on an exceptional basis.161 If FRONTEX 
proposes to and a host Member State invites them, Cape Verde can send nation-
al border guards in order to participate in certain maritime and air border control 
activities.162 Strategies for Joint Return operations can be planned.163 Develop-
ment of the technical aspects of border guard procedures as well as the ‘interop-
                                                                      
155  Fink (2012-1) 29. 
156  FRONTEX & National Police of Cape Verde (2011) 1, § 2. 
157  Ibid., 1f, § 3. 
158  Ibid., 2, §§ 4.1-4.3. 
159  Ibid., §§ 4.5, 4.6, 4.11. 
160  Ibid., § 4.4. 
161  Ibid., § 4.7. 
162  Ibid., § 4.8. 
163  Ibid., § 4.9. 
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erability’ of border guard organisations are to be discussed.164 The parties need 
to consent on amendments.165 The Agency may finance common FRONTEX-led 
activities and determines their terms and conditions.166 They must be agreed 
upon on a case by case basis, which means that the Cape Verde National Police 
can always try to negotiate more favourable terms.167 It is also worrisome that in 
this WA, no reference is made to human rights or to any other similar protective 
standards. Although the human rights situation in Cape Verde is not one of the 
worst ones at the moment, substantial concerns have still been raised by the US 
State Department in 2010 and 2012 about issues such as women’s rights, child 
abuse and labour, police violence and impunity and excessive duration of pre-
trial detention.168, 169 
These provisions only confirm what has already been observed about the ex-
treme vagueness and therefore broadness of the terms of the WA. It also in-
cludes no provisions with regards to accountability, responsibility complaint 
procedures etc. The fact that the implementation depends solely on the heads of 
the two organisations bears with it a deficit in transparency. Although the WA 
explicitly does not discharge the parties of their international law obligations, 
the complete lack of accountability elements and human rights provisions as 
well as the excessive vagueness is problematic, especially as it is again unknown 
what FRONTEX staff really do in practice outside EU territory.  
3.3.3 The First JO with an Extraterritorial Dimension - JO Hera II 
JO Hera II was a FRONTEX-coordinated Joint Sea Operation, taking place mostly 
in the North Atlantic Ocean, between August and December 2006.170 Its focus 
was the Spanish Canary Islands off the coast of Morocco and the disputed West-
ern Saharan Territory (see Figure 8). FRONTEX said about the 2006 JO Hera II 
that ‘[f]or the first time such an operation was carried out in the territorial waters 
of Senegal and Mauritania and in close cooperation with the local authorities’.171 
It is said to be based on bilateral cooperation agreements between these two 
                                                                      
164  Ibid., § 4.10, 4.12. 
165  Ibid., 3, § 5. 
166  Ibid., § 6.  
167  Ibid., § 6.  
168  See US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2010 
Human Rights Report: Cape Verde’, Report, 08/04/2011 & US Department of State, Bu-
reau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2012 Human Rights Report: Cape Verde’, 
Report, 19/04/2013.  
169  See also CoE Rapporteur Cederbratt’s human rights concerns about WAs in §§ 52ff of his 
Explanatory memorandum.  
170  See FRONTEX, ‘Longest FRONTEX coordinated operation – HERA, the Canary Islands’, 
Article, 19/12/2006.  
171  FRONTEX (2007) 12. 
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countries and Spain,172 but this information is neither specified in the Operation-
al Plan nor the annual report. The content of those bilateral cooperation agree-
ments has not been released to the public.173 However, there are references to 
‘very good cooperation’ between Senegal, Mauritania and Spain.174 
 
 
 
The goal of the operation was to dissuade people to set off in boats towards the 
Canary Islands, which form part of the Spanish and thus EU territory, starting 
from the western African coast, and to intercept the boats and lead them back 
towards Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal if found in their territorial wa-
ters.175 Boats intercepted in those territorial waters are usually lead back to the 
respective country’s coast by the national coastguards:  
When a target is seen, they get in touch with the other FRONTEX means de-
ployed and FRONTEX local coordination centre in Santa Cruz de Tenerife and 
prepare the interception. Normally the Senegalese boats escort the migrants 
inshore, start the legal procedure and try to arrest the people that were paid for 
                                                                      
172  See Amnesty International (2008) 15; FRONTEXIT, ‘The Absence of Democratic Oversight 
over FRONTEX'S External Cooperation’, Note addressed to Members of the European 
Parliament, November 2014.  
173  Carrera (2007) 22; Moreno-Lax (2010) 6; see also Fink (2012) 22.  
174  FRONTEX & AFIC (2016) 6. 
175  Carrera (2007) 23, referring to no longer available internet sources on the UNHCR home-
page. 
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organising the journey. 176 The willingness of the involved third countries to co-
operate with the participants of the JO is considered to be a main reason for JO 
Hera II’s success.177 
While there are a number of activities with, at least, Agency participation 
outside EU territory, it is still largely unclear what those activities look like in 
practice. Even the CF has little knowledge of what FRONTEX does exactly out-
side EU territory, and has not yet done any in-depth analysis on the matter due 
to a lack of sufficient resources.178 
3.4 Conclusion 3 
Concerning the Agency-related actions inside EU territory, it has been estab-
lished in this Chapter that there is an interesting and fundamental dichotomy of 
protection of the external borders and the Agency’s humanitarian objectives. 
These objectives need to be balanced in the JOs. Whether this is really the case 
in practice is not so certain.  
JOs are generally said to take place on home territory, 'protecting' both 
Schengen and EU borders. There are four kinds of operations: air, land, return, 
sea. A famous example for a sea JO is Poseidon Sea, today called Poseidon Rapid 
Intervention. It objective is to coordinate activities to repress irregular migratory 
movement from the Turkish coast towards the Greek isles. It also aims at pre-
venting cross-border crime. FRONTEX’ main activities include identification, 
registration, fingerprinting, interpreting, including nationality screening, which is 
the activity of appreciating whether people lie when identifying as having a cer-
tain nationality and trying to identify which country they are more likely to come 
from. There is expressly no focus on SAR, and the reason given for this is that 
SAR is not one of the tasks accorded by the FRONTEX-Regulation. The Agency is 
still said to respect its obligations under the international law of the sea. Posei-
don Sea has seen an impressive increase in budget, which has to do with the shift 
in migratory movement from Italy and Spain towards Greece. 
The EU’s ‘external dimension’ aims at keeping irregular immigrants at bay. 
However, this external dimension has as a consequence that European actors are 
active outside EU territory. Cooperation with third countries has its treaty basis 
in article 21(1) TEU and article 78(2)(g) TFEU. It can take several forms, which are 
enumerated in article 14 FRONTEX-Regulation. Most importantly, the Agency 
can conclude Working Arrangements with the competent authorities of third 
countries nearly out of its own volition, although a need for a mandate by the 
Management Board. the Commission’s approval and fully informing the Parlia-
ment persists. It was also established that EU law is extraterritorially applicable. 
EU law offers a number of more or less compelling arguments for its application 
to the Agency’s actions outside EU territory, the probably most convincing one 
                                                                      
176  Ibid., referring to a no longer available Press Release by the European Commission. 
177  Fink (2012) 22.  
178  Keßler (2016) 3. 
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being contained in the FRONTEX-Regulation itself, which states once that the 
Agency is constrained to act in full compliance with Union law and also states 
that even extraterritorial action needs to adhere at least to Union standards. 
The ECtHR case law does not serve to convince of the extraterritorial ap-
plicability of EU law, but the ECJ has confirmed in its Boukhalfa case that if a 
sufficiently close link between the extraterritorial situation and EU law can be 
established, that said law can be applied to the situation at hand. Furthermore, 
its ERTA case law, which has established that Union competence for inner-EU 
matters can be established for the external dimensions of these matters as well, 
according to the principle in foro interno, in foro externo, may be analogously 
applicable to the extension of EU law applicability to FRONTEX’ internal activi-
ties. Most of the legal doctrine is not directly applicable because concerned with 
other, specific fields of Union law, but there is a theory arguing that it is a mis-
conception to think that there is such a thing as an EU territory. It is argued that 
there is no such Union territory, per se, and that therefore, there is no territorial 
limitation of EU law. 
The Sea Borders Regulation has been called a big step towards better fun-
damental rights protection of migrants intercepted at sea, but there are still 
numerous points which have been more or less heavily criticised. It has been 
accused, amongst others, of masquerading tensions between Member States, of 
inadequately implementing the Hirsi dictum, of not providing adequate funda-
mental rights standards and not ensuring appropriately that irregular migrants 
are not refouled. Looking at the functional application of the Agency’s compe-
tences as determined in Chapter 2 outside the territory of the European Union, it 
is clear that FRONTEX’ activities can have an important fundamental rights im-
pact. This holds true even though it is often difficult to determine its exact activi-
ties due to a lack of sufficiently precise information. While it remains unclear 
which actions FRONTEX takes exactly on foreign territories due to an impressive 
lack of transparent information giving, this cannot be taken to mean that 
FRONTEX’ actions outside EU territory are always in accordance with EU law. It 
was also established in this Chapter that FRONTEX’ actions outside EU territory 
need to adhere to EU law and therefore should be bound by a number of proce-
dural guarantees for potential applicants for international protection, even if this 
is not made so clear in the current legislation which often seems to be a com-
promise, offering Member States the chance to avoid as much as possible the 
lengthy asylum procedures and the implied obligations imposed on States. 
Through the examples of Italy’s Bilateral Cooperation Agreement with Libya, 
FRONTEX’ working arrangement with the Cape Verdean national police as well 
as its JO Hera II, it has been shown that there definitely is an external dimension 
to FRONTEX’ activities, even though its extent is unclear. 
With the help of the previously identified criteria, it now needs to be evalu-
ated to what degree there already is a sufficient accountability mechanism. 
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4. Which Potential is There for Public Legal 
Accountability? – Application of the Facts to the 
Criteria 
 
 
In this Chapter, it will be appreciated if FRONTEX’ circumstances, mainly those 
identified over the last two Chapters, are susceptible to fulfil the specific ac-
countability criteria identified in Sub-Chapter 1.4.  
As has been observed in Sub-Chapter 1.2, accountability is a necessary 
measure of democratic governance, ensuring that accountable actors cannot 
exercise their powers without oversight, the importance of which grows expo-
nentially with the importance of the powers and influence the accountable can 
exert. The Agency is in a precarious position, from which it has a huge impact on 
a great number of individuals’ lives1 and can easily commit, deliberately or not, a 
great number of serious fundamental rights violations, especially in connection 
with its JOs. 2 Due to this possibility of large-scale fundamental rights violations, 
a way to demand reparation is necessary, especially for ordinary individuals, who 
are naturally in a very vulnerable position compared to parties as influential as an 
EU agency. Thus, the necessity of the existence of an appropriate accountability 
mechanism has been shown. The Agency is nevertheless of the opinion that it is 
not responsible nor accountable for its actions, claiming that they are only of a 
facilitating nature.3 As already mentioned, the CoE’s Rapporteur on Migration, 
Refugees and Displaced Persons said that FRONTEX’ claim that it could not be 
held responsible for eventual human rights violations was a shortcut which 
would not be approved by a court.4 As a quick reminder, the criteria discovered 
were transparency, which may be split into the obligation to report to a specific 
autonomous forum and to accept possible consequences and sanctions deter-
mined by this forum and responsibility, for which there needs to be some degree 
of independent control by FRONTEX over its actions as well as, if the Agency is 
called to account for an omission, the foreseeability of the wrongful act and the 
Agency’s capacity to intervene effectively.5 This discussion is highly theoretical, 
as FRONTEX seems to never have been brought before a court or another sanc-
tion-imposing forum6 (except for the European Ombudsman) itself for breaches 
                                                                      
1  See eg FRONTEX’ role in intercepting (articles 3a(1)(j) & 8e(1)(j) FRONTEX-Regulation) 
and returning (see eg art 9 FRONTEX-Regulation) irregular migrants, see also n200. 
2  Such as push-backs, violations of the principle of non-refoulement, and the rights of article 
47 ECFR. See eg M Kreickenbaum (2013), ‘EU border agency Frontex guilty of massive 
breach of human rights’. 
3  See eg FRONTEX (2012) 3, or Pascouau & Schumacher (2014) 1. 
4  See European Ombudsman, Special Report in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ, 
07/11/2013.  
5  See 1.4. 
6  Thus counting out the European Ombudsman and the EU institutions, which seem not to 
have imposed sanctions on FRONTEX as of yet. 
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of EU law nor is there any concrete information published about what the proce-
dure is of FRONTEX agents commit such a breach. The criteria will be looked 
into successively, starting with transparency (4.1) and ending with responsibility 
(4.2). 
4.1 Is there Sufficient Transparency? 
As established in Sub-Chapter 1.4, the existence of transparency and the criteria 
attached thereto can be established through the presence of the three following 
criteria: the accountable’s obligation to report to a specific, independent forum, 
a debate between accountee and accountable (answerability) and the forum’s 
competence to hand out, when appropriate, legally binding sanctions as a con-
sequence (enforceability).  
The FRONTEX-Regulation proclaims in recital 18 that the Public Access to 
Documents Regulation 1049/20017 should apply to FRONTEX. This means that 
EU citizens can ask FRONTEX to provide them with information and to give 
them access to official documents.8 However, this is not the kind of transparency 
looked for in this context, as it does not involve the Agency reporting to a forum 
which can mete out legally binding consequences. It has been established that it 
is important for an accountable to report to a specific forum. FRONTEX has obli-
gations to report to and to inform several instances: The Management Board,9 
Member States,10 the Commission,11 Council,12 and the European Parliament.13 
It may thus be said that the very narrow definition of transparency is fulfilled. 
However, it has to be noted that this form of reporting is rather limited. The 
                                                                      
7  Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001. 
8  This is how access was gained to most of the Operational Plans quoted in this thesis. 
9  Articles 3(3) (‘detailed evaluation reports for JOs’), 3a(1)(h) (incident reporting by Agency 
to MB fixed in OP), 4 (results of vulnerability assessment), 7(6) (technical equipment), 
8d(2) (requests for rapid intervention of EBGTs), 8d(4) (notification on decision whether 
to deploy EBGTs), 30(6) (final accounts) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
10  Recital 8 (report on developments in research concerning control and surveillance of the 
external borders), articles 6 (same), 8d(6) (on requested number & profiles of EBGTs) 
FRONTEX-Regulation. 
11  Recital 8 (report on developments in research concerning control and surveillance of the 
external borders), article 4 (risk analysis), articles 6 (same as recital 8), 7(6) (vulnerability 
assessment), 14(8) (inform before concluding working arrangements & before deploying 
liaison officers), 30(6) (final accounts) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
12  Articles 4 (risk analysis), 25 (Executive Director’s tasks and FR Strategy), 30(3) (financial 
and budgetary management), 30(6) (final accounts), 33(3) (evaluation) FRONTEX-Regula-
tion. 
13  3b(7) (no of guards MS have contributed to EBGTs), Articles 7(7) (technical equipment 
provided by Member States), 13 (cooperation with Union and international bodies), 14(8) 
(working arrangements & deployment of liaison officers), 25 (Executive Director’s tasks 
and FR Strategy), 30(3) (financial and budgetary management), 30(6) (final accounts) 
FRONTEX-Regulation. 
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forums can only ask for very specific categories of information and the 
FRONTEX-Regulation hardly provides for consequences, although article 33 
includes the option of an evaluation of the Agency by an independent party and 
article 33(3) even provides for an action plan to implement the recommendations 
of the evaluation. Nonetheless, this evaluation only takes place every five years 
and the party conducting the evaluation is neither an authority with the compe-
tence to determine legally binding consequences, nor is it specifically qualified to 
evaluate the Agency and its activities.14 Even so, the evaluation only concerns 
the Agency’s general effectivity in fulfilling its mission as well as its impact and 
working practices. The ‘action plans’ only concern general overarching issues 
and not the day-to-day accountability concerns which may arise. Hence, it is not 
controlled how the Agency deals with specific violations of EU law. 
Furthermore, concerning the specific forum to which FRONTEX should be 
accountable, there is, as of now, not one single accountee FRONTEX has to re-
port to but at least five different ones, not counting the monitoring mechanism 
under the auspices of the FRO. 
The most likely forums for FRONTEX’ possible obligation of transparency are 
the EU institutions: The Commission, Parliament and Council are a good choice 
for a public legal accountability mechanism15 due to their hierarchical position 
above the Agency, the Parliament and Council’s capacity to adopt legally bind-
ing rules, even with regards to the Agency,16 as well as the Council’s competence 
to define strategic guidelines in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.17 At 
the present moment, there are insufficient rules on the matter, as it is unclear 
which rules should be applied on sanctioning, which possibilities there are for 
such consequences and which procedures should be applied. This non-
transparent situation cannot be sufficient for a transparent accountability mech-
anism in the spirit of public legal accountability and good democratic govern-
ance. 
It is foreseen in the Common Approach that the Executive Director is ac-
countable to the Management Board.18 This was applied in article 25(4) FRON-
TEX-Regulation.19 Yet, neither procedure nor consequences are specified in the 
Common Approach nor in article 25.  
The CJEU could also be a forum for FRONTEX’ public legal accountability for 
breaches of EU law, but its downsides, as discussed in Section 1.3.2, make it a 
less than ideal candidate.  
A reason FRONTEX was established in 2004 was that in the different preced-
ing instances, no monitoring mechanism was to be found: The Commission 
wanted this to be remedied and advocated the introduction of ‘a monitoring 
                                                                      
14  Ballestero (2016). 
15  At least superficially, but this would need to be researched further. 
16  Articles 289f TFEU. 
17  Article 68 TFEU. 
18  European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission (2012) 6. 
19  This would be a One for All accountability (see Bovens (2007-2) 458) if the Management 
Board could be considered to be an independent forum. 
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mechanism and of a method for independent and thorough evaluation as well as 
for the processing and utilisation of results’.20 It is remarkable that this issue, 
already present in 2002 and one of the reasons the Agency was even created,21 
has not been properly resolved nearly 15 years later.  
According to the Fundamental Rights Strategy, FRONTEX is obligated to es-
tablish a fundamental rights monitoring mechanism under the auspices of the 
FRO. It is of advantage that the FRO is independent from the Agency according 
to article 26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation, but it is not clear whether this independ-
ence is sufficient, given that the FRO’s position and status contain significant 
drawbacks, such as the fact that she is overworked and understaffed,22 and that 
she cannot issue binding decisions or even sanctions but only reports and rec-
ommendations.23 Furthermore, even though the FRO has, on paper, the right to 
access all kinds of FRONTEX-related information, in fact, this right cannot be 
properly exercised to its full extent and she is not given access to all necessary 
information.24 
Ballestero25 reports that presently, there are quite some difficulties with re-
gards to the monitoring system promised in the Fundamental Rights Strategy.26 
The incident reporting scheme which is in place requires the FRO to assess the 
situation and report on it.27 FRONTEX then informs the concerned Member 
State.28 This mechanism addresses national border guards. It is, however, not 
acknowledged that violations could also be committed by FRONTEX staff.29 A 
                                                                      
20  COM(2003) 687 final/2 2003/0273 (CNS) 1. 
21  Ibid., 1, remarking on the absence of a monitoring mechanism. 
22  Consultative Forum (2016), pp 18ff: ‘The continued increase in the Frontex budget and 
responsibilities throughout 2015 has had limited impact on the staffing allocated (16 
Frontex Regulation, Article 26a(3)) to the Fundamental Rights Officer, who continued to 
count on the support of an assistant (working part-time as the Secretariat to the Consul-
tative Forum), a temporary administrative support staff member and one trainee. The al-
location of limited staff to the Fundamental Rights Officer has barred her from fulfilling 
her supporting and monitoring roles to their full extent throughout 2015.’ 
23  Article 26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation; Pascouau & Schumacher (2014) 3. 
24  Ramboll Management (2015) 136. 
25  Telephone interview conducted on 05/05/2016. 
26  See 2.4.2. 
27  Pascouau & Schumacher (2014) 2. 
28  Consultative Forum (2015-1) 5. 
29  Sanctions cannot be imposed by the Agency if the border guard in question is participat-
ing in the capacity of a national border guard. Then, it is up to the Member State to de-
termine the appropriate consequence (Article 3(1a)§ 3 FRONTEX-Regulation: The home 
Member State shall provide for appropriate disciplinary or other measures in accordance 
with its national law in case of violations of fundamental rights or international protection 
obligations in the course of a joint operation or pilot project.). Nothing is said about the pos-
sibility of FRONTEX staff committing such violations or about an obligation of the home 
Member State to report on what it has decided. Ballestero specifies that FRONTEX re-
ports its assessment to the Member State, which acknowledges the receipt and proces-
sion of said report, but adds that FRONTEX has no leverage to ask how the procession 
was done or what its outcome was (Ballestero (2016)). She reports that FRONTEX has 
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similar monitoring mechanism is envisioned in the FRONTEX Code of Conduct.30 
It contains the obligation of all participating personnel in JOs to report all inci-
dents which might constitute a fundamental rights violation to the Agency. 
However, the worst sanction foreseen in the Code is the removal of the offend-
ing party from the JO by the Executive Director.31 
Pascouau and Schumacher report that there already is an internal incident 
reporting mechanism within the FRONTEX Situation Centre, which monitors 
incidents during JOs and informs the coordinating officers sent by FRONTEX if 
this is considered to be necessary.32 However, there is very little information to 
be found about this mechanism – the Agency’s homepage, for instance, does not 
refer to this mechanism at all. 
The external evaluation conducted in 2015 has asked several parties affiliat-
ed with FRONTEX to appraise the effectiveness of the fundamental rights moni-
toring mechanism (see Figure 9).  
 
 
 
The answers provided differ significantly. A fourth of the NGOs and even parts of 
the Member States and FRONTEX staff considered the mechanism to be not at 
all effective, while 44% of the Member States and 31% of the FRONTEX Staff 
                                                                      
gradually been awarded the power to unilaterally exclude specific officers, but that, at the 
end of the day, sanctioning national officers remained the sole responsibility of the Mem-
ber States.  
30  Article 22 Code of Conduct: Participants in Frontex activities who have reason to believe 
that a violation of the present Code has occurred or is about to occur, are obliged to report 
the matter to Frontex via the appropriate channels. 
31  Article 23 Code of Conduct. 
32  Pascouau & Schumacher (2014) 2. 
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consider it to be efficient to a high degree and 20% of the Management Board 
even say that it is effective to a very high degree. All in all, 50% of the interview-
ees consider the mechanism to be rather effective, but it is telling that the tradi-
tionally more critical NGOs and international organisations without a fault have 
stayed on the lower end of the scale, with the most positive appreciation being 
effectiveness ‘to some degree’ by 25% of the interviewees. The evaluation report 
concludes that the fundamental rights mechanism has not been properly imple-
mented yet.33 
There are little references to a debating phase, but there are instances where 
certain forums can invite instances within the Agency to report to them about 
certain issues,34 which can be considered to be a form of debate if it involves the 
exchange of question and response, of criticism and justification. Thus, certain 
forms of debate can be presumed to exist. Still, it would be better to explicitly 
refer to debating mechanisms in the relevant legislation. 
The FRONTEX-Regulation does not mention any specific sanctions which 
might be imposed by the EU institutions, or any of the other potential forums on 
the whole Agency. There are provisions on the civil and criminal liability of indi-
vidual guest officers, but not of Agency personnel.35 The Regulation also con-
tains provisions on the contractual and non-contractual liability of the Agency: 
Especially interesting is Article 19(3) FRONTEX-Regulation, which stipulates 
that, in ‘the case of non-contractual liability, the Agency shall, in accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make 
good any damage caused by its departments or by its servants in the perfor-
mance of their duties’. In the following paragraph, it appoints the CJEU as the 
instance which shall have jurisdiction to decide on any such disputes.36 This 
mechanism seems never to have been engaged, at least there is no documenta-
tion to be found on it. Also, as was mentioned before, individuals have hardly 
any access to the CJEU. It is unclear how their access is secured in this instance. 
Furthermore, the important restriction of article 263 § 1 TFEU that only those 
acts of bodies intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties is reiterat-
ed in article 263 § 5 TFEU. This is a competence which FRONTEX, as a regulatory 
agency, does not have. Hence, it is not entirely clear how this mechanism is 
meant to be executed in the case of FRONTEX and it cannot be considered to be 
an appropriate accountability forum as of yet. 
The need for an accountability mechanism which FRONTEX has to adhere by 
can also be found in the fact that although the FRONTEX-Regulation contains 
provisions for terminating or suspending JOs ‘in case of violations of fundamen-
tal rights or international protection obligations in the course of a joint operation 
or pilot project’,37 this mechanism has never been exercised.38 Due to the fact 
                                                                      
33  Ramboll Management (2015) 136. 
34  See especially article 25 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
35  See articles 10b, 10c FRONTEX-Regulation. 
36  In accordance with article 263 § 5 TFEU. 
37  Article 3(1a) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
38  At least, no practical reference to this mechanism has been found.  
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that little to no transparency is to be had as to how the Agency deals with fun-
damental rights issues in practice, the question arises whether the need has real-
ly never been there or whether outside observers in the context of an accounta-
bility mechanism would have advised differently. 
The external monitoring mechanism has already been discussed by the EU 
Ombudsman, whose role it is to ‘help to uncover maladministration in the activi-
ties of the Community institutions and bodies (…), and make recommendations 
with a view to putting an end to it.’39 However, it has to be stressed that the 
Ombudsman can only make recommendations, which do not by any means 
equal legally binding consequences or even sanctions. Furthermore, only EU 
citizens have access to this mechanism.40 Thus, the Ombudsman cannot consti-
tute a proper public legal accountability mechanism. Bovens mentions that the 
Ombudsman is not the only accountability mechanism which already exists 
within the Agency framework but that the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
also serves as an instance of accountability.41 The OLAF conducts internal anti-
fraud investigations. It combats fraud, corruption and other unlawful activities42 
and can carry out on-the-spot checks with the recipients of Agency funding 
when necessary43. Regulation 1073/1999, which the FRONTEX-Regulation pro-
claims is fully applicable,44 has since been repealed.45 Instead, regulation 
883/2013 is applicable.46 It mentions the need for the investigated party to sub-
mit necessary documents, thus to inform (article 8), and the OLAF will draw up 
reports submitted both to the investigated party, which ‘shall’ then take neces-
sary action (article 11(4)).47 The relationship between OLAF and FRONTEX is 
close to the one of forum and accountable, but although the Agency is obligated 
to report to the OLAF on the measures it takes following an OLAF-report, there 
are no further consequences mentioned if changes are not implemented. OLAF’s 
Director-General may report such things to the Supervisory Committee and both 
can report to the European Parliament and other institutions,48 but this does not 
equal sanctions. In conclusion, neither the Ombudsman nor the OLAF constitute 
                                                                      
39  Article 2(1) Ombudsman Statute. 
40  Article 2(2) Ombudsman Statute. 
41  Bovens (2007-2) 466. 
42  Article 31(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
43  Article 31(3) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
44  Article 31(1) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
45  It was repealed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
46  Article 20 Regulation 883/2013. 
47  Article 9(4) Regulation 1073/1999: Reports drawn up following an internal investigation and 
any useful related documents shall be sent to the institution, body, office or agency con-
cerned. The institution, body, office or agency shall take such action, in particular disciplinary 
or legal, on the internal investigations, as the results of those investigations warrant, and 
shall report thereon to the Director of the Office, within a deadline laid down by him in the 
findings of his report. 
48  Articles 15(9), 17(4), 17(5)(a) Regulation 883/2013. 
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proper forums for accountability. Bovens is not of the same opinion and submits 
that:  
 
the consequences are not necessarily brought upon the actor by the forum itself. 
Ombudsmen and many chambers of audit, for example, can scrutinise agencies, expose 
waste or mismanagement and suggest improvements, but they usually cannot enforce 
them. That is left to parliament that has the power to put pressure on the minister or the 
commissioner, who in turn can put pressure on the heads of the agencies involved.49  
 
However, this would be in contradiction of the need for one single independent 
forum.  
This analysis has shown that, although there are a few mechanisms which 
might contain elements of transparency and hence of accountability in 
FRONTEX’ framework; they all prove to be faulty to some degree, missing suffi-
cient procedural rules, forum independence, the accountee’s power to allocate 
consequences or even sufficient graveness of the consequences to be considered 
to be sanctions. It can thus be concluded that the lack of transparency which was 
already bemoaned by other sources such as the Council of Europe50 and civil 
society51 persists. 
4.2 Is there Sufficient Responsibility? 
The second element which was found to be necessary for FRONTEX to be held 
accountable for breaches of EU law is responsibility.52 It is needed either in the 
active form, acting in its for its own purposes or sharing the responsibility for 
joint activities with other parties, or passively, omitting to fulfil its duty to pro-
tect by not stopping a wrongful act it knew or ought to have known about.  
 
A Degree of Independence from the Member States 
FRONTEX needs to be at least partly independent because if not, it could be said 
that it solely follows the directions of the Member States (and the EU institu-
tions), which would in consequence lead to a situation as the one which 
FRONTEX claims exists already: with FRONTEX as an unaccountable coordinator 
and a facilitator and the Member States solely accountable for any breaches of 
EU law.53 Moreover, it is quite relevant to look also at FRONTEX’ budget because 
independence depends at least in part on the party’s financial situation:54 if an 
                                                                      
49  Bovens (2007-2) 452. 
50  See eg PACE (2013-1, -2, -3).  
51  See eg FRONTEXIT (2014).  
52  See 1.4. 
53  See eg FRONTEX (2012) 3; Pascouau & Schumacher (2014) 1. 
54  On the link between funding and control, see eg Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), ICJ Pleadings, 
→ 
WHICH POTENTIAL FOR PUBLIC LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY? 
 
 
111 
entity is financially dependent on another, it is more susceptible to being unduly 
influenced by the money-giver and thus more susceptible to corruption. This is 
why it is of vital importance that judges in a democratic society are completely 
independent. Amnesty International has highlighted that the Agency’s budget is 
considerably higher in comparison with other EU bodies active in similar fields: 
while the European Asylum Support Office’s (EASO) budget for 2014 was 
€ 15.600.000, FRONTEX was accorded a budget of 89.200.000€ for the same 
period.55 This is around 5.7 times the budget that the EASO had at its hands. Fur-
thermore, FRONTEX’ total revenue has increased dramatically from € 97.945.077 
in 2014 to € 143.300.000 in 2015 and € 254.035.000 in 2016.56 Over the course of 
two years, the Agency has more than doubled its budget, the contributions from 
the Schengen associated countries and the subsidies having increased especially 
steeply.57, 58 In fact, FRONTEX’ margin of manoeuvre may be considered to be 
rather high, looking at the Agency’s expenditures for its activities, especially for 
its JOs in comparison to all other activities (see Table 3 below). 
It can be seen that of the total budget of € 254.035.000 that the Agency has 
at its disposal for 2016, € 208.897.000 are spent on operational activities and of 
these € 208.897.000, € 119.795.000 are spent on the JOs. The drastic increase in 
budget may be explained by the Agency’s obligation to finance its activities59 as 
well as the recent increase in persons migrating towards Europe and, in coher-
ence with the aims of the JOs,60 further illustrates the EU’s objective to stop as 
many migrants from reaching Europe. This is underlined especially when com-
pared to the budget increase of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) at 
the same time: its budget only increased from € 15.663.975 in 2014 to 
                                                                      
Oral Arguments, Documents, Volume IV – Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits), 1991, § 265 & 
Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Opinion & Judgement) ICTR-94-1-T, T Ch I (7 May 1997), § 602. 
55  Amnesty (2014-1) 16. 
56  FRONTEX, ‘Budget 2016’, Report, 24/12/2015, referred to as (2015-5). 
57  Ibid. 
58  The budget has, in fact, been steadily increasing from the beginning; see Amnesty Inter-
national (2008) 14: ‘The budget of Frontex consists of a subsidy of the Community en-
tered in the general budget of the EU, a contribution from the countries associated with 
the implementation and development of the Schengen acquis, fees for services provided 
and any voluntary contribution from the Member States. This budget has continued to in-
crease. It was 14 million euros in 2005 and 32 million euros in 2006. In December 2007, the 
European Parliament agreed to the Commission’s proposal to double the budget, stating 
that “Given the urgency of immigration matters, the Parliament ...decided to double the 
amounts allocated to the Agency (Frontex). The budget earmarked for Frontex thus rises 
to € 70 million euros in total”, see The Parliament adopts the budget for the European Un-
ion for 2008, see the European Parliament website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
news/expert/infopress_page/034-15283-344-12-50-905-20071213IPR15281-10-12-2007-
2007-true/default_fr.htm.’ 
59  See eg articles 3(4), 3b(6), 8(h) FRONTEX-Regulation. 
60  Aims such as ‘increase the effective prevention of irregular migration’ (see FRONTEX, 
‘Joint Operation Flexible Operational activities’, Archive Entry, 2016) or ‘tackling the ex-
ceptional situation of irregular migration towards Greece and Bulgaria with a desired pre-
vention effect’ (see FRONTEX, ‘Poseidon Land’, Archive Entry, 2016). 
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€ 15.944.846 in 2015 and € 19.438.600 in 2016.61 This may be the reason why, 
despite their, at best, dubious competence for the matter,62 European Border 
Guard Teams (EBGT) now seem to partly take over the tasks of Greek Asylum 
Service Officers in the context of the Poseidon Rapid Intervention.63 
 
 
 
According to recital 15 of the FRONTEX-Regulation, the use of the budget is 
controlled by the Management Board. The Board is composed of two members 
of the Commission and the one representative of each of the Member States as 
well as the non-EU Schengen States.64 This can be interpreted to be a reason for 
which the Agency should, in fact, be able to be held accountable: no specific 
Member State can have more power over the budget than the Union, which has 
two representatives to the Member States’ one. This gives the EU, and with it its 
Agency, more relative influence over the budget than any single State can have. 
Recital 16 of the FRONTEX-Regulation stresses the importance of guaranteeing 
the Agency’s full autonomy and independence and further that an autonomous 
budget was essential to this. Another argument in favour of the Agency’s rela-
tive independence is that, according to article 3(4), it finances or at least co-
finances all JOs and other projects. JOs can be initiated and carried out by 
FRONTEX65 and are based on Risk Analysis Reports66 which also originate from 
                                                                      
61  See EASO, ‘Statement of Revenues and Expenditures 2016’. 
62  It is dubious because the right to asylum in its original sense, the right to grant asylum, is 
part of a sovereign state’s competence (see eg MT Gil-Bazo, ‘Asylum as a General Princi-
ple of International Law’ (2015) 1/27 Int J Refugee Law 3, 3). 
63  See on this the tasks of the officers deployed to Greece as described in FRONTEX, ‘Fron-
tex launches rapid operational assistance in Greece’, Article, 29/12/2015. 
64  See recital 15 and article 21 of the FRONTEX-Regulation. 
65  Article 3(1)§2 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
66  See the last paragraph of article 3(1) FRONTEX-Regulation as well as FRONTEX, ‘Roles 
and Responsibilities’, 2016. 
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the Agency.67 Furthermore, the Operational Plans JOs (and Pilot Projects, for 
that matter) adhere to are drawn up by FRONTEX’ Executive Director, and even 
though they are agreed upon by him as well as the host Member States and oth-
er participating States,68 these facts show that the Agency has, in fact, a consid-
erable margin of manoeuvre. This opinion is not universally shared. Ballestero, 
for instance, supplies that the margin is, in fact, minimal. Concerning FRONTEX’ 
margin of manoeuvre, Keßler sums up that: 
 
Frontex operates in a wider EU context. Its mandate and responsibilities are increasingly 
difficult to discern from those of the individual member states, as they are strongly 
interlinked. For instance, the intelligence provided by the Risk Analysis Unit and the 
financial support from the Agency’s budget have become essential for effective border 
control operations. member states still remain responsible for the actual conduct of 
border controls though.69 
 
There are other factors, such as the command structure during JOs which have 
an impact on FRONTEX degree of independence from the Member States, but 
unfortunately, those factors are held confidential70 and thus cannot contribute 
to the evaluation of the Agency’s possible responsibility. 
 
Further Criteria in Case of Omission 
However, it is not imperative to establish FRONTEX’ independent actions for its 
own purposes. It is sufficient for the purposes of article 14 ARIO that FRONTEX 
aids or assists in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, which is the 
case if it has knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act 
and if the act would be wrongful if committed by FRONTEX. FRONTEX, just the 
same as the guest officer or national border guard of the host Member State 
during a JO, does not have the right to commit a breach of EU law, which is the 
internationally wrongful act this thesis is concerned with. It would have to be 
established on a case-by-case basis if FRONTEX knew or ought to have known 
about it, but seeing FRONTEX encompassing intelligence and information net-
work and the presence of FRONTEX personnel and representatives on the 
ground with the national border guards and guest officers (think eg of the coor-
dinating officer),71 it seems probable that it can often be established that 
FRONTEX ought to have known about it, at least. The presence of staff mem-
bers of the Agency ‘on the ground’ during JOs is foreseen in article 3a(3) 
FRONTEX-Regulation. 
                                                                      
67  See recital 6 of the FRONTEX-Regulation. 
68  Article 3a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation.  
69  Keßler (2016) 3. 
70  See Annex 3 and also Annex 9 to the OP of JO Poseidon 2015, p 40; Annex 9 to JO Triton 
2015, p 35; Annex 5 to the OP of JO Alexis I 2015, p 25; Annex 5 to the OP of JO Alexis II 
2015, p 32. 
71  See 2.2.4 and 4.2. 
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Whether it was actually possible to stop the act from being committed is 
something which must also be established on a case-by-case basis. Especially 
important here is the fact that FRONTEX can terminate JOs at any time if it sus-
pects fundamental rights violations to be persistent or even just if it considers 
that the conditions for the continuation of the JO are no longer given.72 Howev-
er, according to the analysis of the external evaluation in 2015, this mechanism 
has not yet been fully implemented.73 In this context, Rijpma argues accordingly 
that:  
 
Taking into account the presence of Frontex staff in situ during joint operations and the 
reporting obligations of participating personnel, it appears that, in many situations, 
fundamental rights violations may be foreseeable for Frontex, especially if they are of an 
ongoing and persistent nature.74  
 
He stresses the Agency’s duty to ‘take all measures it can reasonably be ex-
pected to take, or else incurs accountability in addition to the respective Mem-
ber States’.75 
Although its ability to prevent violations of EU law from being committed 
needs to be appreciated on a case-by-case basis, it can be concluded that in gen-
eral, FRONTEX can be held responsible for its omissions to prevent breaches of 
EU law, especially because the general framework and circumstances of JOs 
indicate that the Agency might, more often than not, know or ought to have 
known about what is happening during said JOs, which means that it is possible 
to hold it responsible for omitting to fulfil its obligation to protect. 
In conclusion, it has been shown that elements of public legal accountability 
are present in the Agency’s framework, but a satisfactory mechanism does not 
currently exist. However, this is not because of a lack of favourable circumstanc-
es but solely due to a lack of proper legislation. Thus, the present legal provisions 
have not established a sufficient mechanism to hold FRONTEX accountable for 
breaches of EU law.  
One of the issues the current legislation has failed at is establishment of an 
individual complaint mechanism. 
4.3 Necessity for Change? – The Debate about an Individual Complaint 
Mechanism 
In this Section, it will be discussed whether the establishment of an individual 
complaint mechanism is necessary. 
As observed before,76 FRONTEX does not, as of yet, offer individuals the 
possibility to demand reparation for the treatment suffered in the context of a 
                                                                      
72  See 2.1, 2.2, 4.1 and 6.1.2. 
73  Ramboll Management (2015) 130. 
74  Rijpma (2016) 29. 
75  Ibid. 
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JO.77 Although Joint Follow Up Teams examine allegations of human rights vio-
lations committed in the context of a JO, the results are not made available to 
the public.78 Article 3(1a)§3 FRONTEX-Regulation provides that in case of ‘viola-
tions of fundamental rights or international protection obligations in the course 
of a joint operation or pilot project’, the host Member States to a JO should pro-
vide for ‘appropriate disciplinary or other measures in accordance with its na-
tional law’. Individual access to this mechanism is, however, not provided, and 
neither is it defined in any way what these ‘appropriate measures’ entail exactly. 
Nor is mentioned who may, in fact, be confronted with these measures, which is 
an especially pertinent question as, according to article 3(1b) FRONTEX-
Regulation, the Agency has its own pool of border guards and may itself decide 
on the deployment of said European Border Guard Teams.79 The Agency con-
firms that it will consider any complaint, allegation or relevant information con-
cerning alleged fundamental rights violations brought to it by individuals or, 
indeed, any source but the participants to the operation in the context of which 
the violation is suspected to have taken place and promises ‘appropriate consid-
eration’.80 However, this is not codified in a binding manner, nor is it clear what 
the parameters and consequences of such a consideration might be. Further-
more, the Agency does not have the competence to decide on any legal matters 
in retrospect.81 It is, therefore, unknown how fundamental rights violations are 
dealt with within the Agency. Keßler provides that:  
 
(…) currently the Fundamental Rights Officer receives all incident reports. She can also 
observe Frontex-coordinated joint operations in situ and participate in internal Frontex 
briefings, debriefings and discussions. The Consultative Forum and the Management 
Board are regularly provided with reports on incidents and her follow-up activities.82  
 
He underlines, however, that the CF is strongly convinced that a more formal 
individual complaint mechanism, as proposed by the EU Ombudsman is re-
quired. 
According to Article 19(4) FRONTEX-Regulation, the CJEU has the jurisdic-
tion in disputes relating to compensation of any damage caused by its depart-
ments or by its servants in the performance of their duties. However, individuals 
hardly have any access to the CJEU.83 Neither is there individual complaint 
mechanism in place which might allow individual complainants to engage 
                                                                      
76  See eg 1.2 and 1.3. 
77  See also European Ombudsman, ‘Special Report of the European Ombudsman in own-
initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning Frontex’, 07/11/2013. 
78  Amnesty (2014-2) 27. 
79  See also European Ombudsman, ‘Letter from the European Ombudsman opening own-
initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning implementation by Frontex of its fun-
damental rights obligations’, 06/03/2012, § 29. 
80  See FRONTEX (2012) 10.  
81  Also pointed out by FRONTEX (2012) 10. 
82  Keßler (2016) 3. 
83  See 1.3.1. 
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FRONTEX’ accountability directly.84 Thus, individuals presently do not have the 
possibility to demand reparation for the damages and fundamental rights viola-
tions caused to them in the course of FRONTEX operations. This absence, how-
ever, creates fundamental rights concerns.85 Instances like the European Om-
budsman86 and the PACE87 have therefore been lobbying for the introduction of 
such a system for years, which shows that they consider this a very serious defi-
cit seeing that the Agency has, itself, only existed a few years longer.  
FRONTEX maintains that the introduction of an individual complaint mech-
anism is impossible because it is incompatible with its mandate as it ‘does not 
have executive powers to investigate incidents in- volving allegations of viola-
tions of human rights’.88 However, not a lot of options persist if it is excluded just 
the same as the CJEU mechanism. To obtain a judgement from the ECtHR is not 
an easy feat, either: even though individual applications can be made by anyone 
claiming to have suffered a violation of one of their rights laid down in the 
ECHR,89 the Court’s jurisdiction is only compulsory upon the parties to the ECHR, 
which the EU and, in consequence, its institutions, bodies and agencies, are not 
as of yet.90 It will furthermore be difficult for individuals to have access to EU 
domestic law systems, as most fundamental rights violations seem to take place 
even before they enter the Union, as FRONTEX seems to be most often accused 
of performing push-backs, often together with other violations.91 This shows 
unequivocally that, in order to give individuals access to justice,92 another mech-
anism needs to be created. The Consultative Forum quotes the Ombudsman 
saying that there is a clear distinction between monitoring procedures and com-
plaints mechanisms, the former not being suitable to substitute the latter.93 The 
Ombudsman further implies that holding FRONTEX accountable this way would 
go a long way in alleviating fundamental rights concerns by offering victims of 
                                                                      
84  European Ombudsman (2012), Summary § 5. 
85  Eg European Ombudsman (2012), Summary. 
86  Ibid., § 51: ‘Frontex should establish a mechanism for dealing with complaints about in-
fringements of fundamental rights in all Frontex-labelled joint operations. The mecha-
nism should receive complaints from persons who claim to be individually affected, or 
who complain in the public interest. This role could be entrusted to the FRO, who should 
be resourced accordingly.’  
87  PACE (2013-1) § 9.5.  
88  Consultative Forum (2015-1) 5. 
89  See article 34 ECHR. 
90  P Waagstein, ‘Human Rights Protection in Europe: Between Strasbourg and Luxembourg’ 
(2010) Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, SPICE Digest, 1; on the status of 
the EU accession to the ECHR see eg ECtHR: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home. 
aspx?p=basic texts/accessionEU&c=, accessed on 21/04/2016.  
91  See eg Pro Asyl (2014); Amnesty International (2014-1) & (2014-2), Booth et al., FRONTEX 
between Greece and Turkey: at the Border of Denial (EMHRN, FIDH, Migreurop, Copenha-
gen 2014). 
92  As is their right in the European Union: see article 47 ECFR. 
93  Consultative Forum (2015-1) 38. 
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(alleged) violations an effective remedy.94 An appropriate incident reporting and 
follow-up scheme has even been demanded in the Stockholm Programme, 
which invites the Commission to ‘consider including a mechanism for reporting 
and recording incidents that can be satisfactorily followed up by the relevant 
authorities’ ‘[i]n order to promote the proper enforcement of the applicable 
statutory framework for Frontex operations’.95 It is not expressly demanded that 
the mechanism should be accessible for individuals, but it stands to reason that 
the effectiveness of the mechanism would be enhanced if individuals were al-
lowed to submit their complaints, as someone who feels that their rights were 
infringed upon will be more likely to report them as someone who might prefer 
to downplay their own role in an incident. 
It has been shown that there is a considerable need for an individual com-
plaint mechanism, as individuals have currently little guarantees that their com-
plaints will be heard, nor that any actions will be taken to remedy the situation. 
This status quo has persisted since the beginning of the Agency, even though an 
appropriate incident reporting mechanism was one of the very reasons 
FRONTEX was created in the first place. It should also be noted that even if it is 
true that there is currently no room for such a mechanism, for reasons such as 
the fact that FRONTEX does not have the necessary executive powers to provide 
effective remedy, it is not imperative that FRONTEX be the forum for such a 
mechanism. It might even be of advantage if the complaint mechanism was as-
suredly independent from the Agency proper. Moreover, this discussion is espe-
cially pertinent at the present time as the Union is about to establish a new regu-
lation replacing the FRONTEX-Regulation.96 Hence, there is currently the poten-
tial for introducing more appropriate competences for this purpose.97 
4.4 Conclusion 4 
Many elements attributed to transparency are present in the Agency’s current 
framework. It has the obligation to report to a number of forums, it is even com-
pelled to hold debates on its actions with some of them and its reports may have 
long-term consequences on the Agency’s functioning, as some of its forums even 
have legislative power over it. However, the reports usually concern very general 
issues and do not concentrate on individual occurrences of EU law violations. 
Furthermore, no evidence has been found that sanctions can be imposed by any 
of the forums, except, perhaps, for the CJEU, which is not an ideal candidate for 
being the Agency’s forum for public legal accountability for other reasons, first 
and foremost because it concerns itself with acts intended to produce legal con-
                                                                      
94  European Ombudsman (2012). 
95  European Council Document 17024/09, Stockholm Programme 5 § 1, p 55. 
96  For an extensive discussion of the new regulation, see Chapter 6. 
97  Even though the EU institutions have agreed on the Proposal on 22/06/2016, which ren-
ders significant changes improbable. See EU-Observer alert of 22/06/2016, https://euob-
server.com/ tickers/133943, accessed on 22/06/2016. 
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sequences. Those do, however, not lie within the Agency’s repertoire. There is 
thus a fundamental flaw in their compatibility.  
There seem to be a significant number of elements approaching accountabil-
ity mechanisms. Nevertheless, they all suffer from significant flaws with regards 
to the Agency’s obligation to report, the relationship between Agency and forum 
or the forums’ powers and competences with regards to FRONTEX. In conse-
quence, it can be concluded that these elements need to be expanded and im-
proved in order to constitute true accountability mechanisms. 
The claim that FRONTEX cannot be held responsible and therefore not ac-
countable because of its subsidiary role is not entirely accurate, as was shown 
before.98 Even though FRONTEX is widely influenced by Member States and 
Commission alike, it still has a remarkable degree of independence and control 
over its own actions. Its margin of manoeuvre is sufficient to say that it can be 
held responsible for its own breaches of EU law and for its failures to comply with 
its obligation to protect when it knows or ought to have known about a prevent-
able violation of EU law, but also jointly responsible for breaches of EU law oc-
curring during activities carried out with the Member States. Therefore, it is the-
oretically possible to hold FRONTEX accountable on its own, but because of its 
close cooperation with and reliance on the EU Member States, it seems prefera-
ble to advocate its shared responsibility99 and accountability. FRONTEX could 
hence be held accountable if a relationship with an appropriate forum was estab-
lished or if the existing mechanisms were improved. The initiation of any kinds of 
proceedings which contain elements of accountability as observed in this last 
Chapter cannot presently be done by individuals. However, it has previously 
been established that they are those most in danger to suffer the consequences 
of a EU law violation FRONTEX is accountable for. There is a considerable need 
for an individual complaint mechanism and thus for direct access to an account-
ability mechanism for individuals. It has been shown that the introduction of an 
individual complaint mechanism is especially necessary in order to offer individ-
uals an effective judicial remedy and access to justice as, for example, laid down 
in article 47 ECFR. 
 
                                                                      
98  See 2.2.4 and Pascouau & Schumacher (2014) 1. 
99  The PACE also supports the introduction of shared responsibility: PACE (2013-1), § 8.2. 
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5. Main Conclusion 
 
Over the last Chapters, not only the possibility but also the absolute necessity of 
holding FRONTEX accountable has been established by pointing out the consid-
erable influence it can exert over the lives of those individuals it comes in contact 
with, especially with regards to those people’s fundamental rights. Hence, the 
imperative importance of a mechanism calling the Agency to account for its 
actions and activities is evident.  
In order to find out to what extent FRONTEX can be held accountable, it was 
necessary to identify criteria establishing the Agency’s accountability. It has 
been found that the most adequate criteria to determine FRONTEX accountabil-
ity for breaches of EU law are transparency and responsibility, which respectively 
consist of several elements.  
FRONTEX is bound, either directly or indirectly, by a significant number of 
EU law provisions, which it is thus in the position to breach. It does not make a 
difference whether it acts inside or outside EU territory – it is as much bound by 
EU law during its extraterritorial activities as during its actions inside Union terri-
tory. This has been established with a number of means, first and foremost being 
the FRONTEX-Regulation, which stresses at two separate instances that the 
Agency has, as a minimum, to hold up standards at least equivalent to EU law 
when acting outside EU territory or even just cooperating with third countries. 
Even though the factual situation is obscure and information is scarcely to be 
had, it has been established that it does in fact act outside EU territory with the 
examples of the Italy-Libya Cooperation Agreement, the Working Arrangement 
between FRONTEX and the national police of Cape Verde and JO Hera II. 
Transparency is presently understood as the accountable’s – FRONTEX’ – 
obligation to report to a specific independent forum, which can debate over the 
situation and mete out consequences, which may amount to sanctions. Its ac-
countability forum needs to be independent in order to appreciate the situation 
objectively and impartially, but close enough to the matter at hand to have a 
good understanding of it.  
The criterion of transparency is only partially fulfilled. FRONTEX does in fact 
have the obligation to report to a number of instances, and some of them can 
even debate with the Executive Director. It has been shown that there are mech-
anisms which contain elements of transparency and hence of accountability in 
FRONTEX’ framework, but they all prove to be inadequate. There are many ele-
ments of accountability to be found in the relationships between FRONTEX and 
the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the CJEU and even the 
Ombudsman. However, these relationships all prove to be lacking in other re-
spects. There is no sufficient accountable-forum relationship between FRONTEX 
and any of the potential forums. The lack of sufficient procedural rules, forum 
independence, the accountee’s power to allocate consequences or even suffi-
cient graveness of the consequences to be considered sanctions prevent the 
criterion from being fulfilled. A lack of transparency within the Agency thus per-
sists. 
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At this point, it is very important to keep in mind that it is not FRONTEX’ in-
dividual accountability which this thesis aims to establish but its shared account-
ability. This is especially relevant when discussing FRONTEX’ responsibility for 
its actions, which can, according to the doctrine introduced especially by 
Nollkaemper, be shared. This doctrine is, however, not yet established in inter-
national law and still debated.  
FRONTEX’ shared responsibility has to be established on a case-by-case ba-
sis, depending on the circumstances of the situation. Still, it can be said with 
certainty at this point that, even though the Member States have an impact on 
the Agency’s decision-making process and its actions, FRONTEX shows a suffi-
cient amount of independence from the Member States, which are the parties 
the Agency would share its responsibility and accountability with, to be held 
accountable if a breach of EU law attributable to it is established. Shared respon-
sibility can be established if a sufficient amount of control over the shared activi-
ties can be established. Here, it has been shown that FRONTEX has a significant 
amount of independent competences and has control over parts of the activities 
it is involved in. One important aspect of this control is the fact that the Execu-
tive Director may terminate the Agency’s JOs if he considers that, ie, fundamen-
tal rights violations take place continuously. It is not necessary that the Agency 
itself perpetrates the breaches of EU law. It can be held accountable for the vio-
lations it knew or ought to have known about, which is not improbable eg 
through the presence on the ground of personnel such as its coordinating offic-
ers during the JOs. It can also be assumed that it frequently has the power to 
prevent certain violations, eg through the previously mentioned mechanism 
where the Executive Director can terminate or suspend JOs. 
In summary, FRONTEX can generally be held responsible for its omissions to 
prevent breaches of EU law. This is especially due to the fact that the general 
framework and circumstances of JOs indicate that the Agency is usually in a 
position where it should know or ought to have known about what is happening 
during said JOs, ie through its Coordinating Officers, which means that it is pos-
sible to hold it responsible for omitting to fulfil its obligation to protect on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Therefore, it has been shown that while important elements of public legal 
accountability are present in the Agency’s current framework, a complete, suffi-
cient and satisfactory mechanism does not exist at the moment. This deficiency 
is not due to an impossibility to establish such mechanisms, as there do not 
seem to be any insurmountable obstacles preventing its introduction but a sim-
ple lack of proper legislation. Thus, the present legal provisions do not suffice to 
establish an appropriate mechanism to hold FRONTEX accountable for breaches 
of EU law. Yet, it can be concluded that there is presently unexplored potential 
for public legal accountability for breaches of EU law within the Agency’s current 
framework. 
This could possibly be remedied at least partially, with a view to individuals’ 
access to justice, with the introduction of an individual complaint mechanism. 
The importance of introducing such a mechanism has been established in order 
to secure individual persons’ access to justice and to an effective remedy, as 
guaranteed in article 47 ECFR. Those rights are presently not ensured, especially 
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because other complaint mechanisms are either inefficient, inaccessible or suffer 
from both flaws. An individual complaint mechanism seems to be the best way 
to ensure that the article 47 rights are upheld. 
 
To What Extent Can FRONTEX be Held Accountable for Breaches of EU Law Inside 
and Outside EU Territory? 
It has been shown that the answer to this question is multi-facetted. Under the 
current legislation, it cannot be said that a satisfactory accountability mecha-
nism exists. However, it has to be recognised that there is considerable potential 
which has not been properly explored to its full extent. FRONTEX can be held at 
least jointly accountable for breaches of EU law committed inside EU territory 
and outside of it, which it committed alone or aiding another party. Currently, 
however, there is insufficient transparency. It is possible to hold it at least jointly 
responsible, although this is not sufficiently regulated. In this respect, the Agen-
cy’s legal framework suffers from unclear procedures and insufficient and un-
clear competences, pro and independence of the possible forums. 
Theoretically, these issues are not impossible to be remedied and this point 
in time seems to be ideal for implementing these changes, as the Proposal for 
the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency has not gone through the 
whole of the legislative procedure yet. It now rests to examine to what extent 
the issues discovered over those last Chapters are remedied in the Commission’s 
proposal for a new EBCGA. 
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6. The Impact of the Proposal for a European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency on the Identified 
Accountability Issues 
 
 
European Border Guard Teams were incorporated into the FRONTEX-Regulation 
with its 2011 amendment.1 They have since gained importance at the Union’s 
external borders in the last years and have been described as the future of Euro-
pean Border Management.2 This is underlined by the Commission Proposal for a 
creation of a European Border and Coast Guard Agency.3 As the EBCGA is des-
tined to replace FRONTEX, it is of relevance in the context of this thesis to exam-
ine whether the current accountability concerns identified in the conclusion are 
alleviated or exacerbated. Thus, this Chapter will address the Agency’s pending 
transition into the EBCGA. First, the new Agency’s profile will be analysed (6.1). 
Then, accountability issues and the proposed individual complaint mechanism 
will be examined (6.2). In a third Sub-Chapter, it will be determined whether 
Union Law will be applicable to the new Agency’s extraterritorial actions and 
which form its third-country cooperation will take (6.3). Lastly, a few final con-
clusions will be drawn on whether the issues identified in the current framework 
are solved in the Proposal (6.4). 
6.1 Profile of the EBCGA4 
In its young and turbulent life, FRONTEX has experienced much change. Its 
competences and tasks have been increased significantly and its regulation will 
be amended yet again quite soon.  
The new regulation was proposed mid-December 20155 as part of a pack-
age6 by the Commission in response to the demands of the European Parlia-
                                                                      
1  Articles 1a(1a), 2(1)(ea),(g), 3, 3b, 3c, 5, 8, 8a to 8g, 17 FRONTEX-Regulation. 
2  See J Rijpma, ‘Frontex and the European System of Border Guards: The Future of Euro-
pean Border Management’ in M Fletcher et al (eds), The European Union as an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (Routledge, Oxford 2016). 
3  COM(2015) 671 final, 15/12/2015. 
4  For reasons of time- and space management, the presentation of the EBCGA’s features 
and characteristics will concentrate on a few chosen aspects and is by no means meant to 
give a complete overview. 
5  At first glance, the creation of an entirely new Agency just twelve years after FRONTEX 
came into being seems rather extreme, especially since it would probably have been pos-
sible to make do with further expanding FRONTEX’ competences. It can be speculated 
that this move is a strategic one done for publicity’s sake, meant to overcome the 
Agency’s notoriously bad reputation. This reputation can be seen in multiple publications 
by civil society (Amnesty (2014-1), (2014-2), Pro Asyl (2014), HRW (2009,2011).) and the 
existence of blogs and campaigns such as the Frontexit (see http:// www.frontexit. 
org/en/) campaign which exists even as a Twitter Hashtag (see https://twitter.com/ hash-
→ 
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ment,7 Council8 and Commission9 to find a way to effectively manage the migra-
tory pressures arisen during the years of 2014 and 2015. The EU institutions have 
agreed on the Proposal on 22 June 2016 and the European Parliament will vote 
on it in July.10 It has been designed in an effort to save the Schengen area, which 
had been put under undue stress with these recent challenges.11 The objective of 
the new Agency is to ‘ensure a European integrated border management of the 
EU’s external borders, with a view to managing migration effectively and ensur-
ing a high level of security within the Union, while safeguarding the free move-
ment of persons therein’.12 
It becomes immediately apparent when reading the EBCGA Proposal that it 
is much more encompassing than the FRONTEX-Regulation, containing 82 arti-
cles compared to Regulation 2007/2004’s 34. The EBCGA’s tasks are elaborated 
in section one of the second chapter in the Commission’s Proposal.13  
                                                                      
tag/frontexit.), Frontexplode (see http://frontexplode.eu/), Frontexwatch (which exists 
twice: see https://frontexwatch.wordpress.com/ and http://frontex.antira.info/. Neither of 
these blogs have been updated in some time.), Noborder (see http://www.noborder.org/) 
etc. It might therefore be that the EU legislators thought that an image makeover was in 
order. 
6  See Statewatch, ‘European Commission: 15 December 2015: “Package” – Excluding, 
controlling and returning refugees’, 15/12/2015. 
7  See European Parliament resolution of 10 September 2015 on migration and refugees in 
Europe (2015/2833(RSP)), but also European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2014 
on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migra-
tion (2014/2907(RSP)) and European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2015 on the latest 
tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies (2015/2660(RSP)). 
8  See the European Council conclusions of 15 October 2015 as well as the Conclusions of 
the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-
Terrorism, 20/11/2015. 
9  See the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration of 13 May 2015 (COM(2015)0240) 
and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address of 
9 September 2015. 
10  See EU-Observer alert of 22/06/2016, https://euobserver.com/tickers/133943, accessed on 
22/06/ 2016.  
11  COM(2015) 671 final, p2. 
12  See the Explanatory Memorandum and the Legislative Financial Statement attached to 
Commission Proposal COM(2015) 671 final, pp2, 6, 77& 88. 
13  Articles 6, 7 Proposal. According to article 6(1), the EBCGA’s aim is to ‘facilitate and ren-
der more effective the application of existing and future Union measures relating to the 
management of external borders, in particular the Schengen Borders Code’. Article 7(1)(a-
r) lists 18 distinct tasks, including the analysis of migration flows with a view to assessing 
the ‘risk’ of irregular migration at the EU’s outer borders (art 7(1)(a)). Member States can 
be assessed as to their ‘vulnerability’ in the face of irregular migration (art 7(1)(b)). The 
EBCGA can assist the Member States and set up resource pools in numerous ways and 
even assist in the cooperation with third countries. 
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These tasks sound largely familiar,14 but what has changed with the new 
EBCGA Proposal? It seems as though the Agency’s tasks still are mostly the 
same, though enhanced through the conferral of farther-reaching competences 
and the addition of new tasks.15 Carrera and Hertog went so far as to label the 
EBCGA a ‘Frontex+ agency’.16 In the proposed Regulation, prominent attention 
is paid to Return17 and on enforcing the external borders. Its setup has been qual-
ified as ‘semi military’18 due to the planned involvement of national border and 
coast guards, which, in some Member States, have military status.19 According 
to Carrera and Hertog, this constitutes a move to re-establish the Agency’s dom-
inance in the field of border protection, as there was significant competition for 
the protection especially of the maritime borders by different (para-)military and 
other players.20 This is, according to them, also the reason why cooperation 
agreements with the two other agencies which are also concerned with the pro-
tection of the maritime borders are laid out in article 52(2) and (3) of the Pro-
posal.21 Although coast guards are only involved ‘to the extent that they carry 
out border control tasks’, this merging of border and coast guard instances is 
highly problematic. According to Guild et al., it stands in sharp contrast with 
provisions of the Schengen acquis, which is non-military in nature and introduces 
an additional problem of accountability: ‘A key challenge of military intervention 
relates to the difficulty to ensure proper legal, judicial and democratic accounta-
bility and rule of law compliance of their border surveillance actions.’22 Consider-
ing this, it is especially important that sufficient accountability mechanisms be 
integrated into the EBCGA’s setup. Rijpma, too, calls for a clarification of the 
relationship between the involved military and non-military parties.23 
Concerning the EBCGA’s organisational structure, it is immediately notable 
that a further instance, the so-called Supervisory Board, is planned to be creat-
                                                                      
14  In order to see what has stayed the same, see Commission Annex to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and 
Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) 863/2007 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final 2015/0310 (COD), 15 December 2015.  
15  Those new tasks are largely in line with the FRONTEX Management Board’s recommen-
dations (2015) 3ff. 
16  S Carrera and L Hertog, A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a Name? (CEPS, 
Brussels 2016) CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe No 88, eg abstract, p 1, p 2, 
etc. 
17  See 6.2. 
18  E Guild, E Brouwer, K Groenendijk and S Carrera, What is happening to the Schengen 
borders? (CEPS, Brussels 2015) CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe No 86, 18. 
19  Commission Communication, ‘A European Border and Coast Guard and the effective 
management of Europe’s external borders’, COM(2015) 673 final, 15/12/2015, see also 
Carrera & Hertog (2016) 3, referring to the diverse members of the European Coast Guard 
Functions Forum (ecgff.eu/members). 
20  Carrera & Hertog (2016) 3. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk & Carrera (2015) 22; Carrera & Hertog (2015) eg 23ff. 
23  Rijpma (2016) 8. 
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ed. How it fits into the Agency’s organisational structure is illustrated in Figure 
10.24 
 
 
 
The Executive Director has the obligation to suspend or terminate operations in 
the course of which fundamental rights violations are being committed especial-
ly if those violations are ongoing and persistent.25 Unfortunately, the Proposal 
does not include the conditions for this assessment.26 Rijpma adds that in 
 
(…) addition that suspension or termination is also required when the conditions to 
conduct operations no longer exist is valuable if understood to include situations in which 
fundamental rights violations take place even outside the direct scope of the Agency’s 
powers (eg sub-standard reception or detention conditions).27  
 
It should also be pointed out that the Executive Director’s obligation to termi-
nate or suspend operations in the course of which fundamental rights violations 
are committed is not detailed enough and it is a major shortcoming that it does 
not include the FRO or incorporate roles for the relevant monitoring mecha-
nisms, such as the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism or the results of the vulner-
ability assessment.28  
                                                                      
24  This Figure will not be explained in detail, as this thesis does not have room for such 
lengthy explanations, but is included to give a simplified overview over the EBCGA’s 
structure. 
25  Rijpma (2016) 31. 
26  Ibid.  
27  Ibid. 
28  Rijpma (2016) pp 8, 31. 
THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN EBCGA 
 
 
127 
Theoretically, the Agency’s competence to carry out a vulnerability assess-
ment is not a new competence, as such; FRONTEX already possesses a similar 
one, enshrined in the third and fifth paragraphs of article 4 FRONTEX-Regula-
tion.29 The Agency’s supervisory role is enhanced in the Proposal,30 giving it the 
competence to ‘assess the technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources 
and contingency plans of the Member States regarding border control’ (art 12(1) 
Proposal). Unfortunately, fundamental rights have not been assigned a place in 
the vulnerability assessment.31 The fact that the vulnerability assessment takes a 
look at a State’s capacity to keep out irregular migrants without taking into ac-
count whether their fundamental rights are respected is telling. This further illus-
trates the Union’s primary focus on closing off the external borders instead of 
finding a way to deal with the migratory influx on a long-term basis. Nonethe-
less, it has been pointed out that the Proposal is insufficient insofar as that it 
does not  
 
[c]larify the relationship between the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism and the 
Vulnerability Assessment model (…) [, e]nsure that the Agency’s supervisory role does not 
prejudice working relations in the field of operational cooperation (…) [and fails to 
i]ntroduce a fundamental rights component into the Assessments.32 
 
It has been criticised that the EBCGA is once again33 not assigned border guards 
of its own but that it still has to rely on national guards, even if those are now set 
up in pools and are more easily accessible to the Agency.34 This is impractical in 
the long-run, as the Union’s standard ‘remedy’ when confronted with a migra-
tion-related ‘crisis’ is to increase the Agency’s budget.35,36 However, it frequently 
cannot take effective measures with its increased finances because it does not 
have the autonomous manpower to do so and requests to the Member States to 
supply more officers often go unanswered.37  
The EBCGA’s crisis-driven38 right to intervene without prior request from the 
home Member State is quite revolutionary, expanding the Agency’s competenc-
es considerably. However, it has to be kept in mind that the Agency cannot act 
on its own and that the cooperation of the Member State in question is still nec-
                                                                      
29  See also Carrera & Hertog (2016) 13; Ramboll Management Consulting (2015) 35. 
30  See eg Recital 13, arts 7(1)(b), 9, 12 Proposal. 
31  Rijpma (2016) 31. 
32  Ibid., 5. 
33  Of the 775 border guards it had requested in 2015, it had only been granted 447, and often 
only on a provisional basis. See FRONTEX, ‘Frontex asks for 775 border guards’, Article, 
10/02/2015, and Carrera & Hertog (2016) 12. 
34  Carrera & Hertog (2016) 12. 
35  Ibid. 
36  The all-round ‘solution’ of increasing the Agency’s budget has also been applied to the 
Proposal, see 6.2.4. 
37  Carrera & Hertog (2016) 12; see also Ramboll Management Consulting (2015) 76. 
38  Carrera & Hertog (2016) 12. 
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essary.39 The Urgent Action Provisions of article 18 of the Proposal allow the 
EBCGA under certain circumstances to initiate Operations in Member States 
which have not given their consent to this on the basis of a Commission imple-
menting act specifying the actions to be taken. The Member State cannot be 
completely circumvented. The Executive Director, who determines the exact 
actions to be taken, will also be required to swiftly transfer the Commission deci-
sion to the Member State. The Member State is required to cooperate with the 
EBCGA and will be involved in the planning and execution of the Operation in 
question.40 
Peers claims that the Union overshot its competence by incorporating this 
Urgent Action Provision, leading to the incompatibility of the proposed regula-
tion with Union law. He claims that, specifically, articles 72 TFEU and 4(3) TEU 
are infringed by this provision, as article 72 TFEU expressly states that the 
‘maintenance of law’ and the ‘safeguarding of internal security’ is an inalienable 
and uninfringeable competence of the Member States.41 He continues explain-
ing this with two concrete examples which he thinks are an expression of the 
spirit of article 72,42 and concludes that therefore, while this does not exclude 
the Union’s competence to also regulate border controls43, the Union cannot 
replace the Member States’ powers of coercion and control or oblige them to 
carry out certain operations.44 Article 4(2) TEU requires the Union to respect 
‘essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security’. This obligation 
would, according to Peers, also be infringed by the Urgent Action Provisions.45 
Nevertheless, this view is not shared by all. Carrera and Hertog argue that ar-
ticle 77(1)(d) TFEU grants the EU the competence to adopt ‘any measure neces-
sary for gradual establishment of an integrated border management system for 
external borders’.46 They think that the principle of sincere cooperation of article 
4(3) TEU is the foundation for the Union’s right to intervene.47 A complaint 
mechanism is planned to be established under article 72 of the Proposal. This is 
especially remarkable because civil society and EU institutions alike, including 
instances such as the EU Ombudsman, have lobbied for its introduction for 
                                                                      
39  See article 18(4), (6), (7) Proposal. 
40  Ibid. 
41  S Peers, The Reform of Frontex: Saving Schengen at Refugees’ Expense?, in EU Law Analy-
sis Blog, 2015, § 9 of the Section entitled ‘The new European Border and Coast Guard’. 
42  He says that the EU’s competence concerning intelligence agencies is limited in the field 
of border controls and specific powers of coercion and control for the EU police agency 
Europol and the EU prosecutors’ agency Eurojust are blocked. 
43  See also article 77 TFEU. 
44  Peers (2015), § 10 of the Section entitled ‘The new European Border and Coast Guard’. 
45  He also bemoans the political implications for the Member States’ territories to be 
breached like that, the State often having hang-ups about this stemming from the Cold 
War, the World Wars and even earlier historic instances.  
46  Carrera & Hertog (2016) 12, also referring to the European Commission’s Explanatory 
Memorandum, p 3. 
47  Ibid. 
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years. This is of such importance that it will be addressed in its own Sub-
Section.48 
Carrera and Hertog criticize that the Proposal does not address some of the 
Union’s migration and asylum policy’s most pressing shortcomings: it is especial-
ly bemoaned that a great emphasis is placed on the principle of mutual trust and 
confidence, a principle which has not yielded the wished results in other fields of 
European migration law, considering the lacking implementation of common 
European asylum standards across the Member States.49 The Proposal does not 
discuss which party should have the competence to negotiate the institutional 
setup, framework and working methods of the Supervisory Body and the FRO. 
Rijpma notes that the Proposal does not address fundamental shortcomings 
such as the issue of ‘accountability for operational activities at the external bor-
ders’, which ‘is rather likely to add to the current unclear division of responsibili-
ties’.50 He also questions the Proposal’s effectiveness and warns that one should 
not get one’s hopes up prematurely, as he considers it contradictory that Mem-
ber States are unwilling to provide the Agency with much-needed supplies and 
personnel but would consent to more binding obligations under the Proposal.51 
6.2 How is Accountability Dealt with in the Proposal? 
Rijpma submits that certain factors of the Proposal are bound to weaken the 
existing accountability mechanisms or will at least fail at improving them.52 This 
Sub-Chapter will consider these factors.  
6.2.1 New Roles of FRO, Consultative Forum and Fundamental Rights 
Strategy 
The preamble of the FRONTEX Fundamental Rights Strategy demands the ‘im-
plement[ation of] proper monitoring mechanisms based on reporting to the 
competent authorities and sanctioning, applying a zero tolerance policy’.53 It has 
become clear in the previous Chapters that such proper monitoring mechanisms 
hardly exist today. With the development of the new EBCGA Regulation, the 
possibility has arisen to remedy these shortcomings. Whether the present Pro-
posal fulfils this objective will be examined in this Section. 
The Fundamental Rights Strategy and the role of fundamental rights in gen-
eral are discussed in article 33 of the Proposal. In comparison to article 26a(1) 
FRONTEX-Regulation, article 33 of the Proposal is much more detailed. Article 
33 demands that a new Fundamental Rights Strategy be drawn up. This seems 
                                                                      
48  See 6.3.4. 
49  Ibid., 13. 
50  Rijpma (2016) 5. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Rijpma (2016) 31. 
53  FRONTEX (2011) 1. 
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like a sensible idea, as the current Strategy dates back to 2011 and may need 
revision. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the Proposal does not contain the 
Agency’s obligation to ‘put in place an effective mechanism to monitor the re-
spect for fundamental rights in all the activities of the Agency’.54 This is highly 
problematic and unadvisable, especially as this role has not been expressly ac-
corded to the FRO in article 71, neither. Moreover, it is unfortunate that article 
33(4) of the Proposal only requires the Agency to ‘take into account’ the reports 
of FRO and Consultative Forum, which does nothing to alleviate the status quo 
where FRONTEX often disregards the Forum’s advice and treats it in a way 
which may often negate the Forum’s efforts in furthering fundamental rights 
protection within the Agency.55 Still, the guarantee in article 33 that fundamen-
tal rights shall be protected during the course of the execution of the EBCG’s 
tasks is of fundamental importance, as it encompasses both national border 
guard authorities and the Agency.56 
The role of the Consultative Forum seems to remain nearly the same, the 
wording of article 70 being nearly identical with article 26a(2) FRONTEX-
Regulation. The exception is the addition of one last paragraph, providing for the 
Forum’s right to access to all information regarding the respect for fundamental 
rights. This right to information includes the possibility to visit the sites of 
EBCGA operations or rapid border interventions. Unfortunately for the Consulta-
tive Forum, this right is limited by the necessity of the host Member State’s con-
sent to the visit.  
The provisions concerning the FRO have changed insofar as that the FRO is 
no longer obliged to report to the Consultative Forum, as was the case in article 
26a(3) FRONTEX-Regulation, but now only needs to cooperate with it (art71(2) 
Proposal). The FRO’s competences have expanded not only through her role in 
the individual complaint mechanism,57 but also due to the fact that article 71(3) 
of the Proposal stipulates that she has to be ‘consulted on the operational plans 
drawn up’. It is certainly positive that she shall be consulted, but the moment in 
time when this is supposed to happen is not ideal, as article 71(3) mentions that 
consultation shall take place on the already drawn up Operational Plans, which 
may, in practice, mean that her advice will have little to no influence on the Op-
erational Plans. 
Rijpma stresses that the issues regarding accountability which now exist 
within the FRONTEX framework will be exacerbated by the introduction of this 
kind of shared responsibility of European Integrated Border Management be-
tween Member States and Union and the ‘significant reinforcement of the tasks 
of the Agency without the transfer of genuine executive powers to the Agen-
cy’.58  
                                                                      
54  Article 26a(1) FRONTEX-Regulation; see also Rijpma (2016) 31. 
55  Information gained from interviews with several members of the Consultative Forum. 
56  Rijpma (2016) 31. 
57  See 6.2.3. 
58  Rijpma (2016) 8. 
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It is dubious that the Agency’s obligation to set up a fundamental rights 
monitoring mechanism and the FRO’s obligation to report to the Consultative 
Forum have been suppressed.59 
6.2.2 Relationship with Member States and EU Institutions 
The relationship with the Member States and EU institutions is interesting to 
look at because it determines in part the degree to which the Agency is an au-
tonomous and independent actor. 
Through Vulnerability Assessment and Urgent Action provisions, the Agency 
has gained a considerable amount of additional independence from, and even 
control over the Member States. Although much still depends on the Member 
States’ approval and cooperation, the Agency’s powers to initiate certain actions 
have grown.60 
The role of the Commission will be more pronounced than it is now. The 
EBCGA’s duty to cooperate with it is not only set out in article 51(1) but all over 
the Proposal.61 The Proposal supplies that in situations requiring urgent action, 
the Commission plays a central role and is instrumental in obliging a Member 
State to cooperate.62 The Commission will also be required to give its approval 
before the Agency can cooperate with the competent authorities of third coun-
tries.63 It coordinates the actions of Migration Management Support Teams, the 
EBCGA only having an assisting role.64 Risk analyses shall be submitted to Coun-
cil and Commission (art 10 Proposal).65 The Agency will also be obliged to submit 
its research results and reports to the Commission.66 In the area of research and 
innovation, empowerment by the Commission will often be required before the 
EBCGA can take action.67 Where shortcomings in the supply of technical equip-
ment are identified, the Management Board will be required to inform the 
Commission, which will then assess the situation and inform the European Par-
liament and the Council.68 Every three years, the Commission will evaluate im-
pact, effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s work and shall inform, 
amongst others, the EP and the Council on the outcome of the evaluation.69  
The Agency will have the obligation to inform the European Parliament 
about a number of decisions.70 It will be supplied with the consolidated annual 
                                                                      
59  Ibid. 
60  Articles 14(4), 18, 67(3)(g) Proposal. 
61  See eg article 7(1)(o), 17(4), 26(3), 51(3) Proposal.  
62  Articles 12(6), 18 Proposal. 
63  Article 52(2) Proposal. 
64  Article 17(4) Proposal. 
65  Article 10 Proposal. 
66  Article 36(1) Proposal. 
67  Article 36 Proposal. 
68  Article 38(6) Proposal. 
69  Article 80 Proposal. 
70  It needs to inform the European Parliament about the number of border guards that each 
Member State has sent to participate in the EBCG Teams (art 19(9) Proposal) as well as of 
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activity report of the Agency71 and, together with Council and Commission, with 
its multiannual programming and work programme.72 It will be consulted on the 
multiannual programming.73 Both the EP and the Council can invite the Execu-
tive Director to report to them on his activities, especially concerning the Fun-
damental Rights Strategy, the work programme for the following year and the 
multiannual programming.74 The Council is the Agency’s budgetary authority.75  
All three institutions have significant roles in the retrospective budgetary 
and financial oversight over the Agency.76 The importance of the Agency’s au-
tonomy is stressed at several instances in the Proposal. Recital 32 reads:  
 
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency should be independent as regards 
operational and technical matters and have legal, administrative and financial autonomy. 
To that end, it is necessary and appropriate that it should be a Union body having legal 
personality and exercising the implementing powers, which are conferred upon it by this 
Regulation. 
 
Its independence is guaranteed through an autonomous budget.77 In the Explan-
atory Memorandum to the Proposal, the Commission explains that the EU sub-
sidy for FRONTEX in 2016 is 238 686 000€ and that, for the EBCGA to function 
properly, the subsidy needs to be raised by at least 31 500 000€ in 2017 and that 
until 2020, an additional 602 personnel should be hired and the budget again 
modified adequately.78, 79 Article 55(3) stipulates that the EBCGA will also be 
operationally and technically independent.  
The EBCGA is laid out to be dependent on the three EU institutions in a 
number of ways. The most influential role is held by the Commission, while the 
EP mostly holds the right to be informed and consulted and the Council’s influ-
ence is largest concerning the budget. Still, the Agency is laid out to be inde-
pendent operationally and regarding technical matters as well as legally, admin-
                                                                      
the number of technical equipment they supplied (art 38(7) Proposal). It is also supposed 
to inform the EU Parliament about the working arrangements it will conclude with other 
international organisations or Union bodies (art 51(2) Proposal). The same goes for WAs 
with the competent authorities of third countries as well as cooperation agreements it 
will help to arrange between Member States and third countries (article 53(9) Proposal). 
The EP shall also be informed about liaison officers stationed in third countries (art 54(4) 
Proposal). 
71  Article 61(1)(d) Proposal. 
72  Articles 61(1)(e), 63(1) Proposal. 
73  Article 63(1) Proposal. 
74  Article 67(2) Proposal. 
75  Article 75(7) Proposal. 
76  See articles 75, 76 Proposal. 
77  Recital 34 Proposal. 
78  COM(2015) 671 final, 8. 
79  Those indicators for autonomy are mostly not reiterated in the articles of the Proposal. 
This might diminish their significance slightly. 
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istratively and financially autonomous. How this will be balanced out in practice 
is difficult to predict. 
The responsibility for the implementation of the European integrated border 
management shall, according to article 5(1) of the Proposal, be shared80 be-
tween the EBCGA and the national authorities responsible for border manage-
ment. This will serve to ‘exacerbate the existing conundrum as regards shared 
accountability’, says Rijpma, because there has been no matching transfer of 
‘genuine executive powers’.81 Coordinating Officers are again expected to partic-
ipate in every JO as a link between Agency and Member States, reporting back 
to the Executive Director and communicating the EBCGA’s views to the Member 
States.82 
6.2.3 Individual Complaint Mechanism 
An individual complaint mechanism is provided for in article 72 of the EBCGA 
Proposal.83 As has been mentioned before, civil society and EU institutions alike 
                                                                      
80  Also in recitals 5, 8, 12 Proposal. See Recital 5: European integrated border management is 
a shared responsibility of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the national au-
thorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they 
carry out border control tasks. While Member States retain the primary responsibility for the 
management of their section of the external borders in their interest and in the interest of all 
Member States which have abolished internal border control, the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency should ensure the application of Union measures relating to the man-
agement of the external borders by reinforcing, assessing and coordinating the actions of 
Member States which implement those measures. 
81  Rijpma (2016) 29, who adds that such a transfer of executive powers would lead to prob-
lems from a constitutional point of view. 
82  Articles 20(3), 21 EBCGA Proposal. 
83  Article 72 EBCGA Proposal: Complaint Mechanism: 1. The Agency, in cooperation with the 
Fundamental Rights Officer, shall take the necessary measures to set up a complaint 
mechanism in accordance with this Article to monitor and ensure the respect for fundamen-
tal rights in all the activities of the Agency. 2. Any person who is directly affected by the ac-
tions of staff involved in a joint operation, pilot project, rapid border intervention, return op-
eration or return intervention, and who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a 
breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions, or any third parties intervening 
on behalf of such a person, may submit a complaint, in writing, to the Agency. 3. Only sub-
stantiated complaints involving concrete fundamental rights violations shall be admissible. 
Complaints which are anonymous, malicious, frivolous, vexatious, hypothetical or inaccurate 
shall be excluded from the complaint mechanism. 4. The Fundamental Rights Officer shall be 
responsible for handling complaints received by the Agency in accordance with the right to 
good administration. For this purpose, the Fundamental Rights Officer shall review the ad-
missibility of a complaint, register admissible complaints, forward all registered complaints 
to the Executive Director, forward complaints concerning border guards to the home Member 
State and register the follow-up by the Agency or that Member State. 5. In case of a regis-
tered complaint concerning a staff member of the Agency, the Executive Director shall en-
sure appropriate follow-up, including disciplinary measures as necessary. The Executive Di-
rector shall report back to the Fundamental Rights Officer as to the findings and follow-up 
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have lobbied for its introduction for years. However, the Management Board and 
Executive Director of FRONTEX found that under FRONTEX’ current framework, 
it would not be possible to introduce such a mechanism.84 They reasoned that 
under its current mandate, FRONTEX did not have the ‘executive powers to in-
vestigate’ complaints and that it was the host Member State who has the re-
sponsibility to investigate.85 FRONTEX had earlier argued that the executive 
powers to investigate were only held by national and EU courts.86 
Recital 30 declares it to be an ‘administrative mechanism whereby the Fun-
damental Rights Officer should be responsible for handling complaints received 
by the Agency in accordance with the right to good administration’. The FRO is 
expected to play a central role in this mechanism, her tasks including the ‘review 
the admissibility of a complaint, register[ing] admissible complaints, forward 
[ing] all registered complaints to the Executive Director, forward[ing] complaints 
                                                                      
given by the Agency to a complaint. 6. In case of a registered complaint concerning a border 
guard of a host Member State or a member of the teams, including seconded members of the 
teams or seconded national experts, the home Member State shall ensure appropriate fol-
low-up, including disciplinary measures as necessary or other measures in accordance with 
national law. The relevant Member State shall report back to the Fundamental Rights Offi-
cer as to the findings and follow-up to a complaint. 7. The Fundamental Rights Officer shall 
report to the Executive Director and to the Management Board as to the findings and follow-
up given to complaints by the Agency and the Member States. 8. In accordance with the 
right to good administration, if a complaint is admissible, complainants shall be informed 
that a complaint has been registered, that an assessment has been initiated and that a re-
sponse may be expected as soon as it becomes available. If a complaint is not admissible, 
complainants shall be informed of the reasons and provided with further options for address-
ing their concerns. 9. The Fundamental Rights Officer shall, after consulting the Consultative 
Forum, draw up a standardized complaint form requiring detailed and specific information 
concerning the alleged breach of fundamental rights. The Fundamental Rights Officer shall 
submit that form to the Executive Director and to the Management Board. 
The Agency shall ensure that the standardized complaint form is available in most common 
languages and that it shall be made available on the Agency’s website and in hardcopy dur-
ing all activities of the Agency. Complaints shall be considered by the Fundamental Rights 
Officer even when they are not submitted in the standardized complaint form. 10. Any per-
sonal data contained in a complaint shall be handled and processed by the Agency and the 
Fundamental Rights Officer in accordance with Regulation (EC) 45/2001 and by Member 
States in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA. The submission of the complaint is understood as the complainant consenting 
to the processing of his or her personal data in the meaning of point (d) of Article 5 of Regula-
tion (EC) 45/2001 by the Agency and the Fundamental Rights Officer. In order to safeguard 
the interest of the complainants, complaints shall be dealt with confidentially unless the 
complainant waives his or her right to confidentiality. For complainants who waive their 
right to confidentiality, it is understood that he or she consents to the Fundamental Rights 
Officer or the Agency disclosing his or her identity in relation to the matter under complaint. 
(Emphases added). 
84  Consultative Forum (2015-1) 5. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Consultative Forum (2014) 43. 
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concerning border guards to the home Member State and register[ing] the fol-
low-up by the Agency or that Member State’ (see also art 72(4)). It is planned 
that possible criminal prosecutions will be conducted by the home Member 
State of the accused guards. Access to the mechanism shall be granted to every 
person directly affected by the actions EBCG groups are involved in who submits 
that his or her fundamental rights were violated in the course of – and due to 
said action or to third parties acting on behalf of such persons (art 72(2), (3)). The 
complaint is to be submitted in writing, by filling out a detailed form which is 
supposed to be available in the ‘most common languages’ (arts 72(2), (9). It is not 
specified which languages those are. This may turn out to be problematic, as it 
cannot reasonably be expected that all persons coming in contact with the 
EBCGA speak a passable English, French, Spanish or Arabic, for instance. In addi-
tion, it is problematic that the provisions on the complaint mechanism do not 
contain rules on format, content and deadlines.87 
The mechanism is meant to distinguish between complaints brought against 
border guards supplied by Member States and EBCGA personnel. If a national 
border guard is alleged to have violated fundamental rights, it is his or her home 
Member State, and if EBCGA staff is concerned, it is the Executive Director who 
‘shall ensure appropriate follow-up’ (arts 72(5), (6)). Both the Executive Director 
and the home Member State are then supposed to report their findings back to 
the FRO. However, nothing is said about the content of the possible disciplinary 
measures, about what might be considered ‘appropriate follow-up’ or the proce-
dure involved in ‘following-up’ the accusations against EBCGA staff. Article 72(8) 
of the Proposal refers to the right to good administration when saying that com-
plainants shall be informed, either of the inadmissibility of their complaint or of 
its registration. The paragraph also says that in the second case, the complainant 
shall be informed that he may expect a response soon. However, nothing is said 
about actual remedies. It is stressed that an administrative mechanism should be 
installed.88 In fact, the Legislative Financial Statement attached to the Proposal 
emphasizes that the ‘complaint mechanism is an administrative mechanism 
since the Agency cannot itself investigate allegations of violations of fundamen-
tal rights by members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams.’89 It is 
thus questionable whether the right to an effective remedy is effectively safe-
guarded.  
Another difficulty which needs to be taken into account is the overworked 
and understaffed status of the FRO.90 Although she may be in a perfect position 
to deal with individual complaints,91 in her current situation, she is ill-equipped 
to deal with the considerable influx in workload to be expected from her role in 
                                                                      
87  Rijpma (2016) 8. 
88  Recital 30, articles 72(4), (8) Proposal.  
89  COM(2015) 671 final, 84. 
90  Consultative Forum (2016) 36f, n641. 
91  See eg Consultative Forum (2014) 14. 
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the complaint mechanism as planned in the Proposal. This has already been 
pointed out by the Consultative Forum.92 
The individual complaint mechanism is an administrative one even though, 
under article 47 ECFR, individuals have the right to effective judicial redress.93 
This means that the individual complaint mechanism proposed by the Commis-
sion is insufficient and cannot alleviate the concerns expressed by civil society 
and Union instances alike, especially the European Ombudsman. Legal experts 
further criticise that the complaint mechanism is not only not judicial94 in nature, 
but also not independent from the Agency.95 Furthermore, it remains unclear 
which powers the FRO has in case of insufficient reporting on the follow-ups and 
deadlines for said reporting are not provided.96 
Rijpma criticises that the Commission’s estimation that the mere existence 
of an individual complaint mechanism renders the EBCGA’s actions fundamental 
rights-compliant is inaccurate.97 
6.3 Extraterritorial Applicability of Union Law & Extraterritorial Third-
Country Cooperation 
The determination of the applicability of EU law to the Agency’s extraterritorial 
actions has the same fundamental importance here as it had in Sub-Chapters 3.2 
and 3.3, dealing with the same issue concerning FRONTEX. It is important to 
prove its applicability so that Union standards of accountability can be applied to 
those tasks carried out extraterritorially, as well.  
The new Proposal lays down in the third paragraph of article 82 that ‘[t]his 
Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member 
States in accordance with the Treaties.’ It should be noted that it only explicitly 
mentions the Member States and that no mention of extraterritoriality is made. 
This does not exclude the reasoning for the extraterritorial application of EU law 
explained in Chapter IV from being applicable in this case as well. In fact, article 
53(1) of the Proposal requires Member States and Agency to ‘comply with norms 
and standards at least equivalent to those set by Union legislation’. This means 
that they have to apply Union law or standards which are even more demanding.  
The general framework for cooperation with third countries will be examined 
in Section 6.3.1, before exploring the Agency’s role in the increase of return co-
operation (6.3.2). 
                                                                      
92  Consultative Forum (2016) 36f. 
93  See Rijpma (2016) 30. 
94  Also, according to Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk and Carrera (2015) 21, the mechanism 
was originally proposed to be ‘without prejudice to judicial remedies‘, the same provision 
cannot be found in the Proposal of December 2015, not even in spirit.  
95  Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk, Carrera (2015) 21. 
96  See also Rijpma (2016) 30. 
97  Rijpma (2016) 8. 
THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN EBCGA 
 
 
137 
6.3.1 Operational Third-Country Cooperation 
It is highly problematic that, while article 53(1) of the Proposal requires the 
EBCGA and the Member States to ‘comply with norms and standards at least 
equivalent to those set by Union legislation’ when cooperating with third coun-
tries (even when on foreign territory), it is not required that those third countries 
adhere to similar standards. The fact that this cooperation may take place on the 
territory of the third country raises questions of responsibility, as it is not clear if 
a third country can be held to adhere to Operational Plans, nor is it specified how 
those plans are drawn up (eg what the third country’s role is in the development) 
and what their status is under international law.98 
Even more dangerous seems the fact that the provision allowing liaison of-
ficers to be stationed only in countries with ‘minimum human rights standards’99 
has been suppressed in article 54 of the Proposal. Rijpma demands that coopera-
tion be allowed only with those third countries which are party to the ECHR, the 
GRC and its Additional Protocol and that the provision concerning the Liaison 
Officers be reintroduced.100 
6.3.2 Returns 
The extraterritorial dimension of the EBCGA Proposal can be seen in the way it 
regulates return cooperation. Return cooperation101 logically has an extraterrito-
rial aspect, as, in order to remove irregularly staying third-country nationals, it is 
necessary for those agents assisting in return to leave Union territory. 
While return cooperation is one of FRONTEX’ tasks under the current legisla-
tion, its competences in the area are planned to be extended significantly under 
the EBCGA Regulation.102 This is in line with recommendations made by the 
FRONTEX Management Board after the external evaluation in 2015.103 In re-
sponse to demands by the Council,104 the Proposal stipulates the inclusion of the 
EBCGA’s right to organise joint return operations on its own initiative as well as 
to promote the acquisition of travel documents for irregular migrants about to 
be returned. 
Articles 26 – 32 of the Proposal deal with Return Operations and Interven-
tions in a detailed manner. A lot of concepts unknown to the FRONTEX-Regula-
tion are introduced, such as Return Office,105 European Return Intervention 
                                                                      
98  Rijpma (2016) 23. 
99  Article 14(3) FRONTEX-Regulation, see 3.2.2.  
100  Rijpma (2016) 7ff. 
101  See Rijpma (2016) 22ff for an extensive analysis of the provisions on return cooperation. 
102  See Section 4 of the Proposal. 
103  FRONTEX Management Board (2015) 3.  
104  Commission, ‘European Council meeting (15 October 2015) – Conclusions’ (Press Release) 
EUCO 26/15, 15/10/2015, p 4ff. 
105  Recital 20 and article 26 Proposal. 
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Teams,106 return intervention,107 mixed return operations,108 return special-
ists,109 return experts,110 forced return monitors111 and (third-country)112 forced 
return escorts113.  
In article 31(4) of the Proposal, the extraterritorial dimension of the EBCGA’s 
return interventions become clear: according to this provision, it is possibly to 
deploy staff to third countries as well as to cooperate with them on an opera-
tional basis. The focus on returns has been reinforced in such a way that the 
planned EBCGA has even been called an ‘EU returns agency’.114 
Within articles 26 to 32, reference is made at several instances either to the 
Return Directive115 as a whole or to certain of its provisions. As a result, the Re-
turn Directive is applicable to the return operations and interventions of the 
EBCGA. More importantly, the guarantees contained in this regulation become 
applicable and bind both national and EBCGA staff. This includes not only provi-
sions such as article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC on the best interest of the child, 
family reunification, state of health and non-refoulement. The Agency will not 
only claim the right to propose the coordination and organisation of return oper-
ations and interventions and even to draw up the Operational Plans116 but also 
be competent to initiate Return Operations without the Member State’s input in 
situations requiring urgent action117 Thus, it seems important and necessary for 
it to also respect procedural guarantees such as the right to an effective remedy, 
enshrined in article 13 Return Directive. Important steps have already been tak-
en, such as the repeated guarantee to respect fundamental rights and the provi-
sion saying that return operations from one third country into another may only 
be executed if said third country is party to the ECHR (art27(4)). However, no 
reference is made to any procedural guarantees. It may be argued that the 
Member States in which the ‘returnees’ are irregularly present are responsible 
                                                                      
106  Recital 22 and article 31 Proposal. 
107  Return Operation involving European Return Intervention Teams, see article 2(14) Pro-
posal for the full definition. See also recital 21 and article 32 Proposal.  
108  Article 27(4) Proposal. 
109  Recital 22 and article 30 Proposal. 
110  Recital 22 Proposal. Return experts are only mentioned this once. It is not entirely clear 
whether Return Specialists and Return Experts are two different categories of EBCG Staff 
or whether they are two different names for one and the same position. Rijpma (2016) 
distinguishes between them on pp 7 and 20 without explaining the difference, but no fur-
ther evidence is found on the existence of return experts or on what their exact role is 
supposed to be. 
111  Recital 22 and articles 27(4), (5), 28 Proposal. 
112  Article 27(4) Proposal. 
113  Recital 22 and article 29 Proposal. 
114  Carrera & Hertog (2016) 4. 
115  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally stay-
ing third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98. 
116  Article 27 Proposal. 
117  Article 18(2)(e) Proposal. 
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for providing effective remedies, but the Agency would gain such extensive 
rights and competences through the proposed regulation and even partly limit 
the Member State’s role in the initiation of such operations that a proportionate 
expansion of procedural obligations is appropriate. 
It has been especially criticised that the tasks, powers and responsibilities of 
the agents carrying out the return operations and interventions have been insuf-
ficiently detailed, and that the legal regime on board of aircrafts should be laid 
out clearly.118 The role of the FRO is characterised as insufficient and reporting 
duties in the context of return cooperation as lacking.119 Furthermore, it is point-
ed out that from the wording of article 27(4) it is not clear that both third coun-
tries involved in a mixed return operation should be party to the ECHR and also 
that both these countries should comply with EU fundamental rights stand-
ards.120  
6.4 Conclusion 6 
The purpose of this Chapter was to determine whether the Commission Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the European 
Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, Regulation 
(EC) 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC alleviated or exacerbated cur-
rent accountability concerns. The answer to this question is equivocal. 
Framework-wise, the EBCGA still resembles FRONTEX, but it has been reno-
vated through the introduction of new competences and capacities and through 
the integration of a military factor in its set-up, the consequences of which are 
not entirely foreseeable yet. The conferral of farther-reaching competences for 
the tasks which have stayed the same for FRONTEX and EBCGA as well as the 
addition of new tasks and powers, such as its new role in returns operations and 
interventions, consequently offer the EBCGA more opportunities and make it 
easier to violate fundamental rights. This goes a long way to illustrate the neces-
sity of installing a complementary accountability framework the Agency needs 
to be bound by every step of the way. Existing mechanisms which support ac-
countability have changed. Some, unfortunately, have been deleted completely 
from the Proposal and for others, such as the FRO, insufficient support is offered 
in order to make it possible for them to properly exercise their functions. 
Concerning the obligation of transparency and of submitting to the scrutiny 
of a specific independent forum, no convincing positive changes were proposed. 
While the EBCGA Proposal provides for even less transparency than the 
FRONTEX-Regulation, the new Agency would be more easily held responsible 
compared to FRONTEX’ current framework, as it seems to have farther-reaching 
obligations to report to the institutions than before. The Commission and Mem-
ber States still exercise political and policy oversight through their representa-
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tives on the Management Board.121 This is of advantage with regards to the iden-
tification of an appropriate accountability forum, but it has to be noted that still, 
the EBCGA’s obligations to report remain rather vague and it is again not explic-
itly taken into consideration that Agency staff is susceptible to commit breaches 
of EU law, too.  
Concerning the EBCGA’s responsibility for breaches of EU law, some chang-
es are announced in the Proposal. Article 5(1) of the Proposal foresees that the 
responsibility for the implementation of the European integrated border man-
agement will be shared between the EBCGA and the national authorities respon-
sible for border management. Rijpma predicts that, as no ‘genuine executive 
powers’ are anticipated to be transferred, the issues as regards shared accounta-
bility will be worsened. While it is stressed both in the recitals and in article 5 that 
responsibility is supposed to be shared and while article 5 elaborates shortly on 
how this should be done, these provisions still remain too unclear. Regarding the 
Agency’s control over its activities, no major changes seem to be incorporated in 
the Proposal. The same can be said about the foreseeability of potential breach-
es of EU law for the Agency, as the role of the Coordinating Officer seems to be 
extended in the Proposal, situating the Officer in an even better position to ob-
serve the compliance with EU law of the involved parties’ behaviour. 
In conclusion, while some interesting and positive attempts to further the 
Agency’s accountability have been included in the Proposal, it has to be deter-
mined that overall, too little has been done and that, if anything is going to 
change at all with regards to the Agency’s accountability, it might even be for 
the worse. Those attempts at alleviating pre-existing issues resemble, after clos-
er inspections, attempts to placate critics more than genuine solutions.  
An important factor of the discussion about FRONTEX’ and the EBCGA’s ac-
countability is the idea of an individual complaint mechanism, a topic of much 
controversy during the last half-decade or so. While, at first glance, the introduc-
tion of the individual complaint mechanism might be seen as a success and 
strengthening the Agency’s framework for accountability, its many shortcom-
ings mark it clearly as a placebo.  
The proposed Regulation does not explicitly state that EU law is applicable 
to the EBCGA’s extraterritorial actions, but a non-restrictive interpretation of 
article 53(1) of the Proposal provides a compelling argument for the Agency’s 
obligation to adhere to Union law while outside EU territory. 
All in all, the Proposal does not live up to the hype existing around it. Neither 
does it live up to the expectations resting upon it fundamental rights protection-
wise. The Proposal for the EBCGA Regulation does not provide for new account-
ability mechanisms except for the long-awaited individual complaint mecha-
nism, which, at a closer look, resembles a placebo more closely than a real sys-
tem to ensure access to justice and the right to an effective remedy. The Com-
mission seems to have contented itself with including mechanisms which are not 
truly effective but rather meant to be placating those advocating for a better 
fundamental rights protection. 
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The issues identified in this thesis can be resolved. Especially now, as the in-
troduction of the EBCGA Regulation is pending, it is possible to remedy all the 
shortcomings. However, the current proposal is insufficient, especially with re-
gards to the individual complaint mechanism, which is nothing but a placebo. 
Unfortunately, the Commission’s Proposal has already progressed rather far in 
the legislative procedure and the chances for introducing any major changes at 
this point are rather slim. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1 
Interview with S Keßler, Vice-Chair of the Consultative Forum, 01/06/2016 
 
Questions 
 
1.1 - The Consultative Forum (CF) has been operational for three years - how do you 
evaluate the effectiveness and the factual influence of the CF’s advice on 
FRONTEX’ actions? 
According to the Frontex Regulation (Article 26a(2), first subparagraph) the key 
role of the Consultative Forum is ‘…to assist the Executive Director and the Man-
agement Board in fundamental rights matters’. 
Core areas, on which the Consultative Forum has to be consulted, are ‘the 
further development and implementation of the Fundamental Rights Strategy, 
Code of Conduct and common core curricula’ (Article 26a(2), second subpara-
graph). 
The Working Methods of the Consultative Forum specify that the Consulta-
tive Forum ‘is a knowledge and expertise resource to enable Frontex and its 
Management Board to gain information and advice relevant to the aim of devel-
oping and promoting the respect of Fundamental Rights in all Frontex activities’. 
The Consultative Forum ‘offers strategic opinions, recommendations and a pool 
of information on how Frontex can structurally improve the respect and promo-
tion of fundamental rights in its various activities’. 
Implementing these provisions, the Consultative Forum has over the past years 
provided Frontex with, inter alia,  
- Expert review of key documents, e.g., Frontex Plan of Work, training curric-
ula, VEGA Children Handbook; Input to the drafting process of the Code of 
Conduct for Joint Return Operations; 
- Human rights related information for the use of the Risk Analysis Unit; 
- Recommendations based on observations during field visits to joint opera-
tions; 
- Participation of Consultative Forum members in the joint operation VEGA 
Children; 
- Human rights related training to border guards in Frontex-coordinated 
seminars; 
- Ongoing communication on fundamental rights matters through formal and 
informalmeetings, communication with the office of the Fundamental 
Rights Officer, with theExecutive Director, with the Management Board and 
with several Frontex staff. 
 
Frontex may invite the Consultative Forum to visit a joint operation as observer, 
and the Consultative Forum has actively asked to be invited to send members on 
occasional visits to Frontex coordinated operations. The aim is not to monitor, 
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but to be in a position to issue recommendations on joint land or sea border op-
erations that are based on observations of how things work in practice and not 
only on the examination of rules, instructions and reports that are on paper. 
However, the visits do not only have to be arranged with Frontex, but the ap-
proval of the member states concerned with that activity is required as well as 
the agreement of the member state that hosts the operation. This means that 
Consultative Forum members can visit joint operations, but not by unilateral 
decision, randomly or at short notice. Nor is there a right to such visits. 
Additionally, the access of the Consultative Forum to certain sets of Frontex 
documents must be improved if the Forum is expected to produce more mean-
ingful recommendations. 
More time is needed for the consultation processes (including the prepara-
tion of expert meetings) as the timelines should allow for the consultation of 
relevant experts within the organisations and institutions that are represented 
on the Consultative Forum. 
The Consultative Forum members carry out their work (analyses, drafting of 
reports or contributions, consultations with other Forum members, exchange 
and engagement with other stakeholders, etc.) within their regular working time 
and with their organisations’ resources; it must therefore be reconciled with their 
other duties. This limits the time and means members can devote to the Consul-
tative Forum. 
 
1.2 - In the operational process, does consultation take place before actions are 
taken by FRONTEX? 
The Consultative Forum is not regularly consulted by Frontex before starting a 
joint operation. 
 
1.3 - In your estimation, with which frequency is the CF’s advice adhered with? 
This very much depends on the issue at hand. 
 
2.1 - What form does the monitoring system promised in the Fundamental Rights 
strategy take?[1] How do you evaluate its effectiveness? 
With regard to the implementation of the Fundamental Rights Strategy, the 
Fundamental Rights Officer has a clear monitoring role that covers all Frontex-
coordinated joint operations and activities. She receives all incident reports and 
has unfettered access to documents and officials. She can also observe Frontex-
coordinated joint operations in situ and participate in internal Frontex briefings, 
debriefings and discussions. The Consultative Forum and the Management 
Board are regularly provided with reports on incidents and her follow-up activi-
ties. 
                                                                      
[1] The Strategy Paper’s preamble reads: ‘implementing proper monitoring mechanisms 
based on reporting to the competent authorities and sanctioning, applying a zero toler-
ance policy’. 
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On the other hand, the Fundamental Rights Officer is considerably under-
staffed. The Consultative Forum has, therefore, repeatedly called on Frontex to 
allocate more resources to the Fundamental Rights Officer. 
In addition, the Fundamental Rights Officer is currently developing a moni-
toring system that would go beyond her current observation activities. However, 
this work is very much depending on what will be the new provisions of the pro-
posed European Border & Coast Guard Agency Regulation. 
 
2.2 - Is the forced return monitoring system mentioned in article 9(1)(b) Reg 2007/ 
2004 the same monitoring system as the fundamental rights monitoring system 
referred to in article 26a(1)? If not, where are the differences? (e.g. who does the 
monitoring, procedure etc)? 
Article 9(1b) Frontex Regulation refers to article 8(6) Return Directive. According 
to the latter, responsibility for setting up a forced return monitoring mechanism 
lies with the respective member state. Frontex has not established an ‘own’ 
monitoring mechanism. On the other hand, the Fundamental Rights Monitoring 
System is a tool to be developed and established by Frontex itself. 
 
3 - How does FRONTEX deal with allegations of FR violations in practice? Is there a 
set of rules? How do investigations proceed? (How) is the Consultative Forum in-
volved? 
As already stated in the answer to question 2.1, currently the Fundamental 
Rights Officer receives all incident reports. She can also observe Frontex-coordi-
nated joint operations in situ and participate in internal Frontex briefings, de-
briefings and discussions. The Consultative Forum and the Management Board 
are regularly provided with reports on incidents and her follow-up activities. 
The Consultative Forum has, however, strongly supported the recommenda-
tion of, inter alia, the European Ombudsman that Frontex should establish a 
more formal individual complaints mechanism. The proposed EBCGA regulation 
contains a provision that would oblige the Agency to do so. We are currently 
waiting for the results of the law-making process. 
 
4 - When describing its cooperation with third countries, FRONTEX frequently uses 
policy terms which do not help to clarify what is effectively done in the context of 
this cooperation. What is it that FRONTEX does in practice when acting outside EU 
territory? 
The Consultative Forum has yet to look more in detail at the Frontex cooperation 
with third countries. Because of our limited capacities, it was not possible to do 
an in-depth analysis. However, our information so far is that cooperation focuses 
on exchange of information, including ‘risk-analysis’, and capacity building, in-
cluding training of border guards and other law-enforcement officers. 
 
5 - When reading amended Regulation 2007/2004, the impression is won that while 
the EU member states have a definite influence on the actions of the Agency, 
FRONTEX still has a considerable margin of manoeuvre. Would you say that this 
holds true in practice? How free is the Agency to act on its own initiative or how 
absolute is member states’ and EU institutions’ influence on it? 
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Frontex operates in a wider EU context. Its mandate and responsibilities are 
increasingly difficult to discern from those of the individual member states, as 
they are strongly interlinked. For instance, the intelligence provided by the Risk 
Analysis Unit and the financial support from the Agency’s budget have become 
essential for effective border control operations. member states still remain 
responsible for the actual conduct of border controls though. 
 
6 - FRONTEX claims to be the primary actor of SAR missions.[2] Considering this 
statement and also in the light of FRONTEX’ fundamental rights obligations, how 
can Fabrice Leggeri’s statement that SAR is not FRONTEX’ mandate and not in the 
mandate of the European Union[3] be understood? 
These statements are indeed contradicting each other. In the view of the Consul-
tative Forum it is a clear obligation of Frontex to ensure that in the context of 
joint border operations SAR missions are conducted whenever the need arises. 
 
7.1 - What is your position on the apparent legalisation of push-backs in the Sea 
Borders Regulation 656/2014?[4] 
7.2 - In your professional opinion, are fundamental rights and principles such as the 
right to asylum, the right to an effective remedy, the prohibition of non-refoulement 
and of collective expulsion etc. respected by this regulation as promised in article 4? 
7.3 - Considering the prohibition of refoulement, the right to asylum and the right to 
an effective remedy as well as the provisions of the asylum procedures directive, 
(how) can coast guards be competent to assess a claim for asylum on the spot? 
I will reply to these questions together because they are interlinked. 
With the ‘apparent legalization of push-backs’ you probably refer to article 
7(2)(c) Maritime Borders Surveillance Regulation (MBSR). However, there are 
some restrictions: 
-  If the vessel in question does not fly a flag of a member state and cannot be 
assumed to have the nationality of a member state the interception requires 
the prior authorization of the flag state. 
-  If the vessel is assumed to be ‘stateless’ all measures depend on a decision by 
the member state that hosts the operation. 
 
Especially in the second case, the guarantees laid down in article 4 apply. Conse-
quently, if a person on an apprehended vessel claims to be in need of protection, 
a ‘push back’ is not allowed (this also derives from the Hirsi judgment of the Eu-
ropean Court on Human Rights). 
                                                                      
[2]  See FRONTEX website: See FRONTEX website: http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/ 
types-of-operations/sea/. 
[3]  ‘Triton cannot be a search-and-rescue operation. I mean, in our operational plan, we can-
not have provisions for proactive search-and-rescue action. This is not in Frontex’s man-
date, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European Union’,  see 
Guardian article http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/22/eu-borders-chief-says-
saving-migrants-lives-cannot-be-priority-for-patrols. 
[4]  See e.g. articles 6, 7 and 8 of said Regulation. 
ANNEXES 
 
 
169 
Since a border guard official is not able to assess a protection claim on the 
spot, in my view the MBSR clearly provides for the persons on an intercepted 
vessel to be disembarked on the territory of a member state and be provided 
with access to proper asylum procedures. 
 
8.1 - Do you think the individual complaint mechanism introduced in the proposed 
Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard sufficiently alleviates con-
cerns addressing FRONTEX’ accountability brought forward in the past by different 
sources, be it civil society, the EU Ombudsman or others – especially considering 
that it is supposed to be only administrative and without positive consequences for 
the claimant? 
Even after the establishment of an individual complaints mechanism Frontex 
could impose disciplinary measures only on their own staff. With regard to hu-
man rights violations committed by staff of the member states, Frontex would 
have to leave the appropriate decisions to the respective member states. 
The efficiency of the mechanism would, therefore, depend firstly on the 
means (most notably: staff) allocated to it. In addition, it would need a clear 
commitment by Frontex that in any case where there is a report on a human 
rights violation 
- the Agency will immediately and by itself conduct the proper investigation 
or officially communicate the incident report to the authorities of the respec-
tive member state and request that immediately an investigation is carried 
out, 
- verify that appropriate disciplinary or criminal actions and sanctions are 
taken, 
- suspend or terminate a joint operation if an investigation is not carried out 
because of a member state’s refusal and/or no appropriate actions are taken 
against the perpetrator(s) of a human violation or if human rights violations 
persist to occur 
- bar the future participation of the national staff of a member state who has 
been responsible for the human rights violation in any operation. 
 
8.2 - Article 70 of the EBCGA proposal concerns the Consultative Forum. It is nearly 
identical to the relevant paragraphs in article 26a of the FRONTEX-Regulation, 
except for the addition of the following paragraph:  
 
‘The Consultative Forum shall have access to all information concerning the respect for 
fundamental rights, including by carrying out on spot visits to joint operations or rapid 
border interventions subject to the agreement of the host member state.’  
 
In your opinion, has your (the CF's) influence expanded? Will you be able to work 
more effectively? 
The EBCGA regulation has not been adopted yet. It is, therefore, too early for 
assessing the impact of the new provisions on the work and possibilities of the 
Consultative Forum. 
However, the sentence which you quote does not add anything really new: 
Article 26a(4) Frontex Regulation already provides for the Fundamental Rights 
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Officer and the Consultative Forum to have ‘access to all information concerning 
respect for fundamental rights, in relation to all the activities of the Agency’, and 
as described in the answer to question 1.1 
Frontex may already invite the Consultative Forum to visit a joint operation 
as observer, and the Consultative Forum has actively asked to be invited to send 
members on occasional visits to Frontex coordinated operations. 
 
1 June 2016, Stefan Keßler 
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Annex 2 
Map of EU agency headquarters, European Union 2016, accessible under 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm#goto_2 -> Agencies and 
other EU bodies -> Map  
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Annex 3 
Examples of blacked out information in FRONTEX OP for EPN Poseidon Sea 2015 
and its Annex 
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Annex 4 
Arrivals in Greece, Italy and Spain in 2015, Openmigration.org 2016, available at 
https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/a-political-laboratory-how-spain-closed-
the-borders-to-refugees/, accessed on 30/03/2016  
 
 
 
 
